入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場

- - 一種多元身份的知識視野

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導論

一、研究動機

在美國外交史的研究領域，最為人所批評的乃是容易淪為美國國家史組成的一部分，充滿著狹隘與美國中心主義，美國「歷史學家傾向於根據華盛頓的觀念，來重建世界，並根據美國決策者的標準、價值觀和設想來評價政策」，成為帶有國家主義史觀的歷史研究，這主要是因研究者很難跳脫美國的身份限制，他們可能因語言與文化的限制，缺乏運用多國檔案的能力，侷限於運用美國官方檔案，他們僅重視美國自身的因素，而忽略他國對美國外交政策形成的影響，視他國只是被動的接受美國外交政策，進而做出反應。外交史的研究無疑受到研究者身份的限制，而無法對歷史事件進行全方位的詮釋，儘管有研究者努力達到兩面俱呈，但仍無法全面流露出對於某國或某族群偏袒的解釋與言論，因此外交史研究往往具有為政治立場服務的知識性質。

如果說研究者的身份背景限制了外交史的客觀性與否，以致


2 王立新，〈試析全球化背景下美國外交史研究的國際化與文化轉向〉，《美國研究》，第一期，2008年，http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_mgyj.asp?id=1123&table=mgyj
於單一身份研究者可能會有立場的偏頗，那麼多重身份或多元身分的研究者，他們會如何自我定位？多重身份研究者面對祖居地（原鄉）與居住地（他鄉）的多重壓力與檢視，原鄉人質疑他們是否有背叛祖國的可能，而他鄉人則懷疑他們對祖國有所偏袒，因此他們的政治效忠中，充滿變動的因子，夾在祖裔國與居住地的雙重矛盾之間。政治效忠的問題，引發對於他們研究是否中立客觀的質疑，正如Frank H. Wu所言：「雖然他們被認爲是來自外國的東方人，亞洲移民卻被排除在亞洲問題的客觀權威之外。他們對亞洲的了解可能來自血統，但不是研究。儘管如此，他們仍被質疑為叛國者或自私自利的中間人。」不過，多重身份研究者則一貫宣稱，其多元的身份背景與語言能力，正是他們得以比單一身份研究者更客觀中立的原因，且能扮演促進彼此之間溝通的橋樑角色。究竟混血的文化身份背景，會使研究者研究外交史時更加客觀中立，抑或是仍有所偏袒？

曾經被費正清譽為「天才史學家」的日裔美籍學者入江昭（Akira Iriye），最為人所稱道的地方，就在於他外交史研究的中立客觀，費正清稱讚他能夠沒有文化成見，以超越任何特定的國家利益的角度從事歷史研究，而入江也表示自己並非採取日

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3. 石之瑜，《社會科學知識新論——文化研究立場十評》，北京：北京大學出版社，2005，頁200。
本觀點，也無美國觀點，而為純粹的歷史學者。在美國外交史學界，入江昭應是最早倡導歷史學的國際化者，也是最早倡導文化轉向的外交史研究者，透過前者追求客觀的史學研究，並藉由後者彌補現實主義史觀的狹隘。入江因而擺脫了美國外交史研究中的兩大傳統，第一，美國中心的外交史研究，第二，現實主義史觀的外交史解釋；他的作品因而有別於同在美國從事研究相關領域的同僚。

費正清認為，入江昭之所以能夠客觀且別出心裁的，以文化因素做為分析外交史的視角，與其多元的文化身份背景有關。然而混血的身份背景，真如費正清與入江所言，可以使其中立客觀，且不偏不倚的立論？混血的身份背景是入江昭開展出不同於美國外交史研究傳統的唯一因素？亦或是如同單一身份研究者可能有的偏袒傾向？日裔美籍的入江昭，也有著偏向日本或者偏向美國的核心關懷？這些都是有待進一步閱讀討論的身份政治。

本書試圖透過入江昭學術成長的大環境背景，以及學術著作內容，說明入江昭有別於美國外交史研究傳統範式的學術觀點與研究方法，所為何來？與他多元的身份背景有何關係？藉此了解多元身份的研究者，如何建構他們的學術思維內容，其論述是如
實的中立客觀亦或仍難免偏袒。

二、研究背景：文化轉向與去中心觀點的歷史研究

在美國外交史研究裡，戰爭與衝突的研究課題一直佔據核心位置，數量大大超越和平的研究，這是因為現實主義史觀一直是主導美國外交史研究的主流學術範式。現實主義史觀著重在國家安全、國家利益、國家實力、國家威望的探討上，以國家作為研究的主體。既然追逐權力與利益為其間的關鍵概念，因此國家間存在的危機、戰爭與衝突乃成為主要的研究題材：「只要國家依然是歷史研究的基本單元，歷史學家注目於研究衝突就不可避免。」

入江昭固然也涉入戰爭與衝突的課題，他是研究近代美國東亞關係史著名的學者，著重在中美日三邊關係史的探討上，但有別於現實主義史觀。入江昭在研究中美日之間的戰爭與衝突時，其主要的目的不在於證明戰爭的必然性，而在於從國際視野中發現導致戰爭與衝突的原因，並試圖化解這些原因，希冀和平的到來。入江的學生楊大慶便如此介紹他的老師：「他雖然研究國際

9 入江昭、王建華等（譯），〈歷史學的國際化〉，輯於中國美國史研究會（編），《現代史學的挑戰──美國歷史學會主席演說集 1961-1988》，上海：上海人民出版社，1990，頁 535。
10 同前註。
11 同前註。
間的偏見與衝突，但更重視各民族、各國間的共通性，以及為促進國際相互了解所做的努力，因為這是減少誤解，杜絕國際衝突的希望所在。因此入江相信戰爭並非必然，只要誤解與仇恨的根源得以消除，那麼和平的世界也會到來。

不過仇恨與敵意印象之所以累積，與過去彼此交往的歷史記憶，以及文化差異所造成的不同看待世界與對方的眼光有關，文化和成為入江昭研究中重要的分析概念。入江注意到，「選擇追求權力或強調經濟利益，取決於對文化及文化與世界的關係做出何種假設」。所以在權力秩序與經濟秩序之外，更應該關注文化秩序的研究，因為人們有著怎樣的文化概念，影響著他們追逐權力與利益的行爲。

入江昭的研究著作大致可以分為幾類：(一) 關於國際關係史的著作：這類著作又可分為兩類，一是對世界歷史的發展做通論性的介紹；一種是國際關係史的分析層次上，透過多國官方檔案資料進行專題性的研究，以多面向的視角對某一事件或情勢進行全面性的理解。在國際關係史的作品中，入江多以美國、日本、中國三者為研究對象，探討三者間在不同時期的互動關係。

12 杨大慶，〈入江昭〉，《近代中國史研究通訊》，第十五期，1993，頁56。
13 入江昭，王建華等（譯），〈歷史學的國際化〉，前引書，頁537。
14 這類通論性的歷史著作包括有：The origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific.; The cold war in Asia: a historical introduction..; Pearl Harbor and the coming of the Pacific War: a brief history with documents and essays.
15 這類專題性的歷史著作包括有：After imperialism: the search for a new order in the Far East, 1921-193.; Across the Pacific: an inner history of
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（二）關於國際關係的著作：這類著作主要探討不受疆界限制的全球性議題和發展，主張國際關係除了是一種權力關係外，也應是一種文化關係，因此應同時以權力、經濟、文化三個層面來理解國際關係，才是較全面的。

在入江昭的著作當中，不管是歷史性的抑或是國際關係層面的，可以發現存在著兩個共通點。第一、強調人類社會之間普遍性的存在，並以此追求和平的世界。入江的作品充分的展現了他樂觀與理想的性格，在完整的分析完某一戰爭或衝突後，他總相信如果雙方能持續進行文化層面的溝通交流，那麼和平秩序指日可待。他像似一個宣揚和平理念的傳教士，不斷透過著作，以一種宏觀的、訴諸全人類的、普世的眼光告訴人們，彼此之間共有普遍性的存在，他特別反對狹隘的、民族化的歷史研究，那只會讓人們更加分裂，而不是往彼此和平共存的方向邁進，畢竟「歷史是全人類的歷史，而不只是屬於人類的各個部分」，他特別倡導歷史學的國際化，以及著重非政治、非軍事的、文化轉向的外交史研究，目的就在於追求一個和平的世界。

第二，中美日始終是入江主要的研究對象。入江昭的研究範圍，雖然從早期中美日三邊關係，漸漸轉變為對亞洲與東亞的區

American-East Asian relations.; Pacific estrangement: Japanese and American expansion, 1897-1911等。

關於國際關係方面的著作有：Cultural Internationalism and World Order.; Global community: the role of international organizations in the making of the contemporary world.; Power and culture: the Japanese-American war, 1941-1945.; China and Japan in the global setting等。

入江昭、王建華等（譯），《歷史學的國際化》，前揭書，頁 534。
域範圍，最後又擴大為全球性的關懷，但都可以發現美國、日本、
中國一直都還是他主要的研究對象，只是他在不同時期，分別以
國關史、地域史與全球史的視野分析中美日。

在中美日的相關研究裡，和平世界的概念仍然充斥其中，他
認爲過去中美日之間的戰爭，多是文化上的成見所導致。例如二
戰時期，日本繼承西方中心觀點對中國的看法，認為中國是落
後，而日本是亞洲現代化最成功的國家，因此日本有義務促進中
國朝現代化邁進，方式是透過帝國主義式的侵略。可見中心觀
點的論述只會使文化分歧加大，而不會使之聚合。入江是根本反
對以中心觀點來研究歷史的，因爲中心觀點只會使特殊性增加，
進而強調某民族的優越，成爲一種民族化的歷史學，而跟入江歷
史學國際化的目標是背道而馳的，他說：

現在有一種趨勢，……即強調各國和各種文化之間的
差異，或當地社會發展過程的特殊性，人們對各種社
會、政治和思想趨勢進行比較後，常常以重申其特殊
性而告終，於是越比較世界各地的觀念和制度，就越
發現其間的差異，這種情況也許不可避免，但我覺得，
這種旨在證實地方差別、民族差別和文化差別的做
法，與歷史學國際化的目標是背道而馳的。有時我們
也許有必要使歷史學非民族化，以便使之國際化，換
言之，我們必須找到眾多民族共有的問題和反應，而
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不是侷限於人類特殊範疇的問題和反應。入江反對中心觀點與強調特殊性、優越性的歷史研究，主張去中心觀點的歷史研究，亦即史學的國際化，他以此種觀點進行中美日的研究，其實相當程度上，反應了二戰後美日學界對於西方中心觀點研究的反省風潮。

三、問題意識

身分影響立場，以致於對二戰時期的太平洋戰爭，日本思想界認為是結合亞洲其他國家與西方對抗的聖戰者，至今大有人在，美國人則認為是對抗日本島國主義擴張的戰役，而入江昭會有怎樣的答案？日裔美籍的入江昭的身分策略透露新的可能性。或許跨文化的身分背景對入江昭有利有弊，一方面是同時具備美、日的身分背景，使其能夠不帶民族主義的看待三邊關係，亦不帶有美國學界當中一直都有的西方中心觀點的問題；然而另一方面美、日的身分背景卻也成爲入江昭自身身分認同的問題，身處美國知識社群當中，入江昭的日裔背景，是否也難免形成有待處理的身份政治？或反之亦然，既然擁有美國國籍，那該如何面對有血緣紐帶關係的日本？

因此本書試圖透過入江的學術文本，及其學思歷程的大環境背景，探討日裔美籍的入江昭所採取的身份策略。首先，將透過

18 同前註。
入江昭洋所著的學術著作，整理歸納出他對世界與中國的認識；再者，從他對世界與中國的看法，分析他的身份策略。之所以探討他的世界觀，原因在於在他的文本中可以發現，對於普遍性的追求以及構築一個和平的世界，一直是他學術主張的核心關懷，而中美日又是他研究的主要對象，因此在看待中美日三方的歷史時，入江也是以和平的世界觀來加以理解的。質言之，和平的概念是其外交史研究的起點，和平的世界觀乃是本書必須處理的問題。

另外，不論從學術著作的內容，或他自己本身的活動觀察，中國之於入江，似乎都有重要的意義。從身分背景來看，日裔美籍的入江昭對於日本與美國的重視其實不令人意外，然而他對中國的興趣卻不亞於美、日。在文本中，每每有中國因素的出現，中國似乎是他和平世界裡一個不可或缺的角色。此外，其於2007年10月17日在台灣大學政治學系舉辦的口述歷史訪談中，也曾表示自己不是日本史的專家，但相對而言，他花在研讀中國史與美國史的時間反而更多。與中國沒有強烈身分背景聯繫的入江昭，對中國的興趣所為何來？中國在他和平世界的學術內容中扮演怎樣的角色？對入江自身，中國又代表著什麼意義？在美日學界對中國的認識都有著某些既定的看法下，身處在美日身份之間的入江昭，對中國的看法如何，說明了他在美日之間身份意識與身份策略的選擇，透過研究入江對美日之外的中國的認識，有助於理解文化混血身份的入江昭的身份意識與策略。

入江的學術發展歷程與他所處的學術背景，孕育了入江在學術上的位置，並說明入江試圖對話的對象。入江是屬於二戰後美
國東亞關係史，繼費正清之後新一代的學者，他受惠於美國教育交流機構，在美完成學業，並在美國執教，在學術上他提倡歷史的國際化與文化轉向的外交史研究，使其成為外交史學界重量級的學者，因此無疑應該將他放在美國外交史學界的发展脈絡當中。此外他雖然不是中國學專家，但是中國一直是他研究的對象之一，他對中國的看法也不同於多數美日學者西方中心觀點的中國觀，而相當程度反應了 1960-1970 年代，美日學術界對西方中心的中國觀的檢討風潮，因此也應把入江置於這樣的氛圍中，才能充分理解他對中國的認識。

本書以下依序從四方面探討入江昭所採取的身份策略：（一）入江昭的學思歷程與大環境背景；（二）入江昭的世界認識；（三）入江昭的中國認識；（四）入江昭的身份策略。有待釐清的問題包括，身處在美國學術圈中，入江如何開展出有別於美籍身份學者的外交史研究途徑？他對世界與中國的看法如何？這些與眾不同的觀點，與他混血的身份背景與學思歷程有何關係？入江在世界與中國認識中採取怎樣的論述策略，以達成所謂的中立客觀，以因應美日學界雙重的檢視與壓力？其宣稱的論述的中立客觀是否真的存在，亦或是隱約仍具有傾向性？
四、研究方法與架構

本書所欲探討的問題是文化混血身份的入江昭的身份策略。透過入江昭的學思歷程與學術著作，試圖找出日裔美籍且身處在美國學界的他，採取何種論述策略，有著何種身份意識。本書將借鑒後殖民研究方法與劍橋學派對於思想史研究的方法，前者主要是針對具有移民經歷或文化混血身份而身處兩種身份認同之間的，必須有意識的處理與不同社群之間的關係，亦即對出生地與移居地的雙重認同，因而採取了具有彈性或非對抗性的策略。本書採取後殖民方法，根據入江昭的學作文本，分析他如何透過文本管理自己身處在美國與日本，或與亞洲之間的位置。後者強調思想形成的內在與外在因素，除著重針對入江昭文本內所呈現的學術主張意涵分析外，也著重入江昭學術主張形成的脈絡背景，值得略做說明如下。

劍橋學派主張在分析文本時要處理的至少有二個問題：第一，文本的內容為何？第二，作者的意圖（intention）為何？就第一個問題而言，劍橋學派除了著重於文本內容中所抽譯出來的哲學觀念，試圖解釋這些哲學觀念的內在聯繫與相互關連，即「內在研究法」的精神（Internal Approach）之外，也強調以歷史

19. 「內在研究法」假定思想的自主性，而著重解釋思想內的「單位觀念」的有效性。「內在研究法」可以補足「外在研究法」的不足，因爲思想的形成並非只是時代的產物，研究對象必須受到歷史環境制約，仍有自主思考的空間，而本文從入江文本抽譯出他思想中的「單位觀念」，即「和平」的概念。參考：黃俊傑、蔡明田，〈中國政治思想史研究方法試論〉，《人文學報》，第十六期，1997，頁6-9。
研究的方法，將文本置於歷史的情境中來考察文本。因爲觀念並
非一成不變，文本自身所抽譯出的抽象哲學概念是斷裂的，且非
歷史的，只有將觀念置於當時的時空脈絡 (context) 中，才可以
對作者所欲表達的觀念有正確的理解。以劍橋學脈主要的代表人
物 Quentin Skinner 的話說，即「如果我們想要用一種真切地歷史
精神來書寫一本哲學史的話，我們需要將以下原則當成是首要任
務之一，就是我們必須將我們所研究的文本置於那個可以讓我們
理解這些作者在書寫（這些文本）時所要施行（的行為）所處的
智識脈絡（intellectual contexts）當中，」此之謂的「外在研究
法」（External Approach）。對於文本有了合宜的理解後，才
能進行第二層次的分析，探究作者的意圖是什麼，「一旦解讀出
文本的文意之後，讀者就可以知道文本的作者寫作的目的是要接
受或背書，抑或是要挑戰或反駁當時語言或意識形態脈絡中所預
言的常規或假設。」

20  Skinner, Quentin, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method. (New York:
Cambridge University Press., 2002). p. 3. 轉引自：梁裕康，〈意圖與意義—
論 Quentin Skinner 意義理論中的一些問題〉，《政治科學論叒》，第三十
三期，2007，頁 85。

21  以「內在研究法」抽譯出文本的抽象哲學概念是斷裂，而沒有時空背景的，
思想的形成是在具體的時空環境下發展，不同的時空環境都可能對思想形成
影響與轉變，因此重視脈絡背景的「外在研究法」可以補充「內在研究法」
跳離時空環境的不足。參考：黃俊傑、蔡明田，前引書，頁 1-43。

22  Skinner, Quentin, “Social Meaning and the Explanation of Social Action,” in
Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy, Politics
梁裕康，前引書，頁 86。
因此本書以下第一第二章所處理的問題，是入江昭學術發展過程中的脈絡背景，梳理出他學術轉折過程中的學術語境。由於入江昭在美國學術圈從事外交史研究，且他的主張與戰後美日對中國認識的去中心觀點反省風潮相較，兩者之間有不少相類之處，因此以下將把入江昭置於外交史學界，及戰後美日對中國認識的發展脈絡中，來理解入江昭的文本內容，進而主張入江昭的學術觀點並非無中生有，在外交史學界受到全球化與後現代主義衝擊的背景下，以及戰後美日對中國認識的一片去中心論述理念下，入江昭對普遍性的追求，和平世界的建構，及其中國的認識，都可以看出依循上述脈絡發展的痕跡。

第二章與第三章，將集中處理入江昭的學術史文本內容。由於他著作與研究的議題相當廣泛，但不難看出如何建構一個和平的世界，對對普遍性的追求，始終是他從事研究的目的。因此第二章將從他的學術文本中，梳理出和平世界的概念。此外，在他的著作中，多半是美國與東亞關係史的研究，尤其是美中日三者的歷史研究，他對中國有著與美日同等的關懷，他對亞洲也比其他區域更加重視。因此本文第三章將耙梳出他的亞洲認識與中國認識。從入江學術文本的整理中，可以知道他學術主張的意圖，在於否定戰爭與衝突不可避免的觀念，試圖透過文化的力量，建構一個和平的全球共同體，如此世界將不再因身分歧異而導致衝突，如此和平的世界將可到來，而他正同樣是以建構和平世界為目的，來看待亞洲與中國的。本書整理的範圍，乃以入江的英文著作为主要的分析對象，因為入江主要對話的對象，也是引起學界迴響最多的作品，都是英文的。
第四章在前述入江昭對世界與中國的認識基礎上，結合入江昭的學思歷程與學術語境，探討入江的身份策略，亦即在美國的學術圈中，入江如何處理或不處理自己的雙重身份，其跨文化的身分背景，對於學術主張有何密切的相關性。本章運用訪談法與比較分析法，藉助於 2007 年 10 月 17-18 日入江昭在台灣大學政治學系接受作者之口述歷史訪談，以及同在美國從事東亞事務研究的韓裔美籍學者金淳基，於 2007 年 6 月 5、7、12 日在國立台灣大學政治學系與中山大學政治學研究所接受作者之口述歷史訪談。他們有類似文化混血的身份，相互比較，探究多元身份學者的身份意識。

第五章總結入江昭具有的文化混血身份背景，如何促成他選取身份與論述策略，來同時因應美國與日本兩方面檢視的壓力。他是否只能處於尷尬的兩難處境，而被動的調整出一種能同時令美日雙方都滿意的論述策略，抑或是他試圖主動打破日裔美籍的身份限制？入江著作裡對於和平世界、全球共同體、公民社會這類普遍性概念的提倡，似乎提供了替雙重身份建立合理的生存與生活機制的可能。

最後將本文的研究方法與架構，整理如下：
著重入江學術發展脈絡的分析，或稱「外在研究法」。

研究方法

訪談法與比較分析法。

研究架構

第一章 入江昭其人及其學術語境

第二章 入江昭的世界認識—普遍性的追求及和平世界的建構

第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識

第四章 入江昭的身份策略

第五章 結論
第一章 入江昭其人及其學術語境

第一節 入江昭的生平背景

入江昭於 1934 年出生在日本東京，出生時正處於二次大戰即將爆發的時期。父親入江啓四郎（Keishira Iriye）是一位國際法教授，也曾經是一位新聞記者。1938-1941 年歐戰爆發的期間，其父被派至日內瓦與巴黎進行採訪，而年幼的入江也隨著父親在歐洲渡過三年時光。1943-1945 年又跟著父親前往中國南京待了二年，直到戰爭結束後才回到日本。

入江昭在美軍佔領日本的情況下完成了中學教育，之後於 1953 年獲得 Joseph C. Grew Foundation 的獎學金，赴美國賓西

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2 入江昭談到，他當時選擇歐洲史作爲研究對象，是因爲在 Haverford College 历史系裡只有兩位教授，一位是教美國史，另一位則是歐洲史教授，在 1950 年代的美國大學院校，很少亞洲史專長的教授。相較之下，入江認爲歐洲史比美國史要有趣的多，因此選擇 18 世紀的英國傳教士作爲其研究的題目。


除了學術上的成就外，入江昭更是個實踐者。他認爲和平世界的達成，必須靠著不斷的溝通與交流，才能使彼此更加的相互理解，而實踐可以透過兩種方式：一是透過個人的力量，特別是學者之間的交流；二是透過教育交流的方式。他嚮往的教育交流，很大一部分是來自於入江個人的成長經驗，入江表示他之所以能在美國接受教育也是得益於教育交流機制，因得益於教育交流，所以入江願意和更多的外國學生和學者交流觀點、促進理解。他認爲單一個人雖然無法對歷史發展的路徑帶來很大的改變，但身為學者可以對促進彼此理解、建立溝通網絡，作出更多貢獻。基於這樣的想法，入江即使如今已經退休，但仍然在全球各地進行演講與知識交流，藉此過程促進個人層次的文化交流的網路。

第二節 入江昭的學術語境

學界一般把入江昭歸類為二戰後美國的外交史專家，其研究領域在於美國與東亞（中日）的關係，無論是在外交史上的研究

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觀點，亦或是對於東亞認識，入江昭都有別於美國學術界的普遍看法。本節以下將分成兩部分介紹入江昭學術發展的背景，其一是二戰後美國外交史研究的發展，目的是為了找出入江昭在美國外交史學界當中的位置；其二是二戰後美國與日本對中國認識的普遍看法。入江昭雖非學科分類下的中國專家，但中國卻始終是他學術關切的重點之一，因此第二部分將試圖找出擁有日裔美籍雙重身份的他，在認識中國上所採取的學術視角，與二戰後美日對於中國的普遍認識有何相關之處。

一、二戰後的美國外交史研究：文化轉向與歷史的國際化

(一) 早期美國的外交史研究：從民族主義到現實主義

早期美國外交史研究孕育於第一次世界大戰之後，乃隨著美國逐漸成為世界強權，因此對外關係的研究大為興起，培育了第--代的外交史學者，這些學者大致受政治史的訓練出身。由於研究取向的不同，早期美國外交史研究大致可以分為兩個學派：其一是民族主義觀點；其二是進步主義觀點。

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5 在早期的外交史研究中，往往對於民族主義有高度的重視，這是根植於近代外交關係乃始於1648年威斯特法倫條約之後民族國家的出現，因此民族主義很自然的成為外交史探討的對象，且外交史常被稱為民族史、國家史的重要組成部分。各國在外交史的研究社群往往以本國立場出發，往往形成偏頗的民族主義史觀，在美國對外關係的研究社群當中，就無法避免這樣的傾向。
第一章 入江昭其人及其學術語境

民族主義史家（nationalist）歌頌一次世界大戰後美國權力的提升，以及強調美國門羅主義（Monroe Doctrine）和特殊主義（Exceptionalism）的外交政策傳統，他們着重國家層次的探討，把美國外交放在國際（通常是歐洲）的背景下來理解，且注重官方檔案研究6。相對地，進步主義史家（progressive historians）則持相反觀點，他們較少著重官方檔案以及國家層次的探討，而注重研究影響政策制定者的知識背景，以及形成外交的國內政治、經濟和區域力量。「進步主義史家看到的美國對外關係的特色，是改變而不是持續，是衝突而不是一致7」，主張外交政策形成的因素會隨著歷史環境而改變。

1930 與 1940 年代，隨著法西斯主義的興起、二次大戰的爆發、冷戰以及核武競賽的國際發展，使得美國外交史家不復以往樂觀，對外交關係的前景趨於幻滅，如此悲觀的態度孕育出了 1950-1960 年代的現實主義史家( realist historian)，其中以 George F. Kennan 和 Hans J. Morgenthau 爲代表，均將美國外交史與現實主義國際政治學相結合，建立起了以現實主義研究外交史的典範，提供了外交史學界一種從未有過的理論分析架構。類似於民

考：唐啟華，〈全球化下外交史研究的省思—最後一擊或重生契機〉，發表於中興大學歷史系主辦「全球化下的史學發展國際學術研討會」，2004 年 6 月 5 日，頁 10。


入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場--一種多元身份的知識視野

族主義史家的，是現實主義史家著重在分析國家行爲者或政策制定者如何運用權力來增進國家利益，以及著重國家安全、國家利益、權力平衡和大戰略等議題上的探討。

(二) 1960-1970年代美國外交史的研究：從現實主義到修正主義

現實主義者的分析架構，很快地成為外交史學界的主流，因為在此之前，缺乏分析框架的外交史，往往被認爲只是外交紀錄，以及官方檔案的大雜匯所拼湊出來的歷史敘述，而現實主義的分析架構彌補了外交史研究理論方面的缺憾。不過許多歷史學家也在現實主義的框架下，另外加入新的分析面向，例如入江昭的指導老師 Ernest R. May，不僅把美國外交放在國際的背景中理解，也倡導運用多國官方檔案的國際關係史（international history）研究，也有學者在現實主義框架下，加入關鍵人物的研究，以及意識形態與社會力量對於外交決策的影響等。

這些新的面向，重新燃起了1960-1970年代外交史研究對於內部因素的重視，並以 William Appleman Williams 爲首，被稱為修正主義者（revisionist）。大部分的修正主義者看到，美國是...

9  Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Ibid, pp. 3.
10 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Ibid, pp. 3-4
以多邊經濟關係造成的穩定與和平關係，來尋求世界秩序的獨特性，這樣的世界秩序反映的不只是美國經濟上的富裕，也反映了美國自由資本主義，以及自由民主的意識形態對海外的影響。

因此與進步主義史家的不同之處，在於他們除了主張經濟利益驅動政策，也主張觀念驅動政策，認為美國的觀念以及自由資本主義意識形態會對外交產生影響。例如美國領導者往往以門戶開放的原則，來進行擴張主義的行動，亦即以宣揚自由資本主義意識形態，主張各國應該門戶開放，藉此尋求外國市場，來解決美國國內的經濟與政治危機，與此同時則建立美國海外帝國。而與現實主義史家的不同，則在於其強調經濟力量對決策制定的影響，強調非國家行為者所扮演的角色，尤其是有組織的商業和金融團體、國家和社會的連結，社會結構對外交政策的影響，意識形態對美國對外關係史的重要性。

「研究取向在1960年代末至1970年代初期，逐漸增強的修正主義歷史風潮，對於形象的研究有重要的意義。」從入江昭的著作裡知道，除了國家層面的分析外，他更注重非國家行為者的作用，除了權力面向的分析外，他更強調經濟與文化的面向，尤其是對於形象的形象的研究，並以中美日三國為研究對象，

12 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
13 Frank Ninkovich 著，牛可譯，《範式失落：文化轉向和美國外交史的全球化》，《冷戰國際史研究Ⅱ》，2006，頁121。
14 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, op. cit, p4.
15 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Ibid.
因而被歸屬於修正主義派的學者。他曾以美日形象的研究為例，說明如何達到更有效理解日本歷史、美國歷史以及美日關係的目的：「達到這個目的的方法之一，就是比較兩國全球主義（globalism）、世界主義（cosmopolitanism）、民族主義（nationalism）、特殊主義（particularism）和地方主義（provincialism）的演變，而不應把美日形象當作是一種抽象的龐大的整體，我們必須觀察各個層次的意識及其根源，美日關係畢竟是個別的日本人、美國人以及日裔美國人之間相互作用的結果，這些人可能對於全球策略有所關心，有着世界層次上的關注，也可能有著務實的民族利益，個人的偏見和特徵，或完全的忽略與漠不關心。」

(三) 1970-1980 年代美國外交史的研究：後修正主義與文化轉向

修正主義者忽略正統國家安全因素，以及他國對美國外交的影響，招來許多的批判，對此在 1970 年代以 John Lewis Gaddis 爲代表的一些後修正主義者（postrevisionist），試著以偏向現實主義的觀點來取代修正主義，再次回到強調國家行爲者與決策精

17 王立新，〈一個文化國際主義者的學術追求與現實關懷：入江昭與美國的國際關係史研究〉，《美國政治與法律網》，2006 年 4 月 14 日。 

第一章 入江昭其人及其學術語境

英、戰略與地緣政治因素、國家安全、國家利益與權力平衡的研究重心，後修正主義者再次主張，在美國外交政策中，地緣政治的考量是超越內部因素的。後修正主義者將現實主義史觀發揚為美國外交史研究中的主導地位。

時至1970年代末期，史學界出現了諸多其他新的發展，尤其是法國年鑑學派（annual school）所倡導的社會文化史研究，對史學界造成全面性的衝擊，而外交史研究也不例外。長期停留在現實主義的研究框架之外的外交史研究，似乎在新的史學研究趨勢中，被遠遠拋在腦後，成為一種過時而沒有新意的史學研究。哈佛大學國際關係史教授Charles Maier就曾批評到：「缺乏研究轉變的潮流，也沒有公認的大師，缺乏學術界尖端的集體事業感，絕對不在歷史學發展的先鋒領域之列，各大學及教育機構之中，外交史已成為養子，有天份前景的研究生被社會史有趣的方法吸引。」

不過對於社會文化因素的重視，造成外交史研究的一大衝擊，但也是大轉機。衝擊在於更多的研究者對外交史興趣缺缺。19

19 Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, op. cit, p5.
20 加迪斯在他的著作中，不時地用運肯南的觀念，作爲檢驗的標準，在某種程度上仍保有民族主義的氣息，同時後修正主義的其他學者，則被更多專題研究的繁重任務，他們的研究確保了現實主義史觀繼續在外交史領域內保持領導地位。參考：Frank Ninkovich, 前引書，頁124。
缺，轉投社會文化史研究；轉機在於促成反思，開始出現由下而上的歷史書寫來重建外交史，意即從社會結構與文化結構的面向來分析美國對外關係，不再堅持原本居於主流的現實主義觀點。

入江昭正是文化轉向後的外交史研究先驅之一，在他將國際關係定位為一種文化之間的關係後，有越來越多的史學家轉向以文化觀點來詮釋外交史。入江昭認爲，應該將焦點擺在廣義的文化領域，擴及非官方、非政治的問題，而其對文化的定義是：「記憶、意識形態、生活型態的傳達與產物，和一種符號或標誌，例如藝術作品、電影書籍」。這種廣義的文化領域研究，很自然必須包含社會結構與文化結構的分析，在研究對外關係時不再只是單純從利益估算的角度來探討國與國的關係，而是從更深層的國家內部的社會文化習性與需要，深入探討一國人民之所以會形成對他國印象的根源，由此形成文化關係與外交關係之間的連結。的確，入江的作品就向來著重大眾的形象觀念與不同國家彼此的誤解，他尤其對於不同國家的人民如何發展出對彼此的刻版印象，進而導致歧視和忽略，特別感興趣。亦即認爲對誤解的研究與化解是國際關係史的重要課題。如此一來，文化轉向的外交史研究，便不再受制於政治、經濟的物質性議程，而是強調個人、大眾、種族、女性等價值或態度有關議題的開展，這相當一部分是受到後現代主義史學的影響。

入江的學生 Frank Ninkovich，認為入江倡導的「文化轉向，所預示的不僅是一個新的範式霸權的爭奪者，它還標誌著範式思

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Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, op. cit, p. 7.
維的終結。實際上一致的共識是不可能達成的，因為老框架的沒落，已經使得所謂融合範式的想法成爲空談之談，更甚者因爲全球化的效應，加劇了各種框架難以融通的情況。」意味文化轉向的外交史研究，除了開脫出一條不同於現實主義觀點的道路之外，也宣告傳統一貫的學術思維時代的結束，而這也是爲了因應傳統外交史研究所無法解释，在1980年代全球化興起後形成的諸多複雜面向的窘境，尤其是全球化對於民族國家與國家主權的衝擊，已嚴重影響到傳統外交史研究中的現實主義典範。」「全球化結果，可能是使世界變得更加一致，但正是這種同質性，迫切地需要解釋的複雜性，現實主義典範無法解釋全球化下的諸多現象。因此「在一個以一種範式抑或兩種對立範式為基礎的教條化學科共識的框架內，全球化是得不到解釋的。」一言以蔽之「全球化是反範式的。」文化轉向並非以文化來替代傳統的權力觀點，而是在過度強調權力觀點的傳統外交史研究中，文化層面長期被忽視，而這些層面可以解釋權力觀點所無法解釋的議題，因此「文化並不足以成爲一個可以用來替代任何其他範式的獨立範式」，文化轉向的外交史研究強調的多元性與反範式，使其能因應全球化下的衝擊，開拓出一條完全不同於權力觀點的道路。

23 Frank Ninkovich，前引書，頁133。此處「範式」為譯者用語，意即「典範」，原文為 paradigm。
24 Frank Ninkovich 著，同前註，頁136。
25 Frank Ninkovich，同前註。
26 Frank Ninkovich，同前註。
27 Frank Ninkovich，同前註，頁135。
全球化不僅是反範式，同時也是反國家中心論述，因爲一旦全世界人民在概念上可以跨越疆界而相互連結，便沒有任何國家或地域是可以自我分離於世界之外，則每個國家史都應該視為是全球歷史的一部分來理解。相對於傳統外交史研究總是採用單一國家檔案來建構國家史，故往往具有國家中心主義或民族主義史觀，入江昭則大力提倡歷史的國際化，倡導運用多國檔案進行專題性的研究，他自己則以美國、中國與日本三者作爲研究的對象，其後又將層次拉高到跨國史的研究，以不受疆界限制的全球性議題和發展爲研究對象，不限制特定國家或特定區域。與入江一樣立場的還有 Michael J. Hogan，認爲「要確保外交史在史學研究的地位，必須朝一些新方向努力，跳脫美國中心論述的限制，更努力地尋求全球國際化。」在全球化下，傳統外交史朝向全球史與跨國史的發展已是必然趨勢。

二、二戰後美國與日本對中國的認識：去中心的中國認識

入江具體指出過去的學術場域存在西方中心觀：「在過去，歐洲人與美國人是所謂的領導者，他們是學術上的精英，也發展出他們自己歷史學、社會學、人類學的規則，並分傳播到世界

各地，中國、日本以及其他地區，也都學習這種方式，過去的學術很大程度是西方取向的。在東方研究上也不例外，西方人也是以西方中心觀點的有色眼鏡，在看待東方、中國與日本。不過，即使是非西方國家，也都承襲了西方學術的道統，來彼此看待，例如身處亞洲的日本，就曾經一度以西方的眼光，來看待同樣身處亞洲的中國，此中偏狹的中心觀點的方法論，直到二戰後的1960-70年代才出現反省的聲音。

(一) 美日偏狹的中國認識

1. 美國對中國的認識——進步的西方，落後的亞洲

「美國和中國的交往歷史，很好地說明了美國人是如何因其自身獨特的歷史經驗和視角而去忽視世界的多樣性，他們還狂熱地試圖改變那些和我們不同的文化，以便我們所熟悉和控制。」這是Michael Hunt所點出美國知識界對中國認識貫有的美國中心觀點。美國中心觀點並非獨自形成，其淵源來自於一派相承的歐洲歷史文化所形成的西方中心觀點。正如Edward W. Said在《東方主義》一書中所說的：「歐洲人的想像，被作爲在

與任何非歐民族文化進行比較時的權威標準。此外還有一種歐洲人對東方的想像的霸權，他們自己反覆申明，先進的歐洲人相對於落後的亞洲人具有無比的優越性。」因此落後的亞洲與停滯的中國是西方對東方的主要印象。

美國知識界也承襲歐洲學術的脈絡，以西方中心觀點對東方與中國進行考察，最顯著的例子為，1950-60年代建立現代中國學研究的John King Fairbank（費正清）的「衝擊—反應」模式。此種模式認為「西方資本主義社會是一個動態的近代社會，而中國社會是一個長期處於停滯狀態的傳統社會，其缺乏自身發展的內在動力，只有經過西方的衝擊，中國傳統社會才有可能擺脫困境獲得發展。」在包括費正清在內的許多中國通眼中看來，中國社會缺乏內在動力，需要一個外來的力量加以推動，而西方正擔負起這樣的任務，只有接受西方的衝擊，中國才能獲得發展，朝向近代化邁進，這無疑是一種從西方角度出發的西方中心觀點。

32 例如：明恩溥（Arthur H. Smith）《中國的性格》、盧公明（Doolittle, Justus）《中國人的社會生活》。其中著作中的中國都受到外部衝擊下破敗的中國形象，他們貶抑中國的落後，並以西方的標準來改寫中國。參考：侯且岸，同前註，頁344。
33 「雖然費正清主觀上對理論抱有戒心，但他的研究在客觀上，又不可避免地反映出一種獨特的模式和架構，這就是人們所熟悉的衝擊—反應模式。費氏的近現代中國研究，實際上貫穿了這一模式。」參考：侯且岸，同前註，頁258-259。
34 侯且岸，同前註，頁259。
心觀點。這種以西方為中心的模式，在美國現代中國學界一直佔有統治地位。

2. 日本對中國的認識—進步的日本，落後的中國

明治維新以前，日本知識界對中國的態度是崇敬的，當時的中國是亞洲最強盛與文明的大國，對於鄰近的日本而言，中國當然是模仿與崇敬的對象。不過這種崇敬的形象，在西方以武力侵略中國後逐步瓦解，同時鎖國的日本也強行被美國打開大門，如何維持國家的生存成爲日本當時最重要的問題。

進步的西方以及落後的亞洲的西方中心概念，在西方打敗中國及日本後似乎更加獲得印證。日本本身為亞洲的一份子似乎同樣也遭東方專制主義所詛咒，日本爲了能加入西方，自需擺脫落後的中國，以朝向進步的西方邁進，成爲文明國家的一份子。在此基礎上的脫亞入歐論應運而生，成爲福澤諭吉《文明論之概略》的主要動機，後來的討論轉而要以日本取代中國，佔據東亞新文明的核心位置，而所謂的新文明就是以日本爲代表的近代歐洲的文明。比如德富蘇峰提出「日本擴張論」，積極主張日本對中國開戰，而其理論基礎正是要將文明的精神注入野蠻的社會中，這種以文明作爲包裝帝國主義行動的論述，隨著日本國力的日漸發展而成爲主流路線，也成爲日本發動大東亞戰爭的理論基礎

35 侯岳良，同前註，頁259－273-274。
36 子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，《東亞儒學：批判與方法》，台北：台大出版中心，2004，頁166。
37 陳建廷、石之瑜著，《中日合群？日本知識界論争「中國崛起」的近代源流》，
——身為進步文明的改革者，日本有義務改造落後文明的中國。總的來說，明治維新以後，日本的中國認識是透過「移植歐洲形成的東方觀，原封不動的轉成日本建構的亞洲觀」，將進步的西方與落後的亞洲的相對關係，轉為進步的日本與落後的中國的關係，以西方中心觀點為判斷標準，透過貶抑中國來顯示自身是進步文明的國家，乃是屬於西方的範疇。

(二) 二戰後美日中國認識的反省：去中心的中國認識

1. 美國中國認識的反省

60年代中期至70年代的越戰期間，整個美國學術界產生思想上的動盪，在美國中國學界也產生一股左翼批判的思潮，美國新一代的中國研究學者開始批判具有西方中心觀點的中國研究。
他們主張建立新的亞洲觀與中國觀，透過相互學習與交流，解決人類的基本問題，寄望在不帶有種族偏見的觀點下，亞洲與中國研究可以解決美國自身的問題，因爲許多問題是全人類的共同問題。

關於去中心觀點的中國研究，在1968年時哈佛大學的Benjamin I. Schwartz教授有較為前沿的思考，他以研究中國古代思想著名，主張超越時代，使東西先哲們進行對話，他強調包括中國古代先哲在內的人類先知文明起源的同步性，反對所謂的西方中心觀點。在經過1978年Edward W. Said東方主義的強烈批判後，西方中心觀點的學術研究更加受到學界的反省，不管...
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場 -- 一種多元身份的知識視野

是在史學、社會科學、文化研究等各方面，都興起了一股需要重新認識東方的思維。

東方主義的批判引起了 80 年代 Paul A. Cohen 的重視，並成為其中國中心觀的理論支點 43，Cohen 認為東方主義「所專門探討的這種思想支配現象」東方學領域。它是一批自稱為東方學家的西方人，創造出的一整套知識，集中研究的是西方人發明的被稱之為東方的現象 44。」就此，針對中國研究中西方中心觀點的思想支配現象，Cohen 提出了更系統性的批評，他認為「研究中國歷史，特別是研究西方衝擊之後中國歷史的美國學者，最嚴重的問題一直是由於種族中心主義造成的歪曲 45」。如何擺脫這種歪曲，建立一種非西方中心的角度來看中國歷史？Cohen 主張以「中國中心取向」來看待中國歷史，其主要特徵是將中國問題置於中國歷史環境中來研究，且評價與衡量的標準是中國，而不是西方 46，此外展開中國區域與地方歷史的研究，並推動下層社會歷史的撰寫，同時運用史學之外的學科理論方法，將其與歷史分析相結合 47。

「中國中心取向」對於西方中心觀點作出了修正，然而更深層的意涵，是否定了歷史現象可以用一個共通的理論框架來分

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43 侯且岸，前引書，頁 330。
44  Paul A. Cohen，林同奇譯，前引書，頁 194。
45  Paul A. Cohen，同前註，頁 1。
46  Paul A. Cohen，同前註，頁 197-198。
47  Paul A. Cohen，同前註，頁 230。
析，轉而鼓勵根據社會與文化的不同特性單獨設計，亦即將歷史的現象置於歷史的情境中去理解。故「中國」問題應該置於「中國」環境中來理解，同樣地也可將中國置換成日本、美國等，因此「中國中心取向」意涵著一種去中心的論述。

2. 日本中國認識的反省

二戰後，日本對於侵略中國展開反省與檢討，戰前將落後中國與先進日本對比的中國認識成爲眾矢之的。竹內好率先試圖打破西方中心觀點的判斷標準，透過中國抵抗西方的能力，來批判日本知識界盲目學習西方，他提出「作爲方法的亞細亞」，亦即將亞洲視爲方法與理念，盡量避免亞洲的實體化。簡單來說亦即「從亞洲出發，對歐洲近代的觀念的滲透作批判性的反思，邁向真正的普遍精神。」

相較於竹內好將亞洲未來的希望，寄託於以中國為模範的抵抗方法上，溝口雄三提出「作爲方法的中國」，認為研究中國的目的不能侷限於中國，應把中國視為一種方法來觀察世界。過往的中國學研究是「以世界為方法、以中國為目的」，亦即「中國是在世界這個基準下受到計量，……在目前世界史的普遍法則

48 林同奇，《「中國中心觀」：特點、思潮、與内在張力》，《在中國發現歷史——中國中心觀在美國的興起》，1991，頁 6。
49 孫歌，《亞洲意味著什麼——文化圈的「日本」》，台北：巨流，2001，頁 56。
50 陳建廷、石之瑜著，前引書，頁 171。
下，這個世界就是歐洲\textsuperscript{51}，而溝口所主張的「以中國為方法、以世界為目的」的世界，並非西方的世界，而是「那種把中國視為構成要素之一（換言之也把歐洲視為構成要素之一）的多元世界\textsuperscript{52}」。「以中國為方法」並非以中國的基準取代過去西方的基準，而是從中國來看中國，擺脫以日本的或歐洲的需要去測量中國，中國研究的目的不在中國自身或中國內部的中國學，而是透過「施以相對化的多元性原理之上，試圖進一步地創出更高層次的世界相\textsuperscript{53}」，因此「根據中國和亞洲來計量歐洲亦可，反之亦然\textsuperscript{54}」。

子安宣邦提出的「作為方法的東亞」與竹內好、溝口雄三的邏輯雖有不同，但精神一致，在他看來「『實體的東亞』是日本帝國在尋求有機性的東亞一統論時所捏造而成的，這樣的『東亞』僅僅是『中國帝國』或者『日本帝國』的替身而已\textsuperscript{55}」，而子安提出「方法的東亞」是相對於實體東亞，是具有批判性與多元性的方法論。子安宣邦所要強調的與竹內好、溝口相同，都是主張從某種主體的視野進行思考，而非臨摹西方的角度。東亞對子安而言，除了是方法概念外，也是一種文化概念。所謂文化概念的東亞是與一元性的中華主義文明論相對化的地域概念，它既植

\textsuperscript{51} 溝口雄三著，林佑崇譯，《做為「方法」的中國》，台北：國立編譯館，1999，頁106。
\textsuperscript{52} 溝口雄三著，林佑崇譯，同前註。
\textsuperscript{53} 溝口雄三著，林佑崇譯，同前註，頁107。
\textsuperscript{54} 溝口雄三著，林佑崇譯，同前註，頁108。
\textsuperscript{55} 子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，前引書，頁18。
基於，起源於中國文明廣大地域的共同性之上，一邊追求地域內多元文化發展的概念，因此中國文明雖然重要，但不是唯一，中國文明是東亞文化圈的一環而已。文化概念的東亞是一個關係框架，「在這一地域生活的人，可以進行多種多層的交流。它也是一種途徑，把『東亞細亞』當作廣義上的文化相通之地域概念來考慮，並根據這一概念的廣域性，把自國、自民族中心主義相對化，同時也把這個概念塑造成經濟、文化、生活領域中，在空間上能夠進行多層多重交流的關係框架」。

(三) 入江昭認識中國的學術視角

二戰後美、日學界對於中國認識的反省，目的都在於破除西方中心觀點的論述，以去中心觀點的論述，追求真正的普遍性。這反映的是 50 年代末至 60 年代初興起的反西方中心論的思潮。英國史家 Geoffrey Barraclough 認為這種趨勢是由於二戰後世界情勢的急劇轉變，尤其是去殖民化運動的推展，使得第三世界在國際政治中之重要性逐漸增加。學者意識到學術研究中存在西方中心觀點，並努力追求去中心的研究觀點，因爲中心觀點的論述「只會更加片面，更加陳舊，它們都不能充分去取代全球的普遍觀點」，因此去中心觀點的論述是理解多元化世界的適當的

56 子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，同前註，頁 157。
57 子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，同前註，頁 158。
58 侯且岸，前引書，頁 326。Geoffrey Barraclough，楊豫譯，《當代史學主要趨勢》，上海：上海譯文出版社，1987，頁 148。
59 侯且岸，同前註，頁 340。Geoffrey Barraclough，楊豫譯，同前註，頁 149。
途徑，「推進當代歷史研究不僅在於集中批判歐中心論，而且還必須在其他方面付出同樣巨大的努力，去克服民族和種族的侷限性，必須拋棄中心和邊緣的概念，不論這個中心是位於歐洲，還是位於中國60。」

嚴格的學科分工意義上，入江昭不屬於中國學的研究領域，不過在他的研究中，中國始終是他學術探討的主要對象之一，入江的學術生涯始於1964年，刻正是去西方中心論述風潮的開始，萌芽與發展的時期，而從他的學術著作中，可以看出他看待中國的視角，正反映了戰後美日學界追求去中心觀點的思潮。

1. 去中心觀點的學術研究

入江去中心觀點的論述，表現在宏觀與微觀兼具的歷史研究上。入江所謂宏觀上的歷史研究，是把研究對象置於當時代的時空環境背景下去理解，意即全球史的研究角度，同時注重更廣泛地的集體力量的競合關係，例如在探討二戰時的中美日三邊關係時，入江特別在意美國國際主義、日本帝國主義、中國民族主義之間的相互作用。入江說：「一個對決策制定有興趣的人，會對於珍珠港事變中特定的決策感興趣，意即為什麼某些政策被制定？被誰制定？為了達成什麼目的？我不能夠忽略這些，但是我對更廣的問題感興趣，例如日本的帝國主義，日本與美國當時的意識形態，以及與決策制定者之間的特殊連結關係等這類的問

60 倪且華，同前註。Geoffrey Barraclough，楊豫譯，同前註，頁162。
第一章 入江昭的入江昭其人及其學術語境

題。而微觀的歷史研究與 Cohen 強調的「內部取向」的中國研究概念上是相同的，入江稱之為地方化（localized）途徑或去中心化（decentered）途徑，意即由國家內部的社會、政治、文化背景脈絡，來理解一國的問題，及其與他國的互動的方法，因此著重國家內部因素的社會文化史研究，就顯得重要。

入江自己也意識到，過去西方中心觀點主宰史學界的現象，他說：

對許多人而言，現代歷史是一部西方的歷史，西方如何崛起，如何發展成富有強大的西方等等，以及西方如何統治世界，試著去影響其他國家，也就是西方的世紀，歐美的世紀，那是非常實際的。我認為社會史、族別史以及全球化的發展，帶來一個很重要的結果，

62 正如林同奇對於柯文「中國中心取向」的評介：「從表層上看柯文的批判锋芒是指向西方中心論，但是其實質是指向所有肯定歷史現象具有重複性或共性的理論框架。」因此即使柯文倡導「中國中心取向」，但並不是以「中國中心」取代「西方中心」的意涵，而是主張去除中心觀點的論述，透過「內部取向」的研究方法來達成去中心觀點。這種「內部取向」的研究指的是「離開外在的，往往是『殖民地歷史的』看法，而轉向更加內在的取向，其特點是力圖對任何特定的、非西方社會的歷史，從自身的角度出發，通過自身的觀點加以認識，而不是把它當成西方歷史之實際或理論上的延續。」這與入江「地方化的」或「去中心的」外交史研究概念上是相同的。参考：林同奇，前引書，頁6；Paul A. Cohen，前引書，頁7。
就是促使歐洲中心觀點的轉變，……它（歷史）已經被全球化了，所以它包含整個地球，超越了上層的領導階層，也向下深入社會階層，我認為那就是我們現在的位置，我在其中只是一個微小的歷史學家，我只是世界上好幾千個歷史學家的其中之一，但是我試著思考更廣泛、更深入的國際關係史研究。

關於去西方中心觀點的學術研究，入江認為宏觀與微觀兼具的歷史研究，能夠避免中心觀點論述的偏頗，並促使其轉變，因此一直以來，入江都此種方式進行研究，包括他對中國的認識上也是如此的。

2. 國際關係是文化關係

入江昭將國際關係定義為一種文化關係，藉此連結國內與世界的發展，在入江看來，「國家是一個文化結構，而它只有在世界也以文化的形式被概念化才可以與其連結」，因此國家、國際關係、世界都被入江視為是一種文化關係，則中國是文化的中國，國際關係是文化的國際關係，世界秩序是一種文化的秩序。因此對入江來說，中國是文化意義的大國，中國將發揮其文化上的力量，共同促成亞洲地區地域共同體的形成，即亞洲共同體的

65 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p.182.
形成（Asia Community）66，這類亞洲共同體的概念顯然是文化意義上的亞洲共同體，也許入江並無特別強調此類共同體概念的實體性與否，但與子安宜邦倡導的文化意義的東亞，在概念上已有相通之處。

入江昭對中國認識的觀點，與二戰後美日學界興起的去中心觀點的中國認識相比，其間有諸多類似之處，甚至可以相互作爲知識聯盟。不過關於去中心觀點的開展，彼此所需經歷的過程卻不盡相同。可以想見，美國學界要推翻自身早期建立的那種以西方中心觀點出發認識中國的學術正統，要付出多大的努力與更多地小心翼翼？因爲研究者不可避免受限於特定的思想框架，稍有不慎，「這些思想框架就將大大地限制研究者的認識視野，美國人尤其帶有種族偏見色彩的思想框架，這些具有先人之見的框架，都對科學的中國研究產生了消極的影響」67。

日本學界在開展去西方中心論述的過程中，一直都有抗拒實體性的傾向，不管是竹內好、溝口雄三，抑或是子安宜邦，對於去西方中心論述觀點的開展，都是刻苦鉅心地在爲日本作出自我定位，尤其是爲了要避免重蹈帝國主義覆轍而排斥實體性主張。然而，入江昭並無此警覺，故雖然入江昭與戰後美日中國認識的去西方中心論述的觀點可以爲聯盟，但入江昭的去中心論述卻似乎是渾然天成，他似乎沒有戰後美國學者刻意擺脫西方中心的動機，而是主張美中日的相互認識，他也沒有日本學者迫切地擺脫

66 參看本文第三章部分。
67 侯且岸，前引書，頁 331。
西方壓力的需要，或迴避亞洲實體的政治敏感度，而是很自然地，沒有掙扎地就開展出去中心論述的觀點，這泰半與他跨國性的身分背景及順利的生涯經歷相關。

第三節 入江昭的學術發展及其著作介紹

學術上，入江昭是一位外交史學家，繼費正清之後，居於美國東亞關係研究中的第二代，他的學術興趣在於探討近代太平洋國家間的外交史，尤其著重美國、日本、中國三方在二戰前後的歷史。他別出心裁的地方，是以更廣泛的國際體系的架構，以及更深層的社會文化背景，來分析三方政策背後所隱含的形象（image）與刻板印象（stereotype），並從美、中、日三方彼此的觀感、形象與意識形態來說明三方之間的關係，以及戰爭爆發的原因。因此入江昭的外交史研究，不再單單侷限於政府層次，或主要為估算權力的現實主義分析框架，而是以文化的概念作爲切入的視角以及學術關懷的重點。儘管在入江早期的著作中，就已經透露了他對文化因素的關心，但此種文化取向的外交史研究，一直要到1990年代入江才正式提出，期間入江的學術發展也經歷過幾個主要的轉折時期，大致可以分成三個階段：

一、學術生涯初期（1960年代初期）——傳統國際關係史的研究途徑

大學時期的入江昭研讀的是歐洲史，他對東亞歷史的研究是在哈佛大學求學期間才真正開始，師承歐 Ernest R. May，並接受 Fairbank 以及 Edwin O. Reischauer 的指導，他對中國史的研究以及論文題目的選擇，都受到 Fairbank 很大的影響。《帝國主義之後：對遠東新秩序的追求，1921-1931》就是入江運用美國、中國、日本與蘇聯的官方檔案，所完成的探討1920年代東亞秩序的建立與崩壞的著作，也代表著他正是踏入美國歷史學界。在該書中，入江認為，一戰後列強透過條約與結盟方式，維持遠東均勢的帝國主義式的舊秩序已經崩壞，列強都各自尋求一種符合本國利益的新秩序，由於美日中蘇四方對於遠東新秩序的見解不同，最終導致彼此的衝突，亦即1930年代的遠東的政治危機。
以及九一八事變的爆發。此一階段，入江多少也以權力的觀點來分析各國所提出的遠東新秩序方案，認為正是因為各國都希望建立一個和平的遠東新秩序，但又都想最大程度擴大自身的利益，才使新秩序難以建立。這部著作還看不出入江對於文化因素的特別重視，也仍是著重傳統國家間互動交往的國際關係史研究，而將焦點集中在美中日三方上71，但他以多國官方檔案，試圖拼湊出當時的國際體系架構（華盛體系），以較廣域的視野分析各個行爲者，與一般的外交史研究僅著重特定主題的探討仍然有別。「這本書在某種程度上，成爲我當時的研究途徑，意即藉由討論不同民族、國家聚集在一起，試著建立某種秩序，以及該秩序如何崩壞的方式，來討論國際事務，例如一個東亞秩序、一個亞太秩序，或某種秩序72。」


71 入江表示，一開始他將焦點放在中國、日本以及美國的互動關係上，他深深為此著迷，所有他的專題研究，都是以官方檔案為基礎，來處理中美日、東亞、亞太區域的研究。參考：http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/RAEC/act/interviewJ+Iriye+1-2.doc

72 同前註。
二、學術生涯中期（1960年代末-1970年代）
——加入社會文化因素的分析

1967年入江出版的《跨越太平洋：一個美國與東亞關係的內部歷史》，此書主要探討的不是政府層次的交往，而是美國、中國以及日本三方的決策者，以及大眾對彼此相互印象的認知與形成，意即美國人、中國人、日本人是如何認識世界以及如何看待彼此。在序中，入江表示美國與東亞關係總是呈現簡單化、情緒主義以及教條主義的趨勢，「情緒偏見以及情感的理論化，已經影響了中國、日本以及美國面對彼此時的心態，因爲這樣的理由，必須要做一個誠實的嘗試，去看透表面，研究誤解、錯誤觀點以及錯估的事實。」

此種加入文化社會因素的國際關係史研究，有別於《帝國主義之後》以國家為行爲者的分析，入江認為這是受到1960年代史學界興起的社會文化史觀所影響。1960年代國際秩序的混亂，使得許多社會與文化議題都獲得學者的重視，在史學界也興起了社會文化史的研究，「對於此種社會轉變，許多美國與歐洲的歷史學者，認爲着重在政治與外交事務的討論已經不夠，研究女性、性別、種族的歷史已變得非成重要，⋯⋯各種社會與文化議題被1960-1970年代的史學家所提出，當時外交史研究顯得相當

73 Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: an inner history of American-East Asian relations, op. cit, p. xvi.
74 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
過時陳舊，因為傳統外交史僅著重在政府以及他們的互動。」入江說：「注入社會與文化因素的外交史研究，開始影響著我們研究的方式，對我來說，當時我並未意識到，我開始寫關於相互形象以及觀點的作品，其實是 1960 年代的產物。」所以入江認為，自己文化轉向的外交史研究是受到 1960 年代全世界對於社會文化因素重視的影響。

他表示：「……有一段時期，我指的是 1960-1970 年代，我對區域秩序感到非常有興趣，如同我說的華會體系以及它的崩壞，但我也對於彼此相互的觀點感到興趣。」「……在那時，我的興趣在於超越外交政策、決策，以及直接的外交事務，我的興趣也在於形象如何出現，形象不只是被政策決定者所塑造，也被其餘的人們、學者以及知識份子、大眾媒體等所塑造，我感覺到情緒反應、誤解、缺乏溝通，這些事情經常在國際事務中發生。」

1972 年出版的《太平洋上的對峙：日本和美國的擴張，1897-1911》，是入江再次以美日對彼此的形象作為分析重點的作品，入江著重探討為何美日兩國在 1920 世紀之交，由過去友好的印象轉為敵對。他認為當時美日兩國外交的主軸是向外擴張，日本一方面向西朝著中國大陸擴張，注重對朝鮮的控制，另

76 同前註。
78 同前註。
一方面則透過移民與貿易向美國擴張。就後者而言，美國的形象本來是個提供工作機會與自由的土地。然而，美國人卻懼怕日本過度的移民，黃禍論因而大行其道。1905年美國移民法中的排日條款，改變了日本人對美國過於理想的印象，因此日本逐漸朝著另一條路線—中國去擴張。不過此時美國在華商業利益增加，加上美國人對國際主義的強調，認爲有協助中國朝向現代化民主國家轉型的使命，因此美日之間在中國的緊張態勢逐漸形成。由此可以知道雙方彼此的認知相互交織影響，並關係著區域的穩定性。

1981年，在《權力與文化：日美戰爭，1941-1945》這本書中，入江繼續嘗試以文化因素分析太平洋戰爭，認為此戰役不僅是美日兩國權力估算的結果，更重要的是因為美日對於新秩序見解不同，導致戰爭的爆發。在戰爭爆發前夕，美國相信仍可以回到20年代美日合作的和平與穩定的國際秩序，日本方面卻不同意此種看法，追求泛亞主義，結合亞洲國家共同發展，乃是日本此時追求的目標。入江認為這種主張在日本被大肆宣傳成反對西方的帝國主義，使得美國人以為日本最終是要結束西方人在東方的一切利益，致使美國採取更激烈的手段，而這又更加刺激了日本反西方帝國主義的高漲。入江獨有新意的認為，其實泛亞主義的主張並不意味着拋棄西方文明，因爲日本本身已經部份地

西方化，它只是想使「歐洲化的亞洲，再度亞洲化」80。

基於美日對於新秩序看法的分歧，雙方賦予太平洋戰爭的意義也因而不同。日本控制中國，象徵著擺脫西方取向，並與亞洲結成共同命運。這時，只有控制中國，日本人才能夠贏得與西方國家的戰爭，並建立一個全新的反西方的社會，可見中日戰爭乃是日美戰爭的一部分81。美國則認為，亞洲應當是西方國家活動的場域，為了避免亞洲淪為日本泛亞秩序的控制，美國促成中國與西方民主國家的合作，協助中國抵抗日本的侵略行82。

從1960-70年代入江的作品中，文化因素逐漸成為入江分析國際關係史的角度，不僅分析了決策者，也更深入地探討學者、記者、作家以及大眾的看法，運用官方檔案以及通俗作品，完整的鋪陳出事件發生的社會背景。在此之上，探討彼此觀感對於國際秩序的影響，如此便有別於前此著重權力、國家以及官方檔案的傳統國際關係史研究。

三、學術生涯晚期 (1980 年代- )——從全球史到跨國史研究

1980 年代開始，入江在學術上的研究再次出現轉折，文化與社會因素仍是其間主要的分析的角度，但是研究主題的範圍則大為擴大。他談到從 1980 年代開始，他對某些更廣泛的圖像感到興趣，從那時起，他的著作不再侷限於某一區域焦點，不再著重在東亞或太平洋，而是更注重全球的議題。他說：「……這可能是因為全球化的因素，我們可以談論一下全球化，這個詞彙出現在 1980 年代，因爲經濟全球化，全球的資訊、科技、網路，以及所有全球的連結，我認為今天許多人們共享著一種全世界相互連結在一起的感覺，沒有一個區域是完全地分離於其他世界而存在。」而「……近來歷史學家，已經追上了這個趨勢，許多歷史學家開始認爲，如果他們專注於某一國家或區域，應該要把它們視為世界的一部分，以及世界歷史的一部分。」

入江指的是全球史 (Global History) 的研究逐漸受到重視，不同於世界史 (World History)，全球史研究的是跨越國家疆界的研究。
界的互動連結，例如移民、工業化、城市化等這些全球的現象，研究一國的歷史應該將其放在全球發展的趨勢當中來理解，當作是全球史的一部分，所以「全球史是一個了解現代歷史很好的方式，把中國歷史放進某種脈絡中來理解，所以我們可以說中國歷史、日本歷史、國別史都是全球歷史發展的一部分」。

1992年出版的《全球背景下的中國與日本》就是這種全球史研究的作品，在此書中，入江將中日的關係放在全球發展的脈絡當中來理解，中日無法脫離全球而存在，因此國際社群的發展深深地影響著中日兩國的關係，同樣地兩者之間的關係也對國際社群有所影響，這類似於國際關係體系理論的方法，意即國際結構影響著個別國家的行爲，較為不同的是，除強調國際因素外，入江也強調國內因素的作用。


同前註。

作出貢獻，這些體系或秩序都被視為經由國家所建立，無論是帝國主義或後帝國主義時期皆是如此，然而大約在我學術生涯的最後二十年，我對跨越疆界的個人和群體的互動深感興趣，不只是國家間正式的關係，這些非國家互動的總合，我稱之為跨國歷史。」跨國史研究是近幾年才興起的史學研究趨勢，「就如同全球史在觀念上與世界史有所區別，跨國史也與全球史有所不同，它處理的主題可能不必然是全球的，但仍然是跨越國家的，例如區域共同體、區域間的移民、疾病以及環境問題」。

《文化國際主義與世界秩序》是入江於 1997 年的著作，試以跨越國界的行動與概念作爲分析主題。他把焦點放在 19 世紀末到整個 20 世紀國際主義者的觀點的考察上，特別是入江稱之為「文化國際主義」的考察。入江認為 19 世紀末開始，文化國際主義思想開始萌芽，即使經歷過一戰、二戰的洗禮，但有賴於文化國際主義者不斷地努力推動個人與非官方層次在文化上的合作與交流，使得文化國際主義並未因此枯萎，反而逐漸壯大。文化國際主義者相信，文化的交流可以產生彼此經驗上以及認知上的共性，而共性可以促進世界和平，這也是入江所信奉與主張的，他相信二十一世界是個穩定和平的世界，因為文化國際主義

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91 跨國史在概念上與全球史是相同的，但是跨国史可以給予跨國連結的現象，一個比較精確的時間點。參考：Akira Iriye, "The Transnational Turn", op. cit, p.375.

92 參考本文第二章。
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場 -- 一種多元身份的知識視野

的力量將會是定義這個世界的主要因素。

在 2002 年出版的《全球共同體: 國際組織在現代世界成形中的角色》一書中，入江延續了對於全球共同意識形成的考察，並將研究對象擺在國際組織對於全球意識形成的貢獻上，特別是從事文化交流、人道救援以及環境保護等的非官方組織上，例如包括紅十字會、無疆界醫生、綠色和平組織。入江認為透過從事文化交流的國際非政府組織，其間所形成的全球共同意識，可以超越主權國家本質上對於國家利益關心的限制，以全人類為主體，在文化秩序上建立和平的世界。

從 1980 年代開始，可以說是入江學術發展的高峰階段，也是他總結前兩個階段歷史研究，整合成他獨特的，以文化因素全球視野的歷史解釋。至於研究主題，也不再侷限於特定國家或國家層次的分析，而以全球性議題，以及非官方的個人與國際組織作爲研究的重點，其目的在於尋找出一個和平世界的可能方法，顯示出他對於現實世界的強烈關懷。

93 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op. cit, p.x.
從美國外交史學界的发展脉络得知，尽管各时代所强调的重点的不同，但自现实主义史观以来，美国外交学界一直无法摆脱现实主义分析框架的理论依据，即使曾经受到修正主义者的抨击，但1970年代后崛起的修正主义者，又将现实主义史观拉回到外交史学界中学术典范的位置。Paul M. Kennedy以及John Lewis Gaddis，正是此种现实主义史观的代表。在此脉络下，入江昭的位置属于外交史研究中修正主义者的一派，也是1970年代倡导文化转向的外交史研究的先驱之一，因而有别于现实主义史观。

文化转向的外交史，目的是为了去除权力观点的学术范式，更重要的是宣告范式思维的终结。去中心观点的思潮也反映在1960-1970时期，美国、日本对中国的认识上，美日学界意识到过往西方中心观点范式的存在，而苦思打破中心观点的偏狭论述，并建立去中心观点的论述。入江昭的学术生涯正始於1960年代中期，其学术的观点也刻正反映了这类去中心观点的思维，而不同於60年代之前，美日学界对于中国贯有的偏狭认识。在《历史学的国际性》一文中，入江提到，晚年的Fairbank也对某些原本深信不疑的原则和价值的普遍适用性，产生疑虑，例如他对于能否用美国的尺度来衡量中国的发展过程，感到怀疑。入江认为这种对于美国中心论的怀疑与自我批判的精神，是从事史学
研究必須的方法論基礎。


總的來說，入江學術上的轉折，主要受到兩股全球思潮對於史學的影響：第一是後現代主義史學對於社會文化史的強調；第二是全球化影響下興起的全球史與跨國史研究。他說：「事實上我的研究和著作從國家之間轉變為非國家事務的強調，可能是整個歷史學發展趨勢的反映，跨國歷史的強調反映了社會文化史的影響，迫使國際歷史學家對非政府、非政治的行爲者給予更多關注，……或者對於跨國的非政府互動上學術興趣的增長，可能與 1980 年代興起的全球化概念有關，亦或者是一種全球化的

95 入江昭，王建華等（譯），《歷史學的國際化》，輯於中國美國史研究會（編）, 《現代史學的挑戰—美國歷史協會主席演說集 1961-1988》，上海：上海人民出版社，1990，頁 540。
表現形式。」

入江文化轉向的外交史研究，說明了其與美國外交史學界及現實主義史觀的學術正統之間，有着顯著的差別。去中心觀點的中國認識，也與美日學界偏狹的西方中心觀的中國認識有著根本的歧異，而與二戰後美日學界出現的去中心觀點的風潮可以為聯盟吸收美國學術養分而成長的入江昭，不管是在外交史上，或是對中國的認識上，都有著與美國主流觀點不同的見解，此種以多元視野，努力追求真正的普遍性的存在，應與入江昭多元文化的身分背景相關。

第二章 入江昭的世界認識
——普遍性的追求及和平世界的建構

前章將入江昭的學術思維置於外交史學界以及戰後美日對
中國認識的反省風潮中去理解。一直以來，外交史學界的歷史學
家所抱有的史觀多以權力的視野來分析國際事務，其結果，19
世紀的歷史始終圍繞著維也納體系、新帝國主義等主題，而 20
世紀的歷史似乎也只剩下兩次世界大戰、戰間期、冷戰、後冷戰
這樣大致的區別1，「戰爭」、「國家」、「帝國」似乎已經成
為外交史家不得不分析的主題。然而，歷史並非只有權力的面
向，入江昭因而從文化的視野出發，主張文化層面的外交史研
究，因而形成不同於權力觀點的歷史見解2，謂之文化轉向。

1  Akira Iriye, “The Role of Philanthropy and Civil Society in U.S Foreign
Relations,” in Yamamoto Tadashi, Akira Iriye, Iokibe Makoto (eds.),
Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S-Japan Relations,
Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the
Making of the Contemporary World. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002), pp. 4-6.

2 例如：冷戰期間美蘇兩強之間為什麼沒有爆發全面性的熱戰，一般學者認爲是
核子武器所形成的恐懼平衡使美蘇兩強不敢輕舉妄動；然而入江昭認為是國
際組織在當時大力地落實國際主義，推行國際的溝通、交流與合作才建構了一
種和平的氛圍。參考：Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International
Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, pp. 60-95.
此外，入江昭也提倡歷史的國際化，目的在於去除國家中心論述的歷史觀點。入江昭在史學上主張的去中心化的歷史研究、文化轉向的歷史研究以及歷史的國際化，正是要追求一種人類間共存的普遍性（或稱普遍主義，universalism）。入江昭這樣的學術思維，反映了戰後美日學界若干對於帶有西方中心觀點的普遍性所做出的修正與反省，並可與彼等結為知識聯盟。入江昭雖然並未提出一套明確的理論，然而從他的著作中，仍可以整理歸納出他對開展出人類社會中共有普遍性原則的看法，以及基於這些原則之上所建構的和平世界。

第一節 對普遍性（universalism）與和平世界的追求

一、入江昭追求真正的普遍性

與二戰前美日學界一直存在的帶有西方中心觀點的普遍性相較，入江昭所追求的真正普遍性有所不同。就日本知識界而言，「從福澤諭吉的脫亞入歐開始……日本種種刻骨銘心的自我定位，莫不在藉由退出中國以進入普遍性」，亦即超越中國以

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footnote_text:

3 石之瑜，〈退出中國——近代日本對華思想中的普遍性方法與政治正確性問題〉，輯於石之瑜（編），《近代日本對華思想》，台北：台大政治系中國大陸暨兩岸關係教學與研究中心，2007，頁 11。
有可能進入普遍性，藉由擺脫以往與日本不管在地緣上或文化上都關係密切的中國，進而進入代表普遍性的西方，這其中的基本假設就是落後的中國與進步的西方的中國觀。另一方面，就美國而言，歐美知識界莫不在於根據自己的歷史進程評斷亞洲，以歐美的衡量標準來貶抑亞洲，進而鞏固了自己的進步，認爲自己象徵人類的普遍性，其亞洲觀背後的假設就是落後的亞洲與進步的西方。顯然這類普遍性（universalism）代表的並非真正的普遍性，而是帶有西方中心觀點的普遍性，這類排除了中國或貶抑了亞洲的普遍性，並非入江昭所追求的普遍性。

二次大戰後，美日中國學界的學者便有開始對前此的西方中心觀點進行嚴厲的反省，在美國有 Cohen 主張中國中心取向，亦即回歸中國內部來理解中國，以中國的準繩來理解中國。在日本有竹內好「做為方法的亞細亞」，溝口雄三「以中國為方法」、子安宣邦「做為方法的東亞」，莫不在主張以某種在地主體的視野來進行思考，而非勾摹西方的角度，因此去中心化已儼然成為戰後美日中等國學界某種氛圍。

去中心代表的是要更全面、更多元的了解歷史的發展，去中心觀點除了是避免偏頗的歷史研究，更重要的是對全球普遍性的追求，而這類不帶有中心觀點的普遍性，正是入江昭所追求的真正的普遍性。

二、開展人類社會共有的普遍性

去中心觀點所欲追求的所謂真正普遍性，其目標並非一蹴可
及，即使到了 70 年代全世界更加緊密地連結在一起的全球化時代，西方中心觀點的普遍主義論述依然存在。全球化時代在多方面影響去中心觀點的形成，在社會文化上呈現的是兩種極端的發展，「一方面同質化（homogenization）與全球化（globalization），另一方面則是抵制（resistance）、反對與地方化（localization）」。同質化與全球化是透過進步的科技，資訊的傳播或人員的流動，致使世界各地在文化、政治或社會各方面都相互模仿感染。然而，同質化與全球化並非文化之間的平等融合，而是趨向於西方強勢文化，尤其是以美國的文化為主，亦即美國化（Americanization）。另一方面，全球化與同質化的浪潮激起了在地社會對傳統文化的重視，加上全球文化之間的互動增加，導致彼此的摩擦與衝突的機會提高，於是更加形成了對於傳統文化價值信仰的維護，因而採取抵制外來文化以及發揚在地文化的作為。

基於全球化在這兩方面的影響所延伸出來的對於世界秩序的想像，也就理所當然地分成兩類，一類是以普遍主義

4「全球化一詞對不同人在不同的環境下可能有不同的意義，它可能意味著時間與空間的明顯大幅壓縮，也可能指社會關係與互動轉型的一套過程，也可能是指一種複雜且多層面的觀念或社會現象，它也時常被定義為減低國家間障礙、鼓勵更緊密的政治、社會、經濟與文化交流的過程。」本文中的全球化指的是社會文化層次上的全球化。参考：江啟臣，〈全球化〉，輯於張亞中（編），《國際關係總論》，台北：揚智，2003年，頁 272。

5江啟臣，前引書，頁 282。
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（universalism）為標準，強調全球的同質性6，然而這類普遍主義顯然帶有西方中心觀點的色彩，亦即是以美國的標準為判斷的準繩，朝向西方文化的同化力量，尤其是以美國文化為主。如此這類普遍主義並非放諸四海皆準的普遍主義，而是西方的普遍主義，故亦非入江昭所追求的普遍主義。

另一類對於世界秩序的想像是多元主義（multiculturalism），強調文化的歧異性，文化必須被看作是多元的。準此，尊重不同的生活方式和想法成為一個很重要的議程7。根據入江的觀察，「文化多元主義堅持每個文化的獨立性，舉凡宗教、種族、民族、性別、性取向和其他的因素都有其獨立性，在這樣的觀點下，這個世界是由許多種明確地可定義的文化所組成的，每個文化都有自己的價值跟主張8」。「就某種程度而言，單一文化是被排斥的，例如西方文明試圖宣稱自身的優越性就是一例9」，因此「多元文化主義否認放諸四海皆準的真實與價值的存在，所有的文化都應該是平等而有效的10」，更重要的是多元文化主義者主張：

對於社會上所存在的不同文化群體，應尊重其自主性，包容其差異性，使之並存而不相悖，因為每個不

6  蘇國勛、張旅平、夏光著，《全球化：文化衝突與共生》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2006，頁 25。
7  Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p.149.
8  Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 152。
9  Akira Iriye, Ibid, pp. 152-153。
10 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 153。
同群體所代表的文化，無論強弱興衰均有其一定的價值，吾人如能彼此尊重，相互欣賞乃至學習，則人類文明必可迅速獲得擴展與提昇。11

在以上對於西方普遍主義與文化多元主義的討論中，似乎兩者是站在對立的兩面，入江昭就曾指出，「二戰後的歷史顯示，文化分歧和文化國際主義在許多方面相互關連……，而文化多元主義和美國化分別是它們現代的表現形式」。入江昭認爲，二戰後的文化國際主義與西方普遍主義並無不同，即強調西方價值的普世色彩，尤其是美國的價值。相對於此，文化多元主義則著重在文化分歧性與彼此的尊重，抗拒一元化的價值體系。由於兩者論述角度的不同，因此所預想的世界秩序也有所不同，一個是越益朝向同質化的世界邁進，另一個則朝向分歧世界的道路。

儘管二者在主張上有所對立，入江昭認爲二者並非不可相

13 在此處文化國際主義概念與入江昭主張的文化國際主義的觀念不盡相同。入江的文化國際主義強調的是主張透過文化之間不斷的溝通交流，使全世界更加相互理解彼此，進而塑造一個更和平的世界。此處的文化國際主義是指二戰之後強調美國文化主導下形成的以西方文化爲主的不對等的文化交流，強勢的西方文明主導了國際事務的觀點，低度發展國家的多元文化卻以同樣的西方標準來衡量，因此西方文明剝奪了全世界人們的生活、行爲與思想，因此在此處文化國際主義可以視爲是西方普遍主義的同類概念。
容，「……在 1970 年代之後的十幾年間，各地的文化國際主義者試著去發展一個世界環境，在這個環境中，文化的分歧性與共享價值以及關心的意識是同時並存的」。顯然，對於入江昭而言二者不必截然不同，甚至二者應有可以相互融合之處，一旦如此的世界「可以形成，那文化國際主義和多元文化主義是可以相互融合的，事實上兩者將會彼此增強」。如何將二者融合，進而超越西方普遍主義，進入真正的普遍主義，正是入江設想的在全球化時代中一個理想的世界秩序。以入江的話說，即是「文化的分歧性與文化國際主義可以運行一種合作的形式，藉此來定義一個穩定的世界秩序」。

因此在追求真正普遍主義的目標下，如何保有超越國界所形成的人類社會共享的價值，而又同時能夠包容文化的分歧性，將是二者相容的一大關鍵：「文化的普遍主義和文化的分歧這兩個主題已是 1960 年代美國社會既存的事實，美國社會看到分歧性的力量（少數族裔、婦女、反文化議程的倡導）持續在普世價值（正義、平等、民主）的名義下扮演著自身的角色」。入江昭因此認爲，在尊重普世價值的前提之下，包容文化歧異性以及促進不同文化之間的理解，將是文化多元主義與真正的普遍主義之間融合的方向。

14 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 170.
15 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
16 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 175.
17 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 171.
18 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
三、以文化交流开展包含文化多元性的真正普遍主义

一个能够包容文化多元性的普遍主义，才是入江昭所要追求的真正的普遍主义。若非如此就会陷入西方普遍主义仅侷限於一隅的窠臼。而一个包容文化的多元性、尊重文化的差异性以及理解自我与他者之间不同且相互尊重的普遍主义，必须靠文化间的不断的交流与沟通才能达成。

不同文化群体间透过文化的交流与传递，可培养出一种对于不同文化之间的尊重包容的全球意识（global consciousness）、共享价值（shared value）、或称世界公共意见（world public opinion），则存於人类社会中的共性（尊重、包容、自由、公平、正义、民主、审美观等）也就显而易见。入江自己也曾说，「我感到印象深刻的是，不管我到哪裡，都能发现人们中間存在著共同的价值观、共同的生活方式。不管哪裡的人们都有一些共同的审美观，如喜爱美丽的自然、纪念碑和音乐等」。这些共同的审美观、喜好美丽的事物，是全世界人类所共有的特性，是放诸四海皆准的。

借用战後日本著名的中国学界桥口纯三的话来说，上述包含著文化多元性的普遍主义，意即在「施以相对化的多元性原理之
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上，試圖進一步地創出更高層次的世界相，世界雖然是分歧的，但從多元的「世界相」當中，可以得到真正的普遍性。這些普世的價值進而指引著世界的發展，而其自身也透過文化群體間不斷的溝通交流而形成。

四、一個和平世界的藍圖與實踐步驟

入江對真正普遍性的追求有其實際的目的，即對於和平世界的追求。在《文化國際主義與世界秩序》一書中，入江昭提到：「在某方面上，這本書著重在和平的概念，這種和平概念指的是，世界秩序可以且應該經由跨越國界的文化層次上的互動來加以定義」。對入江昭來說，一個和平的世界必須建立在跨國界的文化互動層次上，因為他認為文化歧異所造成的誤解，是戰爭與衝突的原因；因此強調人類共有的真正普遍性的追求，即是轉化歧見邁向和平世界的方式。

以太平洋安全為例，入江在《跨越太平洋：一個美國與東亞關係的內部歷史》一書中表示：

只有當美國與東亞關係被看作是一個智識上的問題，以及只有當所做的努力克服了宣傳、感情主義、以及過份的經驗主義，一個超越過去，邁向和平的太平洋

20 沟口雄三著，林信智譯，《作為「方法」的中國》，台北：國立編譯館，1999，頁107。
21 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op. cit, preface X.
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場——一種多元身份的知識視野

才是可能的。如果中國、日本和美國能夠發展一個新的語言來促進相互的連結，如果他們能夠從過去的負擔中解放出來，那麼跨越太平洋的人類共同體將會出現，且對理解人類發展作出特殊的貢獻。

換言之，一個和平的太平洋社群必須建立在知性的關係之上，也就是文化關係之上，而某個共同性價值的新語言，是建立和平的太平洋社群的先決條件。就此可以推論，第一、入江昭所設計的和平世界，是一個文化定義的國際秩序；第二、入江昭建構和平世界的進程，其關鍵在於能展開人類共同社會中的普遍性。

那麼該如何建構這樣的國際秩序？入江昭曾提到：「如果普遍性（共享價值與關心）、永久性（承諾跨文化溝通和合作不會被變動中的知性風潮所阻礙）、獨立性（能從國際政策或地緣政治的利益支配中獨立出來），這三者能被盡可能遵行，那最後可能會出先一個以文化為中心的國際秩序。」在入江昭的藍圖中，必須透過不間斷的文化溝通與交流，普遍性的追求才有可能。追求普遍性的文化定義的國際秩序，其目的是超脫以往以地緣政治定義國際秩序的窠臼，避免權力、戰爭、利益成為國際事務中的唯一焦點。

接著的問題是如何溝通？怎樣交流？入江昭認爲國家實體

23 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, op. cit, p. 185.
之間的文化交流當然有其重要性，然而他更強調非國家行為者（non-state actor）之間的文化交流，因為一旦以國家實體的名義來進行交流，很容易就會落入地緣政治思考的脈絡之中，則文化交流將淪為國家政策的工具，僅為國家利益服務而已，如此帶有政治的色彩便非純粹的文化交流。故何以通過非國家行為者之間做為文化交流與交流的媒介，才是最好的方式。在非國家行為者之中，入江昭特別強調國際組織（international organizations），尤其是國際非政府組織（international nongovernmental organizations）與個人（individual）這兩者扮演的角色，因為這兩者往往出於純粹的文化交流目的而免於政治色彩，非官方的特性使這兩者可以不受政府干預以本身的目的做為行動的依據。

這些國際組織與個人在國際上不斷地進行文化溝通與交流的結果，就是全球意識的出現，當全球意識出現，全球共同體（global community）也就因而形成：「正在形成的全球共同體是由好幾千個政府間組織，以及國際非政府組織，以及國內公民社會所共同組成24。」這樣的全球共同體「不是全球化的同義詞……全球共同體是指基於全球意識的跨國家網絡的建立，這樣的概念指的是有一個更廣泛的世界在分裂的國家和國家社會之上，無論在何處的個人和群體都在這個更廣泛的世界之上分享著某些共同利益和關心25。」

24 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p.133.
在全球化時代，國際組織與個人的重要性逐漸增加，除了是因為國家扮演的角色正逐漸降低之外，公民社會的崛起也是重要的關鍵，而「公民社會是一個長期被用來描述國內的非國家行爲者的辭彙，包括企業團體、宗教組織以及私人組織，這些組織願意挑戰國家的權威，同時也肩負起國家不願意或不能夠去執行的任務。這些組織除了在國內運作外，也連接國外具有共同目標的組織相互合作，或自身在國外設立分支宣揚倡導他們的理念與主張，於是形成國際組織的形式，因此「國際組織可以被視為形成跨國公民社會要素的其中之一，以及許多連接世界不同部分的力量之一。」

在公民社會的發展背景下，非國家行爲者得以不斷增強其自身的力量，不只是在國內，更跨出國家疆界，藉此促成不同文化群體之間在文化層次上的交流、合作與溝通。如此，一個相互理解、尊重與包容的具有普遍性的全球共同體將因此慢慢成形，這就是和平世界的實踐步驟。

26 入江昭認為跨國企業和國際組織代表一股有效的力量，尋求創造一個國際社會，這樣的國際社會是不同於完全由主權國家間互動所形成的國家體系，同樣地公民社會的崛起以及國家角色的減少，這樣的趨勢也正在全世界發生。
27 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 130.
五、以文化國際主義做為實踐和平世界的方法

入江所謂文化上的交流與合作，指的是諸如意見的交流、人員的交流、學術上的合作或任何可以促進跨國理解的努力。入江昭認為，「不同地域的個人和群體努力試著去發展出一個以文化交流為基礎的社群，……這些群眾的努力終將對世界產生影響，也大大地豐富了人們對國際事務的理解。」他將這些努力背後的動力，以及努力成果的總合，稱為文化國際主義（culture internationalism）。

國際主義（internationalism）指的是「一種透過跨國合作和交換，試著去再形塑國家之間關係的本質的概念、行動或制度」，然而跨國合作有好幾種可能的方式，有軍事上的合作關係，包含安全條約、軍事聯盟等；有法律國際主義（legal internationalism），例如國際法的出現；有經濟國際主義（economic internationalism），例如跨國企業建立起便於跨國交換的網絡；然而入江昭著重於以跨越國界的文化活動來促進國際合作，意即文化國際主義（cultural internationalism）。所謂的文化對入江而言指的是「意義的結構，包括記憶、意識形態、情緒、生活型

30 Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, op.cit, p. 3.
32 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 3.
33 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
態，學術作品，藝術作品和其他的象徵。

然而文化本身會不斷改變，因此以文化交流為基礎的文化國際主義的意義，也會隨著時代的不同而有所变更。

19，20 世紀交際之時，國際主義其實就已經開始蓬勃發展，採取自主的行動來克服國家之間的敵對狀態，而文化國際主義也是在當時開始萌芽。然而當時的文化交流指的是精英階層在科學研究、藝術作品、音樂表演上的呈現，且限定在文明國家(civilized nation)的交流，而所謂的文明國家指的就是歐洲與北美。

一次大戰後，文化國際主義全力發展，戰後的文化國際主義者相信，和平的關鍵在於跨國的理解，而這樣的理解是建立在穩固的智識與文化的合作上。在此基礎上，一戰後的文化國際主義者意識到，「...文化合作做為和平的工具，它的範圍應該要更為廣泛，擁抱世界的其他區域和其他的文明和傳統。」亦即，僅侷限於西方間的文化交流是不夠的。此外，文化國際主義者也意識到，大眾文化在促進文化交流與合作上的貢獻，這主要是因為，溝通科技上的進步使大眾間的溝通交流越益方便，因此「大眾文化可以成爲和平的工具，促進跨國界的理解。」

二戰後的文化國際主義較戰前則更具全面性，文化國際主義


37 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 70.
第二章  入江昭的世界認識——普遍性的追求及和平世界的建構

者意識到世界的分歧性以及非歐洲文化（通常是第三世界國家）在文化事務上所展現的積極性。這些非歐洲文化的領導者批評文化國際主義所展現出的西方中心觀，宰制了全人類的思想、行為和生活，甚至將文化國際主義視為是一種文化帝國主義（cultural imperialism）38，而並非所謂的多元文化的相互理解。如今，文化國際主義關注的是更具普遍性的價值與事物，包括人權、環境保護、人道主義、國際發展、物種保育等議題。這些比原先的文化國際主義更為廣泛的議題39，正是入江昭所主張的具有普遍性意義的文化國際主義。

由以上可知，文化國際主義隨著不同的時代涵義也因而有所變動，然而入江昭所主張的文化國際主義不是狹隘的歐美國家精英階層間的文化交流，也不是文化帝國主義，而是一種純粹的以全人類為主體的，議題廣泛的文化交流，以此種定義的文化國際主義做為方法，來促進跨界間的理解。

第二節  非國家行為者的作用

以入江昭的思維脈絡來看，要追求人類社會共有的普遍性以形成全球共同體，首先必須使不同文化社群彼此相互尊重與包容，因次促進彼此的理解與認識至關重要，而誰來扮演著國際文

化交流中重要的推手？如前所述，入江昭認為是非國家行為者（non-state actor），其中包含非政府組織（NGOs）與個人（individual）。以國家為主體的官方層次上的文化交流以及政府間組織固然有其功能，但入江昭更重視非國家行為者的角色。事實上，非國家行為者在國際關係上的重要性持續增加。「即使在20世紀的歷史中，國家權力不斷擴大至人們生活的各個現象，我們仍然能看到個人、私人團體和許多組織和社群的獨立性，不管是國內的或跨越國界的。」

一、國際文化交流與教育交流發揮的功能

非國家行爲者應推動著哪些領域的活動，才能有助於構築一個入江所謂的不同於現實主義的世界？文化與教育的交流是入江昭強調的兩個部分，主要目的都在於促進跨國之間的理解。

在文化交流上，可以透過資訊的分享、舉辦世界性的展覽、國際會議的召開以及一般的學者、學生、藝術家、記者、觀光客等往來於世界各地的人們。即使人們並未自我意識到他們在文化交流中發揮的功能，但持續不斷累積下來的結果，就是世界各地的人們逐漸建立起了彼此之間的連結、友誼以及不同於國家疆界關係網絡。

在文化交流的關係網絡裡，建立起的彷彿是個不屬於任何國家的「文化承載地」（cultural boarderlands），意即「學生、學者、藝術家和許多其他知識份子跨越國界，進而發展出之後稱之為文化承載地的概念 —— 不屬於特定國家的分享空間，在那裡從許多國家來的個人和團體交換、分享以及型塑他們自己的概念和議程」。在文化承載地裡，不同社會的人們和文化產物都能創造出國家以外的認同以及議程。入江昭形同是在呼應子安宣邦對於文化東亞的觀念，從而在哲學上賦予文化交流高深的意義，亦即要建立此類文化概念的世界，進而形成一個文化交流的框架，使原本分屬於世界各文化群體的人們之間，可以彼此進行著各種多層次的交流，進而超越狹隘的個別國家認同，建立起以全人類為主體的認同。

教育交流是入江昭強調的另個可以促進跨國理解的重要領域，近代傳播科技的發達，使大眾持續發揮著影響力，文化交流因而突破了傳統對文化交流的認知，亦即不再僅侷限於精英分子之間，而有越來越多的人們在文化交流上發揮著自身的功能與感染力，因此影響大眾思想的教育至關重要。不可否認的是，不

43 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 66.
44 文化概念的東亞是一個關係框架，「在這一地域生活的人，可以進行多種多層的交流。它也是一種途徑，把『東亞細亞』當作廣義上的文化相通之地域概念來考慮，並根據這一概念的廣域性，把自國、自民族中心主義相對化，同時也把這個概念塑造成經濟、文化、生活領域中，在空間上能夠進行多層多重交流的關係框架。」参考：子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，《東亞儒學：批判與方法》，台北：台大出版中心，2004，頁158。
同的教育形塑出對於事物不同的看法、思想與觀點，因此「國際主義者相信在所有層次上，正確形式的教育是相當重要的」，而所謂正確形式的教育指的是，在所有國家中的教育都能更具世界性，而非狹隘的、民族的、個別的教育：「經由教育交流，數以千計的年輕男女分享著類似的知識經驗，以及發展一個語彙，藉此他們可以參與有意義的互動。」

二、政府間組織與國際非政府組織

入江昭認為國際組織對促進文化交流與教育交流上有很大的作用。一般來說，以會員資格來分，國際組織又可分成政府間組織（intergovernmental organizations）與國際非政府組織（international non-governmental organizations, INGOs 或 NGOs），前者是經由主權國家間締約所形成的組織，主要在代表彼此的政府，後者指的是由個人和私人團體所建立的組織，參與的成員以非國家行爲者為主體。然而對入江昭而言，非政府組織指的是「自願性的和開放的、位於正式國家機構之外的、由個人組成的

45 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op. cit, p. 72.
46 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
47 Akira Iriye, Ibid. p. 156.
組織，這類組織的基本目標不是追求利益也不參與政治活動۴۹。」
入江謹慎地採取狹隘的定義，強調自願性的、非國家的、非利益的、非宗教的和非軍事的組織，因此企業團體、跨國企業、政黨以及有種族、國籍、性別、宗教、階級、區域限制的組織۵۰，都被排除在入江昭所指的非政府組織之外。以下將分成兩部分，分別說明在入江昭預想的和平世界中，政府間組織與非政府間組織扮演的角色。

三、政府間組織扮演的角色

政府間組織在文化與教育交流上也有所貢獻，最明顯的兩個例子就是國際聯盟（League of Nations）與聯合國（United Nations）。入江昭指出，文化國際主義者的大肆興起，是因爲一次世界大戰後全世界所面臨的殘破景象，使人們發展出所謂的國際精神（international spirit），「這個詞彙所指的不只是世界上國家，必須透過集體合作來彼此合作、維繫和平，更重要的是世界上最穩定的秩序必須建立在健康、教育、學術與藝術各領域的跨國交流上۵۱。」然而徒有無形的精神是不夠的，必須有落實的機制：「這樣的全球意識如果要成爲一股有效的力量，就必

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須被賦予一些制度的形式，因此這就是國際組織扮演的角色。組織因而成為一戰後落實國際精神的重要機制，而國際聯盟正是在此風潮下應運而生。

國際聯盟當中推動文化與教育交流最重要的就是國際知識合作委員（International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation），該委員會是國聯於 1922 年邀請各國重要的知識分子討論建立知識合作機制的結果。委員會建立後，持續邀請各國學者召開國際會議，推動國際交流以及跨國學者的訪問，同時各國也紛紛成立國內的官方知識交流委員會，作爲與國際知識合作委員會的交流的管道，這顯示政府組織在文化與教育交流上的重要性。

然而值得注意的是，政府組織在文化與教育交流上雖有貢獻，但在許多知性的交換的過程中，非官方的個人和團體扮演著更大的角色，這些非官方性質的行爲者與國際知識合作委員會相互合作，共同推動知性的交流。此外關於各國國內的知識交流委員會，許多政府只提供財務上以及道德上的支持，真正的落實與推動還是委由非官方的個人以及團體來執掌。

二戰之後，聯合國的成立代表著的是另一波國際精神發展的

52 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op. cit, p. 8.
53 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op. cit, p. 58.
55 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
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高潮，聯合國教育科學及文化組織 (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO) 承續了國聯時代國際知識合作委員會的使命，繼續推動國際交流活動，其憲章表明「和平若全然以政府間之政治、經濟措施為基礎，則不能確保世界人民對其一致持久而又真誠的支持，爲使其免遭失敗，和平尚必須奠基于人類知識與道德上的團結」。因此聯合國教科文組織希望透過教育、科學與文化來促進各國合作，對和平與安全作出貢獻。

然而，以國家為主體所形成的聯合國教科文組織並未擺脫權力政治思考的陰霾，例如 1980 年代美國反對教科文組織所欲實施的「新世界資訊與傳播秩序」計畫（NWICO），主要考量就是害怕自己在資訊與傳播體系當中的優勢地位將因該計畫的實施而不保，時任教科文組織的塞內加爾籍主席 Amadou Mahtar M'Bow，因多次不服從美國的旨意引起雷根政府的不滿，雷根政府並聲稱教科文組織在蘇聯領導集團的控制下，已經成為「第三世界批評美國和以色列的講壇」，美國與英國相繼指控

57 1980 年代，第三世界國家因害怕電子傳播媒體的不平衡而再次淪為西方另種形式的殖民地，因此促使教科文組織實施「新世界資訊與傳播秩序」計畫（NWICO），同意國家可以對新聞及資訊流通進行干預，對此美國政府認為這是對新聞媒體自由的限制，然而事實上美國是為了粉飾傳播媒體不平衡的事實。參考：Thomas L. McPhail，鄭植榮譯，《電子殖民主義》，台北：遠流，1994。
教科文組織屈服於第三世界國家地方性的議程，因此紛紛退出教科文組織^{59}。以國家爲主體會員的教科文組織即使是文化、教育交流爲訴求，仍難跳脫國家利益的思考模式，一旦涉及與國家利益相關的議程，勢不可免的國家必定仔細估算一番。正如入江所言，「政府對於文化國際主義的支持與贊助將不可避兔地影響這些活動的本質，在官方的支持與推廣下，文化國際主義將變成外交政策的一個面向與媒介。文化外交（cultural diplomacy）而不是文化國際主義可能是這類活動正確的措辭^{60}。」

誠然對入江而言政府間組織仍然有其重要性，但非政府組織在文化和教育交流上關係更是密切，同時可以跳脫權力政治的思考角度。「由國家所推動的（文化與教育交流）倡議，並非不重要……然而從一開始民間的個人和組織就深深地牽涉其中^{61}。」即使是推動文化和教育交流的政府間組織，其推動的計畫也大多與民間的非政府組織之間相配合，例如聯合國教科文組織就邀請此類組織承擔一定任務，根據統計數字，直至 2004 年爲止就有 329 個非政府組織與教科文組織合作^{62}。


^{60} Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 114。

^{61} Akira Iriye, “The Role of Philanthropy and Civil Society in U.S Foreign Relations.” op. cit, p. 46。

^{62} 王淑英、蔡明殿、袁志君，〈與聯合國教科文組織有正式工作關係的非政府組織：UNESCO 工作手冊〉，高雄縣：台灣非政府組織工作交流協會，頁 18-154。http://www.nafia.org.tw/htm/unesco.doc
第二章 入江昭的世界認識——普遍性的追求及和平世界的構築

入江指出，在19、20世紀之交非政府組織大肆興起的年代裡，大部分非政府組織中一個很重要的部分，就是對智識交流的倡導的關注\(^{63}\)，因此在文化與教育交流的層次上，若比較政府組織與非政府組織，入江昭更重視後者的重要性，這是因為「一旦文化被視為是國家關注的焦點，文化可能失去它的自主性。官方支持的文化方面的計畫可能不必然是私人的個人或機構認爲重要的，相反地私人的倡議可能無法與官方的文化議程相配合，也可能被視為是外交政策的破壞份子\(^{64}\)。」大部分的非政府組織從一開始就著眼於文化與教育交流，相對於可能带有政治性意涵與特質的政府間組織，非政府組織的民間性更能純粹的從事文化與教育交流的活動。

四、非政府組織扮演的角色

非政府組織的民間性使其能跳脫國家中心主義的利益思維，在文化與教育的層次上發揮功能，促進去中心的多元文化理解，進而開展出全人類社會共有的普遍性。固然民間性是入江選擇非政府組織作爲其和平世界藍圖主要執行者的原因，然而更重要的是非政府組織扮演了連結（connection）的角色。連結主要展現在兩方面：第一、非政府組織協助迷失的個人與全球化時代接軌。第二、非政府組織是普遍主義與多元主義之間的橋樑。

\(^{63}\) Akira Iriye, “Nonstate Actors as Forces of Globalization.” op. cit, p. 149.
\(^{64}\) Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 114.
(一) 迷失的個人與全球化時代之間的連結

不可否認全球化形成了一個更加互賴與一致化的世界，不管在經濟上、政治上或文化上皆然。這樣的趨同卻也代表對原有社群的破壞，以致人們對原有的地域認同感以及傳統文化的價值產生動搖與質疑。然而，全球化在破壞的同時，卻沒有留下任何解決的方法，於是失去認同感的個人，失去傳統價值信仰的個人只好離散於世界各地而無所適從：「……它（全球化）破壞了人們之間的社群感，使人們感到自身就像是漂流在他們所無法掌控的科技大海中。人們可能模糊地感覺到他們是一個互賴的世界社群的部份，但是這個社群還未定義它自身的道德或精神基礎。」

一旦自身存在的意義與信仰體系產生模糊與不確定，人們就失去安身立命的可能，面對這樣離散的個人，解決辦法之一，就是回到比全球化時代更早之前，更加刻意的強調自身文化的優越性。民族的優越感，於是形成地方主義（localism）、種族中心主義（ethnocentrism）以及文化沙文主義（cultural chauvinism）。然而，這樣的解決方法只會使得世界更加分裂與敵意的增加，這並非入江昭所追求的和平世界。

對此入江昭提出另一個可能的解決方法，以非政府組織來提供離散的個人一個新的認同感。入江提出這樣的疑問：「在這樣的情況下（世界充斥著離散的人們）,我們不能夠說跨越國界的個人、組織，例如國際非政府組織，保存了社群感，也提供一個人

66 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
們互動的道德基礎嗎？他給的答案是肯定的，對於非政府組織在國際上從事的教育與文化交流，雖然是促進世界更加整合，但是同時非政府組織也提供認同的基礎，「非政府組織就好像私人俱樂部，把具有類似關心與價值的個人聚集起來」，而賦予來自不同國家、族裔或宗教的人們一個新的認同感與社群感。

從事文化交流的非政府組織「……提供認同感、忠誠感以及（存在的）目的，給那些在一個不確定的世界當中感到迷失的個人」，同時「……能提供與傳統價值之間的連結，例如正義、自由和同情心，這些價值在今日世界快速改變的科技環境中正在被侵蝕著。」

全球化時代正需要一套穩定世界的秩序，然而個別國家卻無法也無力提供，即使有學者主張霸權穩定理論，認為美國在維護世界秩序上發揮著重要的作用；又若有學者主張經由國家間彼此合作建立安全合作機制，來維持和平的秩序。然而，不管是以美國為主體抑或者是多個國家的聯合機制，這都是以國家作爲主體，一旦主體是國家，就很難避免利益估算的權力政治觀點。入江昭鼓吹要跳脫權力政治的思維觀點，主張「……全球化需要一個秩序的外觀（semblance of order）以及一個責任措施（measure of accountability），這就是那些參與知性交流活動的國際非政府組織在國際上從事的教育與文化交流，雖然是促進世界更加整合，但是同時非政府組織也提供認同的基礎，「非政府組織就好像私人俱樂部，把具有類似關心與價值的個人聚集起來」，而賦予來自不同國家、族裔或宗教的人們一個新的認同感與社群感。
組織所扮演的重要角色。顯然入江認為以從事知性交流的國際非政府組織所提供世界的秩序，才是最有可能達成和平世界的方式。

（二）多元文化主義與真正普遍主義之間的橋樑

如同前述，全球化時代人們注意到了趨同的現象（不管在貨物、資本、知識、印象、傳播、犯罪、文化、污染、藥物、流行、信仰等各方面，紛紛跨越國家疆界朝向同質化去發展），但也因此越加使得人們注意到彼此之間的差異與不同。前者追求的是朝向同質化（以強勢的西方文化為同質化發展的方向），發展成帶有西方中心觀的普遍主義，而後者追求不同文化間的歧異性，並強調彼此相互尊重與包容的多元文化主義。至於入江昭和平世界的藍圖中所追求的真正的普遍主義，是能夠包含文化歧異性，並發展出人類社會中共有的普世價值，邁向真正的普遍主義。

多元文化主義如何開展出人類社會真正普遍主義？國際組織扮演重要的連結角色。「……如果普遍主義和地方主義可以一起對一個穩定的世界秩序的發展有所貢獻，國際組織將在這個過程中扮演重要角色，因為許多國際組織表達了世界各地的人們對和平、正義和互賴的期望。」尤其是從事文化交流活動的非政府組織的角色，「在連結（多元文化主義與普遍主義）的過程中，

72 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p. preface viii.
一個充滿希望的發展是非政府組織的大量出現，……非政府組織已經取代了一些由國家所發揮的功能，而大部分是廣泛定義的文化層面上的功能。」

入江相信，「……將文化的多樣性整合進一個互賴的世界社群是可能的，為了這樣的目標，跨國的和跨文化的交流仍然是最好的方式。」從事文化交流的非政府組織因此能夠促進不同文化群體之間的相互理解、包容與尊重，而這正符合多元文化主義者的訴求，亦即一個相互尊重且非同質化的世界。然而不可否認的前提是，普世價值（包容、尊重、自由、正義、喜好美好的事物等）必須成立，一旦一個相互尊重的世界成形，那麼人類社會中共有的普世價值也就因而出現。入江在〈仁慈與公民社會在美國對外關係中的角色〉一文中舉例說，即便一個音樂作品是起源於法國或德國，也會被全世界所有的聆聽者視為是美好的事物，同樣的例子可以套用在藝術、文學等方面，不管這些作品是起源於哪個國家，都遠遠不如它們具有的國際特徵，也就是「美好的事物」，這一個人類社會共同欣賞的普遍價值。而促進多元文化群體間相互理解、包容與尊重正是從事文化交流的非政府組織所能發揮的功能：「為了確保它們（指美好的事物）普遍性的特質，由民間的個人和組織來積極地從事文化交流活動是很重要的，而不是讓政府來贊助它們。」顯然對入江來說，在文化交流方面，民間的力量是不可或缺的。

73 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 174.
74 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p. 156.
75 Akira Iriye, “The Role of Philanthropy and Civil Society in U.S Foreign
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場--一種多元身份的知識視野

流中，非政府組織要比带有政治意涵的政府組織更加适合扮演推
動者。

再者，當面對為了抵抗被同質化而過分強調自身傳統文化優
越性，進而侷限於一隅的地方觀點時，遊走於國內與國際的非政
府組織，正可以將地域內的個人與國際連結，打破狹隘偏頗的地
方觀。非政府組織在地域內凝聚具有共同關心與認同的個人形成
團體，它們進一步與具有類似目標的組織相互合作與世界接軌，
某些發展更大的組織並直接在國外設立分支機構，如此形成國際
非政府組織。個人透過非政府組織與世界連結，意即跨越政府
組織的層級，個人避免了官方政策的影響，直接地與世界上其他
地域的人們進行著文化與教育的交流與溝通，透過非政府組織接
觸不同地域的人們，發現他們都有着同樣的關心與價值觀，見證
了入江昭所謂的共性或者全球意識。

Relations.” op. cit, p. 44.
五、個人 (individual) 扮演的角色

看似微不足道的個人對於世界會有怎樣的影響？這本溯源，個人是入江昭設想的全球共同體中最根本的基礎，即使非政府組織扮演要角，然而也只是凝聚一群有共同理想與關心的個人，進而把力量發揮到最大。

即使不是透過組織的形式，在傳播運輸科技發展的今天，往來於世界各地的個人正發揮著連自己可能也意識不到的影響力，而逐步建構起人們之間溝通聯繫的網絡，並彼此相互影響著，例如旅遊即是讓來自他國的觀光客能夠理解當地文化的良好機會，也是不同地域的人們之間建立友誼的途徑。

個人在不知不覺中都在為促進相互理解而努力，而這當中入江昭特別重視知識份子知性的交流，他們包括了學者、藝術家、記者，尤其是學者的角色。他說：「每個單一的人都無法給歷史的路徑帶來很大的改變，但我們作為學者可以做得更多，促進溝通、理解並建構橋樑，也就是建立一種網絡，相互理解的網絡，交流資訊和觀點。」因爲學者們擁有一個比較好的位置，可以來實踐他們所專長的事物，學者不僅談論也同時透過專業的組織來促進國際理解，並且在世界各地舉行會議，集合其他學者針對特定問題進行交流，例如，《在環境保護方面，很多國家的私人組織、能源機構、非政府組織等，來自不同領域的人一起來應對

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76 記者劉波、馬娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21 世紀經濟報導》，2006 年 11 月 11 日。 http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023.htm
污染、全球變暖、生物多樣性等問題。學者可以做的就是走到一起來研究這些課題，向世界就這些問題發出警告。77

第三節 公民社會 (civil society)

入江曾經提到公民社會與國家之間的不同，其中最主要的區別在於前者代表的是私領域的事物，後者代表公領域的事物。在地緣政治思考的主權國家觀點上，政府握有權力捍衛公眾的利益，因此在政府治理的形式下與充滿民族意識的公民結合在一起，就形成18世紀以來民族國家的形式78，這種形式之下公民是接受政府的治理；私領域的個人與非政府組織均處於屈從於國家的地位，故此時公民社會難謂形成。

然而，一旦擁有權力的國家不是以權力做為捍衛公民的利器，反而成爲壓迫人民的工具，那個人該要如何？又若國家與公民對於利益的認知有所不同，又該如何？又若國家無法解決或不願參與相關問題的處理，那私領域的個人是否應該肩負起這樣的責任？面對這些問題，入江昭認為從1970年代開始，公民社會一直不斷提升力量，在國家無法或不願完成的任務上肩負起責任

77 劉波、馬娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21世紀經濟報導》，2006年11月11日。http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023.htm
第二章 入江昭的世界認識——普遍性的追求及和平世界的建構

如此由個人與非政府組織所形成的公民社會是超越國家，不附屬於國家之下而能獨自行事的實體（entity），由於公民社會是以全人類作爲主體來關心全人類共有的利益以及普遍性原則，而不是國家利益的思考，因此對於促進跨文化理解有所助益。以入江自己的話說：「就某種程度來說，獨立的國家似乎不能夠超越他們對國家利益，以及民族主義象徵的地方性的關心，因此各地由個人和組織所構成的公民社會，負有職責去鞏固他們對於相互理解以及對話的奉獻。」

入江甚至提出這樣的問題：「非國家行爲者持續提升其影響力，所以 21 世紀的歷史將會被認為是一個公民社會的世紀嗎？就好比 20 世紀基本上是一個主權國家的世紀，而 19 世界是一個帝國的世紀。」入江昭並未正面肯定的提出答案，但他提到 21 世紀跨國性的問題已經不能再透過單一國家來解決，有學者寄望美國霸權的領導，但入江認爲是不可行的，他認為如果個別國家要被取代的話，這個取代者不是美國，而是存在於不同國家的公

79「在全球的許多部份，公民社會正聲稱它們願意挑戰國家的權威，以及買負起國家不願或不能去執行的任務。」

80 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p.130.


82 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 57.
民社會，只有公民社會才能真正促進人類的整體幸福，因此顯然對入江昭而言，21世紀將是一個公民社會的世紀是無庸置疑的。

第四節 全球共同體與人類共同體

一、全球共同體（global community）

在入江昭和平世界的藍圖中，當公民社會中的個人、組織以及政府間組織都努力從事於有益於國際理解的文化與教育交流時，促進了多元文化群體間的相互包容與尊重，一個文化多元主義的世界因而形成，與此同時人類社會中的全球意識也顯而易見。當全球意識開展出來，一個以個人與國際組織所促成的全球共同體於焉成形。全球共同體無疑是一個以文化為基礎的世界觀，是一個有別於國家為主體所建構的國際體系，而是由個人以及國際組織所建立的國際體系。在這以文化取代權力且主體並非國家的世界觀中，避開了權力政治的思考以及國家中心主義，在此文化的世界中有著人類共同性的價值，但也包含了不同傳統文化的本土價值。以入江自己的話來說，全球共同體是一個「……透過政府間組織和國際非政府組織所建立的溝通網絡，……而並

83 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
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不是指一個創造出同質化的世界文明的全球共同體84。」

文化意義的全球共同體是超越國家之上的溝通網絡。在全球共同體裡，最根本的行行為者是個人，不分國籍、種族、性別、宗教的差別，共同開展出人類社會的普遍性原則，並以此原則為基礎，透過組織的形式集結力量共同為全人類的福祉努力。建構此溝通網絡以及人群之間的相互聯繫的最大功臣，入江認為是國際組織：「某種程度上國際組織有效地反映了跨國議題以及強化了全球人類的互賴感，它們被認定正在創造一個替代的世界，一個與主權國家不同的世界85」，他尤其重視那些從事文化與教育交流的政府間組織與國際非政府組織。

二、超越全球共同體的人類共同體（Human Community）

入江昭除了主張以非政府組織促成的全球共同體外，他更進一步設想了一個超越全球共同體的世界，亦即由組織所形成的世界。在《全球共同體：國際組織在現代世界成形中的角色》一書的結論中，入江表示國家行為者與非國家行為者之間的界限相當難劃分清楚86，因此「……所有的組織（國家、商業組織、國際

84 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, op.cit, p.192.
組織以及非政府組織)將會形成聯合國（前）秘書長Kofi A. Annan所谓的服务全人类的策略性夥伴，在世界日益全球化的今天。入江說這樣的一個各組織之間的相互聯盟所形成的世界，是一個比全球共同體更大的圖像，入江稱之為人類共同體（Human Community）。人類共同體是由各組織，包括國家、商業團體、政府間組織及非政府組織所共同合作所形成；而全球共同體是由國際組織，包括政府間與非政府組織所形成。人類共同體這樣的預想，連入江自己都認爲還言之過早，不過全球共同體可以做為形成人類共同體的一個很好的起點。

入江昭有關人類共同體概念的起源，其實來自於他把國際關係視為由多種層次的關係所構成，意即有權力之際的國際關係，有經濟之際的國際關係，也有文化之際的國際關係，這些都是整體國ượng關係中的面向。在過去，過分強調權力觀點的國際關係，因此形成以權力政治思考為根據的世界秩序，但不可否認的是經濟之際與文化之際國際關係的存在，因此「國際關係是這些所有世界的總合，國際關係的研究必須擁抱這些不一樣的、創造的、假設的以及重新建構的世界秩序」。

若依循這樣的脈絡，又可以大略地有以下的區分，權力國際關係的主要行為者是主權國家，經濟國際關係的主要行為者是追求利益的商業團體，文化國際關係的主要行為者是從事文化交

88 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
89 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 2.
流的非政府組織。在入江的思維中，國際關係雖然是三層（權力、經濟、文化）的共構，但是他顯然想把文化國際關係提升到最優先的地位，一旦一個文化定義的國際關係成立且優於另兩者，就可避免權力利益的比較與估算，如此一個和平的世界就可到來。由從事文化交流的非政府組織所促成的全球共同體正是一個文化定義的社群，入江想在一個文化定義的社群上與權力定義的社群、經濟定義的社群相互合作，如此形成人類共同體：「如果這些不同的社群未來能更緊密地結合在一起，將會出現一個人類共同體。」

入江昭所開展出的超脫中心觀點的方法，是把世界視為是一個文化的社群（全球共同體），文化社群的主體並非國家而是個人，透過個人力量的凝聚（非政府組織的形成）進行著跨國的文化與教育交流。在過程中，一方面促進了不同文化社群的相互理解，形成一個多元相互尊重的世界，進而開展出人類社會共同擁有的普世原則；另一方面非政府組織也將個人與世界連結，提供

90 Akira Iriye, 《Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World》, op. cit, p.209.
個人一種有別於國家認同的認同感。一旦能夠退出國家的框架，而以個人為主體在無國家的「文化的承載地」上往來行動，便可以超越地緣政治思考的世界觀，而以全人類的視野追求整體人類共同體的共同利益，那麼和平的世界也將到來。

在全球化時代的今天，文化的趨同與分歧是兩股相互競爭的力量。著名的政治學者杭亭頓 (Samuel P. Huntington) 所提出的「文明衝突論」（clash of civilizations）就認爲，「文化同時擁有分裂和聚合的力量」，以致於「文化近似的人民和國家聚在一起，不同文化的人民和國家則分道揚鑣」。杭亭頓的分裂與聚合似乎是兩條平行線而毫無交會，因此文化近似者會結合的越緊密，相反地也就越加排斥文化分歧者。杭亭頓進而推斷，在全球政治重新組合的文化斷層線之間，不同文化間的摩擦將會越來越深，而非朝向融合的方向邁進，故文明體系間的衝突是世界和平的最大威脅。入江昭其實早在杭亭頓之前就已經注意到文化歧異與誤解是導致衝突的原因。他以這樣獨特的角度來解釋美、中、日三方的歷史演變，頗不同於杭亭頓。入江昭主張透過文化交流的方式，為這條文化斷層線搭起橋樑，分歧固然存在，但如何讓分歧的文化群體能夠彼此理解與尊重，從而開展出人類社會共有普遍性原則才是關鍵。一個既分歧（不同文化群體的存在）又趨同（不同文化群體都意識到彼此之間有著某些共同的特徵）的

91  Samuel P. Huntington，黃裕美譯，《文明衝突與世界秩序的重建》，台北：聯經，2001，頁 76。
92  Samuel P. Huntington，前引書，頁 165。
世界是有可能成立的，其中國際組織扮演著重要的連結者的角色，尤其是非政府組織，因此入江昭似乎提供了一個文明之間必然衝突的解決之道。

最後，以圖表的形式勾勒出本章整理入江昭所預想的和平世界藍圖，如下：
公民社會 (civil society)：非國家行為者 (non-state actor)扮
演越來越重要的角色，包括非政府組織與個人。

國內非政府組織與他國具有共同理念的行為者相互
合作，或者自身於他國設
立分支形成國際非政府組
織，從事文化上的交流。

個人在國際上的文化交流
(包括旅遊、交換學生、
學者之間的交流等)

國際政府間組織 (例如：
聯合國教科文組織對於文
化交流上的貢獻)

文化層次
上的交流
(文化國
際主義)

多元文化主義：不同文化群
體之間的相互尊重與理解。

人類共同體 (human community)：所有組
織 (國家、商業團
體、政府間組織、非
政府組織等)共同合
作形成的社群。

全球共同體 (global community)：由從
事文化交流的國際
組織 (政府間或非
政府組織)所形成
的社群。

普遍主義：人類社
會中所有的普
遍性。

經濟國際主義
政治國際主義
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

日裔美籍的入江昭把學術研究的焦點擺在日本與美國上並不令人意外，但他對中國的重視卻不亞於美日。對他而言中國似乎有不可忽略的重要地位。中國在入江昭學術主張中的意義以及扮演的角色是本章以下的主要關切。

在學術主張上，入江設想了一個和平的世界，因此在看待中國時也是把中國放在和事世界的架構下進行理解，然而中國如何納入這個和平世界的體系當中？又中國在和事世界的構想中扮演怎樣的角色？發揮了怎樣的功能？入江看到 20 世紀末世界秩序的主要特徵之一，就是區域共同體的形成，最明顯的例子為歐盟的成立，因此 21 世紀的世界秩序除了受到個別國家行為的影響外，更重要的是區域集團間的互動關係。而亞洲國家「在二十世紀即將結束的此刻，不論集體上或個別地都持續地在近代歷史的形成中扮演了重要的角色」。因此，中國除了自身的行動

入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場——一種多元身份的知識視野

外，也必須融入亞太共同體、亞洲共同體或東亞共同體之類的區域聯盟當中，才能為和平世界作出貢獻。換言之，少了中國也就無法形成亞洲國家之間的區域聯盟，而少了亞洲國家的世界，就不再能稱為是具有真正普遍主義的和平世界。

第一節 入江昭的亞洲觀

一、和平世界的形成：東方與西方文明之間的溝通與對話

多數從事亞洲國家近代史研究的西方學者，常以東方與西方文明的交會與衝突來進行詮釋，認爲是在受到西方國家的衝擊後，亞洲國家才從前現代國家邁向現代化國家，沒有西方衝擊的

3 入江昭希望在亞洲地區也能出現某種形式的區域共同體，而東亞共同體雖不是由入江率先倡導，但概念上與入江昭的主張相同。而時下流行的「東亞共同體」一詞經常出現在各式的雙邊與多邊合作宣言中，但各界對共同體的認同與內容卻保持技術上的含糊不清。目前一般國際上所認知的所謂「共同體」，主要是指以封闭的和約束性為基本特徵的歐洲共同體為代表。……從東亞國家進行的各式合作來看，雖然對「共同體」一詞，保持想像的空間，但是以「東協加三」架構下，自由貿易區的建構及金融互助等低層次的合作，再進一步推出「東亞高峰會」，一直是東亞成員公認的邁向「共同體」理想的邏輯。”參考：吳瑞君，《東協國家與東亞經濟合作：從「東協加三」到「東亞高峰會」》，《問題與研究》，第 46 卷第 2 期，2007 年 4-6 月，頁 121。
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

入江昭則認為文明之間本是相對的，東方與西方文明本質上不同，然而並無優劣之分。例如，中國社會的特色是體系的持久性以及觀念的和諧；而歐洲文明強調理性主義、現代化和平衡。他認為「兩者都是各自獨立的，具有實質意義的思想體系，兩者都對一個和諧的社會功能提供知性的背景，它們都同等重要，兩者並無正面的抵觸，或者暴力的衝突」。此外儘管兩者存在分歧，也能透過溝通交流的方式發現彼此間共存的普遍性，藉此形成一個更和平的世界。入江和平世界首要主張的，是文明之間的彼此共存與理解，東方（亞洲）與西方文明之間的對話與學習，是形成和平世界的關鍵。

二、亞太共同體的建立：東方與西方偕同的途徑

如何使根植於不同傳統的東西方文明彼此偕同以形成世界？入江認為一個亞洲太平洋社群的建立，可以做為東方與西方對話的平台與基礎，入江在《跨越太平洋：一個美國與東亞關係

的内部历史》一书中主张，中美日三方间的知性的对话能够促使相互理解，并形成一个跨越太平洋的人类共同体。这样一个横跨太平洋的社群所意涵的，正是超越了东西文明的分界线，因为这样一种亚太共同体的建立，是透过代表西方文明的美国，以及代表亚洲文明的中国与日本共同合作才能形成，入江似乎想透过中美日三边的合作，将东西文明彼此连接起来。

即使美国文明与欧洲文明仍有所区隔，但追溯历史源流，美国所使用的语言、艺术、政治组织以及经济活动都是脱胎于欧洲文明。换句话说，入江认为「美国一直都是一一个西方的社会，它的演进都是近代西方历史的一部分」。而中国与日本即使不能代表全部的亚洲国家，但整体而言，亚洲国家之间都分享著某些对于政治和文化稳定性的共同取向，例如儒家所强调的自然与人之间的一个和谐关系，对于亚洲大多数国家政治与文化都产生影响。

美国与中国、日本分别代表西方与东方的文明传统，进行著文明之间的对话，而一个亚太共同体的建立，正是从事这种对话的平台。入江认为要了解美国的历史发展以及西方文明的历传统，就不能不了解亚洲，因为

藉由检视西方带给亚洲国家的影响，我可以更清楚地了解现代历史的一个主要现象，即东方与西方的交

5  相关引述可见前章注释23。
6  Akira Iriye, "Asia and America," op. cit, p. 4.
7  Akira Iriye, Ibid, pp. 5-6.
會。而美國的歷史不管人們有沒有注意到，已經是這個東西交會歷史發展的一部分，且不可能與美國自身的歷史分離；相反地若沒有理解美國在現代亞洲發展中代表什麼樣地意義，美國歷史是不能被完全地了解的。

從18世紀開始，亞洲已經從西方學習到許多經驗與知識，現在是到了由亞洲給予西方一點回饋的時候，但是這種反向的回饋必須也要歐洲人與美國人願意去探究它們才是有意義的。同樣地，亞洲也是東西方交會發展過程中的部分，因此亞洲也必須學習西方，才能真正了解自身歷史的發展與意義，唯有「透過這樣的探索，我們學習到人類社會如何彼此互動，到達今天不管在政治、經濟、活動、審美觀都比以往更加相互依賴的地步。」

入江曾表示，「我認為，建設一個排外性的亞洲國家共同體是錯誤的，不應將美國和一些拉美國家排除在外。可以成立一種跨太平洋的共同體，可以稱之為『亞太盆地』共同體。」這正是亞太共同體的概念，而在東西文明對話的亞太共同體基礎上，可進而促成和平世界。「如果整個亞洲太平洋區域的資源能夠聚集在一起，它將會創造一個龐大的發展幸福以及和平的機會。」

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8 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
9 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 11.
10 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 5.
11 記者劉波、馬娟，〈文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴〉，《21 世紀經濟報導》，2006年11月11日。http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm
個區域可能對於創造一個新的世界社群有所貢獻。」

三、亞洲共同體的形成：追求和諧關係的亞洲意識

亞太共同體所包含的地域範圍很難武斷範定，但大體上「亞太區域的核心仍然可以被視為是由大部分亞洲國家（印度以東）和太平洋國家所組成」，亞洲是形成亞太共同體不可或缺的角色，因而要形成亞太共同體就必須先有共同體意識及亞洲意識的出現。入江從歐盟的經驗中樂觀的看到，在未來會有亞洲共同體的出現：「我認為會有亞洲共同體的出現。我們回顧歐盟之前的歐洲歷史，法德兩國一直不斷爆發戰爭，現在兩國統一在歐盟的旗幟下，和平共處、共同發展，不會再爆發戰爭。亞洲國家之間同樣爆發過戰爭，但是同歐洲國家一樣，我仍然相信我們可以團

結在一起，組成亞洲共同體 15 」。

入江昭所期望建立的亞洲共同體，是透過亞洲國家間不斷地交流，然後所進而發展具有共同價值觀的想像的亞洲共同體 16，此种共同價值觀的出現意味亞洲意識的形成。從歷史的发展過程中，入江看到 1960 年代末期除了歐洲的區域主義整合外，亞洲也在同時間第一次發展出區域的認同，這種認同感不同於 1930 年代日本對其他亞洲國家強行灌輸的大東亞主義，新的亞洲秩序是植基於亞洲國家卓越的經濟表現上，包括中國、台灣、南韓以及東協國家 17。顯然亞洲國家都對追求經濟成長有關共同的認知與重視。

亞洲意識除了展現在經濟層面上，更重要的是在文化上亞洲國家也都追求一種和諧穩定的社會關係，不管是在政治與文化之間或自然與人類之間，這是與西方文明以權力來相互制衡彼此的關係不同。相較於制衡所形成的穩定秩序，亞洲國家更強調以相互融通的方式找到和諧的共存之道，入江曾說：「回憶一下大約在西元 1700 年，正是孕育美國這個國家的時期，亞洲社會就已經

15 劉鸞，〈國際文化主義者入江昭：呼籲超越國家的文明交匯〉，《北大新聞網》，2006 年 11 月 6 日。
http://pkunews.pku.edu.cn/xwzh/2006-11/06/content_110280.htm

16 吳侑倫，《必由之路？日本進入全球化的中國途徑—入江昭、大前研一與小室哲哉的論述》，台北：台大政治系中國大陸暨兩岸關係教學與研究中心，2008，頁 37。

出現了成熟的文明。在當時亞洲最發達的社會—中國，就已經能夠維持政治和文化的穩定性近兩千年的時間。18」

顯然對入江而言，亞洲是一個和諧而穩定的象徵19，基本上是因為亞洲受到儒家思想很大的影響，「中國維持了單一的文明，以及大致來說單一的政治單元，它是一個權力和文化相互支持的體系，這個國家由皇帝和他的僕從、官員所統治，他們都必須依據儒家的標準來行事，在自然、人類以及社會之間有著和諧的關係，而不是疏離的關係20。」儘管並非所有亞洲國家都受到儒家思想的影響，例如印度、東南亞國家，但他們也發展出自己的文化傳統21，來維持著體系的穩定性，這是亞洲文化之間的共同特色。

亞洲國家之間在文化上有著分歧，但這並不影響他們對於和諧關係的渴望，正可以說明在一個多元文化的世界裡，不同文化如何彼此共存，進而開展出彼此之間的共性。入江指出，「雖然亞洲國家在政治和種族上並不如歐洲般一致，然而亞洲的興起指出的是，不只是日本，這個區域的其他國家也都準備好在世界事務當中定義自己的定位，亞洲國家有它們自己獨特文化傳統的這個事實是很重要，因為這意味着國際秩序正在呈現出文化上的分歧22。」在入江所設想的和平世界裡，文化的分歧是必然的，但重要的是如何讓這樣的分歧彼此和諧地存在，這必須依賴不斷溝通。
通所形成的共享價值觀，存在多樣文化元素的亞洲，更需要彼此的合作與溝通，而不是由霸權國主導一切。

因此，亞洲共同體概念並非由單一國家主導，入江認為應由中、日、韓、東協國家共同合作完成，因此亞洲共同體概念下的中國，不會是單一主導的國家，但中國的文明（儒家思想）在亞洲意識的凝聚上將發揮重要的作用。入江曾表示：

21世紀是中國的世紀，並非意味中國將主宰世界，而
是中國將對世界事務發揮多方面巨大影響力，而中國
對世界的影響，將表現在中國經濟、文化對世界的影
響上。21世紀將是文明的世紀，不同的文明碰撞、交
流，相互作用，將對世界局勢產生深遠影響，中華文
明將在這一過程中發揮重要作用。

故在亞洲共同體當中，中華文明雖不是唯一形成亞洲意識的因素，但卻扮演著重要的角色。

四、建立東亞新秩序

2005年12月13日於馬來西亞舉行的東協加三領袖會議裡，

23 記者劉波、馬娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21世紀經濟
報導》，2006年11月11日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm

24 記者劉璇，《國際文化主義者入江昭：呼籲超越國家的文明交匯》，《北大
content_110280.htm
各國領袖曾發表聲明表達希望建立東亞共同體（East Asia community），希冀東亞共同體能夠促進文化或文明之間的寬容及相互理解，即使有人指是純粹政治措辭，但入江認為至少領袖們已經認知到文明間對話的重要性。25

東亞共同體的構想與入江希望建立一個亞洲共同體是一致的，缺了東亞國家的亞洲共同體就不足以稱作亞洲共同體，因而東亞共同體概念雖非入江所提出，但他對此有許多自己的見解，展現在他對東亞新秩序的期待上。他認為東亞國家對於亞洲事務的影響力不只是在政治層面上的，更重要的是經濟與文化層面上的影響。

（一）東亞經濟秩序的建立

入江從歷史的發展脈絡中看到二戰後東亞經濟實力崛起的過程，他認為「1960年代灑下了未來亞太共同體發展的種子」，因為正是在這一階段亞洲國家開始著眼於經濟上的重建與復甦，尤其是身為東亞國家的日本，在美國軍事以及經濟的援助下把國家政策重心全然擺在經濟發展上，使得日本能在戰後快速復甦，成為經濟巨人，並帶動其它亞洲國家經濟上的發展。

入江提到1960年代的越戰並未將日本拖入戰爭泥淖，身爲美國同盟的日本，在美國欲堵中國所發動的越戰中扮演消極角色，日本並不支持美國發動越戰，也不違背美國不承認中共的政

25 Akira Iriye, “Global Governance in the Age of Transnationalism.” op. cit, p. 34.
策，日本試圖將經濟與政治中分離，並以此對待中國以及其他亞洲國家。

與此同時，好幾個東南亞國家結合成東協（ASEAN），把焦點放在區域經濟發展上，這剛好與日本的政策相符合。27 在日本與亞洲國家都以經濟為發展的前提下，日本與東南亞國家在經濟上緊密聯繫，甚至有人啓用戰爭期間的語彙「大東亞共榮圈」來形容這一時期。28

到了 70 年代，即使經歷了石油危機以及布列頓森林體系的瓦解，日本、南韓、香港、新加坡、台灣仍有多驚人的成長。80 年代亞洲經濟已經不同於中東、非洲或拉美而能快速發展。29 90 年則是另外東亞國家—中國在經濟上崛起，並帶動亞洲其他國家的經濟發展：

二戰之後，日本利用美國的科技，並且以美國為出口市場得到了巨大的增長，歷史的這一頁已經翻過了。現在是中國發展非常迅速，生產各種消費品和工業產品，各國經濟之間發生從來沒有的巨大相互依賴性。30

27 Akira Iriye, “The United States and Japan in Asia: A Historical Perspective.” op. cit, p. 47.
28 例如：日本付出巨額賠款給二戰時期其佔領的亞洲國家，同時並給予這些國家優惠貸款。東南亞國家則相對地運用這些資金購買日本的工業產品。Akira Iriye, “East Asia.” op. cit, pp. 211-212.
30 記者劉波、馬娟，〈文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴〉，《21 世紀經濟報道》，2006 年 11 月 11 日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm
也因经济上的互赖，使每个东亚国家都更加需要与其他亚洲国家合作，以形成亚洲共同体。他说道：「日本曾在上世纪 70 和 80 年代短暂地拥有过东亚经济的主导地位，这种地位最终可能将由其他力量取代。但这并不会转变成中国控制亚洲市场或者亚洲经济，而是建立一种地区的共同体，包括中日韩三国以及东盟国家等，建立类似欧盟那样的地区共同体，这是我所希望的。和各自单打独斗、相互竞争相比，形成一个共同体对各个国家都有利。」

(二) 东亚文化秩序的建立

亚洲国家或多或少都受到中国儒家的影响，都各自追求体系的和谐与稳定，然而过去的歷史包袱却始终影响着亚洲国家对彼此的看法，而这也是入江认为形成亚洲共同体的最大阻力。入江曾说：「至于阻力，我认为是亚洲过去的歷史，過去的历史充满了战争，現在仍存在對历史認識的分歧。這將成為亞洲走向聯盟的最大阻力」。尤其是，东亚战争的歷史陰霾直到現在都還深深地影响著亚洲国家之间的和諧關係，入江提到「东亚近年来民族主义的发展很强烈，导致中國、日本与南韩之间的摩擦—對於摩擦的關鍵無疑在于日本民族主义对于上一場戰争（按：大東

31 記者劉波、馬娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21 世紀經報》2006 年 11 月 11 日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm
此處「東盟」為用語上的不同，指的是「東協」。
亞戰爭）的辯護⋯⋯。33 在經濟層面上二戰後的東亞秩序的確已經建立，但文化上東亞國家間始終有無法跨越的隔閡。

入江相信，只有經濟合作而缺乏文化和諧的東亞新秩序很容易再次產生衝突，因各國彼此形象（image）的好壞，是衝突會否發生的根源。因此，欲建立一個和諧的東亞新秩序必須面對下列的困難：第一、戰爭的記憶仍深深留在亞洲人的心中，特別是中國人和韓國人持續對日本的不信任；第二、不像是歐洲國家間有著共同的歷史和文化背景，亞洲是由許多不同種族、宗教和文化傳統所組成，亞洲國家彼此間沒有什麼共同點34。

1. 弭平戰爭記憶的傷口

如何使東亞國家間從二戰的歷史記憶中跳脫出來？入江認為，中日韓三者間必須重新建構對彼此的印象，並進而化解敵意，如此一個和諧的東亞新秩序才有可能，進而一個亞洲共同體才有可能成形。入江對於大東亞戰爭，給予強烈譴責，認為日本應該對中韓等亞洲國家道歉，因「事實上對於本地人來說，日本的統治是更可憎的（比起西方），因為它結合了釋放亞洲的修辭，然而卻很少有實質的內容」35。入江曾對日本戰後的態度感到失望，他說：

33 Akira Iriye, “Global Governance in the Age of Transnationalism.” op. cit, pp. 33-34.
34 Akira Iriye, “East Asia.” op. cit, p. 214.
最令人無法原諒的還是日本戰敗後的態度。譬如日本
正式與中國和解的時間比和英美和解晚了二十年，雖
然他們可能對中國懷有更多歉疚與自責，但是他們卻
始終認為自己不是唯一需要對戰爭負責的一方，亞洲
秩序本來就是由日美兩國共同維繫；另外，他們還堅
持自己也是戰爭受害的一方，因為他們相信這場戰爭
是歷史必然的慘劇，為了解今日的和平與繁榮36。

入江也提及「日本人、中國人、韓國人和其他人將必須了解，
為什麼日本對中國人以及韓國人所犯的錯誤，是一種違反跨國主
義的罪行，以及為什麼對他們來說，為了達到和解的目的，承諾
重新回到跨國主義是重要的37」。意即中日韓三國的人民應該要
了解道歉的意義何在？日本的道歉不是為了滿足中國與韓國日
漸強盛的民族主義需求，日本人也不必因為道歉而感到永遠的羞
愧。道歉的意義在於認清日本過去在二戰犯的錯誤乃違反了和平
的期待與追求，這是一個全人類所共同尋求的目標，而日本的道
歉是一種對於重回追求和平目標軌道的一種承諾。

這樣的任務即使相當困難，但也只有面對了過去的歷史包袱
後，才能夠展望更遙遠的未來，「同樣重要的是這樣的一個區域
秩序將必須面對過去：日本和他戰時的敵人和殖民地必須發展一

36 入江昭，（日本與四強的對抗），輯於入江昭、孔華潤（編），（巨人的轉
變：美國與東亞），上海：復旦大學出版社，1991，頁 207-223。轉引自：
吳侑倫，前引書，頁 63。

37 Akira Iriye, “Global Governance in the Age of Transnationalism.” op. cit, p. 34.
個對彼此歷史的共同理解，……那將是不容易的，但是若沒有分享過去，要分享未來將會是困難的。”只有靠日本真心誠意的道歉，且中日韓三國都理解道歉的真義，一個和諧的東亞秩序才有可能。

2. 從東亞意識到亞太意識

對於 2005 年東協加三領袖會議所提出的東亞共同體的概念，入江以歐盟的經驗為例，認為重點在於能否開展出東亞意識，他說歐盟之所以能夠形成是因爲歐盟各國分享著共同的價值與觀點，例如他們對包容、正義、平等、人權的重視都清楚的載於歐盟憲章中，因此東亞共同體成形的關鍵在能否發展出彼此共同分享的價值觀。

亞洲國家間的確存在著文化及歷史的分歧，例如中國、日本面對西方衝擊的取向截然不同。「……日本試著使自己適應於大量的文化轉變而不失去國家的獨立，而中國在文化上相對地改變較少，但卻一次又一次地經歷嚴重的政治危機……」然而入江並未對此感到失望，他反而樂觀地認為，東亞共同體概念的提出，證明了至少亞洲的領導者們已經認知對對話的必要性，他認為「東亞共同體的國家也可以擁有一些共同的價值觀，同時不排除多樣化，對多樣化要寬容。環境也將是重要的內容。如果可以

38 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
39 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
有一些共同的價值觀，這個國家共同體就將有旺盛的生命力。

入江相信亞洲國家之間仍有某些積極正向的共同形象，例如在經濟上的成就。他說，「當世界把新興工業化經濟體（NIEs 南韓、台灣、香港、新加坡）、中國、東協和其他亞洲國家在經濟上的成就視為是經濟奇蹟時，有一種區域的榮耀超越了國家的認同」。

此外，民主化也是東亞國家的共性，即使緩慢，許多國家都非常強調。入江說：「我認為人民的和平願望和對未來的抉擇是促成亞洲共同體的首要因素，人民要求亞洲建立最基本的保障和平的秩序，中國、韓國、日本人民都要求堅決避免戰爭，維護地區和平，而經濟因素可以強化國家之間的聯繫，這是形成亞洲共同體的推動力」。

顯然他對於和平的期望建立在一種亞洲人民的共同意識上，這種心理層次的願望便是一種文化力量，驅使著亞洲國家彼此合作，不管是官方或民間皆然。儘管經濟交流與相互依賴可推動亞洲共同體，然而最根本的動力還是渴望和平。

時下流行的東亞共同體話語，與入江主張相符。東亞共同體無疑是他亞洲共同體概念的再現，不過入江亞洲共同體的最終目的在於形成亞太共同體作爲東西文明交流的基礎，因此入江特別

41 記者劉波、馬娟，〈文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴〉，《21世紀經濟報導》，2006 年 11 月 11 日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm
43 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

強調東亞共同體與太平洋國家之間的關係，以形成所謂的「泛亞洲區域秩序」或他稱之為「亞太盆地」的概念。他說：「東協這個在發展區域經濟秩序上非常成功的團體，也已開始與韓國、中國、日本以及印度針對自由貿易協定進行對話，最後這些協定的結合將可能促進一個泛亞洲區域秩序（pan-Asian regional order），但是其他的國家特別是美國、墨西哥、澳洲紐西蘭也將會成為會員。」

第二節 入江昭的中國觀：中日合群形成亞洲

東亞共同體與入江話語中對於亞洲共同體的期待，以及東亞經濟與文化秩序的構想，在概念上是相符合的。建立在文化與經濟關係上的東亞必須先行，如此才有亞洲共同體的後續，進而由亞太共同體作爲東西文明交會的途徑，尋求真正的普遍性精神，這是入江設想的達成和平世界的途徑，因而一個和平的世界必定要有東亞的存在，而東亞內最主要的兩個行為者中國與日本，「他們（中日）存在的事實，以及他們交往的形式已經成為東亞歷史中最持久的特色」，中日之間的關係深切地影響著東

45 參考本書註釋 12。
46 Akira Iriye, “Global Governance in the Age of Transnationalism.” op. cit, p. 34.
亞的形成。

東亞形成的基礎在於中日本是否能合作。 「中日兩國文化互動的歷史是如此地根深蒂固，以致於無法被抹滅。」 看似擁有共同文化紐帶的中日合作似乎理所當然，然而歷史呈現出的卻是一種更為複雜的情節。

中國人和日本人作為亞洲的鄰居已經有將近兩千年的時間，地理上兩者是如此接近，然而心理上卻相當遙遠，儘管他們有著共同的文化根基，中日之間都曾經發展出共同感以及分歧感、互賴感以及獨立感、相互尊重又相互猜忌、彼此吸引又彼此抗拒、相互欣賞又以高傲之姿對待他方。他們論及彼此分享的遺產，以及身為亞洲人的認同，但是他們也毫不遲疑地尋求外在的協助攻擊他方。

中日兩國之間儘管「有著共同的文化根基」，然而又為什麼「心理上卻相當遙遠」？早在唐朝時日本大化革新標誌著中日文化的共同根源，然而 19 世紀中期後西方國家的來對中日造成衝擊，中日兩國在心理上的分歧，很大一部分來自於他們面對西方的策略上的不同。中國持續以自身的改造面對西方，然而日本則藉由亞洲超越東西方的對立。中國對亞洲身份缺乏熱情而日

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49 Akira Iriye, “Introduction.” op. cit, p. 3.
本節用亞洲身份界定中國，亞洲便成為雙方齟齬之所在。

一、中國與亞洲身份

（一）亞洲需要中國

中國作為東亞的一份子不僅是地理上的位置關係，更在於文化上賦予東亞特殊性，這是植根於儒家文化對於東亞其他國家根深蒂固的影響，包括韓國、日本在吸收儒家文化思想之後都衍生出各自的流派。子安宣邦文化東亞的概念指出，沒有中國文明作為根基的東亞文明似乎就無法形成，在文化上東亞是需要中國的。

對文化力量的重視始終是中國文明與其他文明有所區別之處，入江曾說「……相較於西方，中國的政治領導者、官員以及知識分子都試著把自身歸屬於一個文明的社會，而不是一個軍事強權。」這種概念根植於儒家文化的傳統，他發現中國人認爲軍事力量充其量是維持國內秩序一個難免的邪惡，不值得感到光榮。相對於西方認為戰爭是一種必然，在中國大部分的軍事衝突是為了要維持國內秩序或對抗蠻夷的入侵，換句話說，軍事用在消極防衛，而非積極侵略，故「相較於文化作爲一個權威以及偉
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場：一種多元身份的知識視野

大的象徵，軍事力量是較不重要的。」

入江曾簡短地探究中國從漢代到清代的歷史興衰，發現儒家文化在漢朝成為正式的官方意識形態後，不管歷經多少夷族統治，儒家始終是維繫中國文明的精神支柱，縱使夷族也被容納入儒家文化圈，甚至比漢人還更中國化。

不管是漢族或夷族統治下的中國，中國文明都持續存在，這證明了儒家文化所展現出的人與自然、政治與文化之間廣泛的和諧關係，入江認為：

這種和諧的思想將有助於將世界不同的地區連接起來，尤其是在亞洲地區之內。中國可以倡導將國家之間的關係和諧化，包括文化寬容和宗教寬容等。如果這樣，中國可以發揚領導作用，建立一種和諧的基礎。中國能做到這一點，因為和諧是中國古老文明的重要原則之一，是儒家的理念之一。但這不只是人與人之間的和諧，還有人與自然之間的和諧。如果能強調這一點，促進國家之間的和諧，容忍彼此之間的分歧，建立一種共同的基礎，我認為這可以成為一種共同性的準則。我希望中國能在這一點上發揮作用。而且鑑於中國對世界文明做出了那麼多的貢獻，我認為中國

\[52\] Akira Iriye, Ibid.


\[54\] 可參考本節第4頁。
應當發揮這種作用\textsuperscript{55}。

因此，起源自中國以和諧關係為內涵的儒家思想，能夠促進東亞、亞洲甚至世界各國之間的交往。

(二) 中國不必然，但應該要有亞洲身份

傳統中國文化建構了自身優越的文化意識，相對於夷狄的無君無父，中國社會處於「父子有親、君臣有義、夫婦有別、長幼有序、朋友有信」的狀態。西方在剛與中國接觸時，也無法擺脫被視為蠻夷的命運\textsuperscript{56}，然而在鴉片戰爭、英法聯軍之後，中國文化優越的自我形象很快遭到攻擊，成為落後必須被淘汰的文明。中國知識份子面對西方開始進行仿效來復興自我，因而有自強運動、維新變法、立憲運動、以及五四時期大量西方文化的引進。然而儘管如此，身處在亞洲的中國從來也沒有如同日本知識界浮現加入西方的願望，故儘管吸收西方文化的長處，然而那只是為了復興中國文化之用，中國還是中國，中國從來也不是西方，亞洲身份從來不曾困擾中國思想界，相較於日本，中國沒有對亞洲身份的敏感度。

近年來中國崛起的提法更隱含了中國不需要亞洲身份，影射中國將直接挑戰歐美，如此中國就不是亞洲身份所能規範的國

\textsuperscript{55} 記者劉波、馬娟，〈文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴〉，《21 世紀經濟報導》，2006 年 11 月 11 日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_2.htm

\textsuperscript{56} 伍曉明，〈自己與異己：西方面前的二十世紀中國文化自我意識〉，輯於陳清僑（編），《身份認同與公共文化：文化研究論文集》，香港：牛津大學出版社，1997，頁 327-330。
家，因為就算歐美繼續把中國看成亞洲，但『中國崛起』之後不
需要靠亞洲……。57」中國崛起意味着中國欲以中國的身分，而不
是亞洲的身分行走於國際社會，並直接面對西方。

然而入江認為，一個不要亞洲身分的中國將無法徹底的了解
自身，只有中國與日本攜手共同形成亞洲，中國才能更認識自
己。Michael Howard 認為現代國家首先是透過異別化、衝突或戰
勝其他國家的方式來定義自身58，此種他者認識是透過賦予他者
敵意並藉由否定的方式來認識自己，即透過「我不是你」的方
式來確知「我是我」，這樣的他者認識通常是帶有貶抑色彩的，
經由將他者定義在落後、野蠻、無知的形象中以顯示自身的優
越、先進與智慧。然而帶有貶抑的他者認識不是入江所主張的他
者認識。入江說：

探索中日間彼此相互認識的學者們認為，中日之間除
了誤解、冷漠、高傲、自大等任何事都具備之外，就
是缺乏溝通。中國人總是堅持著傳統的印象，輕視日
本是一個模仿的侏儒國家，他們一點也不願意學習日
本的任何事務，直到為時已晚。對明治時代的日本人
來說，他們熱切地將自己西方化，直到他們不再把自
己視為是亞洲國家，不再是中國文明圈的一員，1890

57 石之瑜，〈回到亞洲？—日本認識中國崛起的思想基礎〉，《世界經濟與
政治》，第 4 期，2006，頁 13。
年代福澤諭吉反覆宣揚這樣的觀念，他提出日本離開亞洲，加入進步的西方國家的行列。入江說，相互的高傲與自大只會不斷地促成誤解，而這種認為當時中日之間只有負面印象的說法是一種扭曲的詮釋。入江認為自19世紀後半期以降，中日之間更加意識到對方的存在，中日基本上透過歐洲或美國作爲中間的媒介，或者透過直接的觀察獲得彼此的資訊。日本知識界向來熟稔中國的歷史，他們也持續在研讀中國的經典，而當時的中國官方以及知識份子也開始展現出對日本歷史、政治甚至文化的興趣，甚至出版許多關於日本的書籍，尤其是關注在日本的現代化。日本人也不是都主張脫亞，或完全去除日本文化中的中國要素，入江舉出明治時代的改革進行了許多西化的革新，但學校教育卻仍然保持中國漢字的書寫系統，以及對中國古典的研讀，許多的日本人可以說比以前更加熟悉中國文明。

中日之間對彼此的認識當然也是一種他者認識的觀念，因為「自己或者對於自己的意識始終或隱或顯地依賴某一異己」，然而這種他者是不帶有貶抑的，簡言之入江是從正向肯定的方式來認識自己的，因為「我了解你」所以「我更加對自己有所了解」。

59 Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting*, op.cit, p. 28.
60 入江提到根據1884年一位到日本行使外交任務的官員（Ch'en Chia-lin）觀察，日本已經建立新式學校、開礦、造鐵路、組織銀行以及執行許多國家轉型的計畫。Akira Iriye, Ibid, pp. 28-29.
62 伍曉明：前引書，頁326。這裡的異己是作者用語，意指的是他者（the other）
中日之間的情結也是如此，這是因爲中日之間在文化上的血緣關係是如此地根深蒂固。中日文化彼此相互交織影響著。中國不了解日本就無法了解自身，日本不了解中國也無法了解自身。

(三) 以文化國際主義看待中日文化的相依性

「事實上明治時代的日本人經常強調作爲一個成功西化的國家的角色，因此扮演著中國與西方之間的中間者。」例如許多根據西方原著所撰寫的日本著作大量翻譯成中文。中國人透過日本人的翻譯吸收西方的辭彙與概念，因此「在當時文化上的改變是中國歷史中的一個重要現象的話，那將很難忽略日本人的中介。」然而這是否是一種日本的文化帝國主義呢？入江間接地否定這個的角度：「無論這個案例指的是否是日本控制了中國文化或日本對中國的文化霸權，這都是一個較為複雜的假定，正因為日本人不曾動搖過他們對中國文化的依賴，特別是他們的文學以及書寫系統。」入江表示，中國人最多認為日本只是成功地傳遞了西方文明，這並不代表中國人受到日本文化的影響。

入江提到的美國與亞洲之間的關係也可以用來說明這樣的想法：入江認為學習亞洲是為了更加了解美國的歷史、社會與文化。美國可以藉由亞洲的歷史經驗以及天人之間的和諧關係來解決美國的問題。例如：美國人關注都市犯罪、污染、貿易赤字、商業效率等問題，都可以參考其他國家在相關議題上的處理辦法與經驗。例如：中國有效地減少貧窮，日本的低犯罪率的成就都可以作爲美國的借鏡。參考：Akira Iriye, “Asia and America.” op. cit, p. 5, 10.

Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op.cit, p. 34.

Akira Iriye, Ibid.

Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 35.
若加以引申入江的意思，與其說中國是受到日本文化的影響，不如說是受到西方文化的影響，因為日本只是中間人而不是傳遞日本文化。「相對於西方人，日本人不會試圖轉變中國人來信仰他們的宗教，神道或佛教⋯⋯畢竟是中國給予日本佛教信仰」。

入江認為，日本與中國文化有很淵源，這是為什麼在中國人的印象是，日本文化乃脫胎於中國文化，因此中國文化比較優越。而日本人心理上一直急欲擺脫日本文化是中國文化分支的說法，因此知識界努力開創學說證明日本文化並非次於中國文化。以文化帝國主義來看待文化關係就一定會有優劣之分，因此應該以文化國際主義取而代之，視文化關係為文化群體之間的平等關係。

入江曾舉 1920 年代美國文化的盛行為例，「因為美國是發展中的大眾文化的中心，被意識到的新國際主義大致可與文化美國化（cultural americanization）相互替換，但是這不能被視為一種眼光狹隘的現象，或是一種其他意義的帝國主義⋯⋯借用 1990 年代的辭彙，美國文化變得去中心化了（de-centered），也就是說美國文化傳播到世界的其他區域，也就不再只是『美國的』了」。當美國文化被在地文化所內化吸收後，美國的文化特性也許仍然存在，但已不同於原初的美國文化而具有在地特色，成為當地文化傳統的一部分。中日之間的文化關係也是如此，日本

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67 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
68 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
69 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, op. cit, p. 84.
文化對中國文化的依賴是可以確定的，但在吸收了中國文化後，
日本自身也發展出具有中國文化特徵，又不同於中國文化的日本
文化。這兩種文化本就有所相依，但也有所區隔，它們都是天平
兩端平等的文化傳統，不是優劣的關係，它們相互交織影響著，
不斷地建構著彼此的文化內涵，因爲文化關係是不斷互動、溝
通、交流與建構的雙向過程。則日本知識界努力透過文本闡述證
明日本與中國在文明地位上的平等關係，其實是一種不證自明的
道理，至於之後日本知識界發展出的脫亞入歐欲與中國切割，或
以西化最成功的亞洲國家自居，須負起教導落後中國的責任，
或 1930 年代必須扮演帶領全亞洲面對西方挑戰的日本，這些都
是日本傳統上對自身傳統文化自卑感作崇的結果。由文化自卑所
引起的文化優越感，無疑是錯誤的，因為，日本與中國文化根本
無法分離（中日文化本就相依），也不必分離（中日文化本就有
所區隔），若能以文化國際主義看待的中日文化關係，探究的便
不再是中日文化的優劣問題，而是二者如何溝通、交流與相互影
響。
二、日本與亞洲身份

(一) 日本需要亞洲身份

如同中國在 19 世紀中期以後面對西力的衝擊，日本也當面臨相同的過程。西方東來以前，中國是日本學習模仿的對象，居宣長曾形容當時日本對中國文化的崇拜是「欲僞裝其身為漢人，視皇國為他國」。儘管有些誇大，但不難看出西方東來前的日本從來也就沒有懷疑過自己的文化身份。當中國經歷過鴉片戰爭的敗戰後，日本對中國的崇敬的態度開始瓦解。中國的敗戰似乎證明了黑格爾「文明西洋」與「落後東洋」的二元對立看法，而「黑格爾的『東洋』概念也有如緊箍咒般，束縛了極力向西方認同的近代日本之東洋觀。」在此二元對立的觀點下，崇敬中國且文化上對中國有著很深依賴的日本

70 轉引自：武安隆，《文化的抉擇與發展》，天津人民，1993，頁 27-28。
71 黑格爾西洋與東洋二元對立的看法是典型西方看待東方的視角，西洋是進步的文明，東洋則是野蠻、落後、充滿專制主義的社會，而中國正是這種原始型態社會的代表：黑格爾西洋（文明）與東洋（落後）的二元對立看法基本上成為近代西洋對東方以及中國的理	
72 子安宣邦著，陳瑋芬譯，同前註，頁 129。
本，是否也會成為西方人眼中專制主義的原初社會型態？在此擔憂下，許多日本知識份子認定中國是必須排除的對象，例如福澤諭吉的脫亞論73，又如津田左右吉努力證明日本與中國在文化上從來就不屬於一體74。更進一步的是除了脫離非文明的地位外，日本更要朝向天粹的另一端邁進—文明國家，因而要「入歐」，日本明治維新大規模地西化運動，正是在這樣的思想背景下產生。

不過，日本在經歷過三國干涉還遼以及華盛頓會議之後75，發現自己並未為西方所接受76，在西方眼中日本仍是屬於亞洲，
癱然脫亞入歐的策略失敗了。無法進入西方的日本至此只好重新回頭尋找自己的亞洲身份，已經不是西方的日本，又若沒有亞洲的身份來定位自己，那將使日本陷入身份困境中，因而亞洲的身份成爲日本所必須，重新回到亞洲的日本勢必面對如何處理中國的問題，因爲有中國存在的亞洲才是完整的，然而過去以「脫亞」來擺脫對中國文化的歷史負債，如今重回亞洲的日本勢必再度面對如何處理與中國文化關係的老問題。

既然日本需要亞洲身份，而亞洲需要中國，因此中國成爲日本無法避免有待處理的問題，無法與中國切割，那就只好面對接受。接受中國文化又可能使得日本成爲中國文化的輸入國，而成爲次等的地位。於是「改造中國」成爲當時日本知識界採取的策略，「日本如果不能退出中國，就必須徹底清洗改造中國，才能通往普遍性。」藉由改造中國以證明自己如同西方一樣具備有改造他人的能力，並顯示日本比中國優越，正是在這樣的背景下


李靜旻，《一個中國，兩種威脅：美國與日本知識界的文化策略》，台北：台大政治系大陸暨兩岸關係教學與研究中心，2007，頁 108。石之瑜，《回到亞洲？—日本認識中國崛起的思想基礎》，前引書，頁 4。

石之瑜，《退出中國—近代日本對華思想中的普遍性方法與政治正確性問題》，《近代日本對華思想》，2007，頁 5。
下，大東亞共榮圈的概念於焉成形，日本將自己與其殖民地（尤其是中國）結合在一起，並加以改造，成為共同抵抗西方的力量。

戰後，日本與美國緊密的聯繫似乎隱含了日本回到西方的可能，「日本的經濟和文化事務與美國的緊密連結是多過於與中國的，在美日關係中的權力、經濟以及文化層面都有著某種一致性。」日本思想界的左派與右派對美日關係的密切性有著不同見解，左翼思想家以反帝國主義的觀點反對美國，而右翼思想家則成爲親美的勢力，然而儘管主張上不同，但他們都是把西方當作必須面對的對象，也因爲如此亞洲成為日本必須要有的身份。

總之，日本面對西方身份策略總是以亞洲作爲基礎，儘管歷史上有一度日本曾自認不需要亞洲身份（脫亞入歐），但最後結果是失敗的，日本還是必須回到亞洲，因而從二戰前直至今日，亞洲身份一直是日本的現身策略，因而亞洲對日本而言有如下的意義：（一）亞洲身份免除日本的身份困境：脫亞入歐戰略下失敗的結果，是必須重振亞洲身份。（二）亞洲身份使日本取得與西方文明間的平等地位，因為日本既要否定西方的優越，又認知

79 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op.cit, p. 110.
80 「右翼人士所謂『不曾戰敗』是直接面對盟軍說的，其中在當代表最主要的成員顯然是美國，他們堅持天皇諭示的是終戰，不是敗戰，故參拜靖國神社並無不妥……。然而左翼的反帝路線與右翼的靖國神社路線，不都是把西洋當成日本最終必須面對的對象嗎？所以儘管左翼與右翼之間有著義無反顧的對立，卻因為終戰的問題意識相同，使中國的工具性身份以及其作爲日本必須採取措施加以妥善應對的亞洲成員，成爲他們之間在本體論上的默契。」石之瑜，〈回到亞洲？——日本認識中國崛起的思想基礎〉，前引書，頁10。
到日本不能單獨對抗，故必須靠亞洲框住中國的相件81。（三）
亞洲身份使日本取得與中國文明平等的地位，亞洲身份使日中之
間的民族文化差異或優劣得以消除，因為二者同屬亞洲。

(二) 日本本來就是亞洲國家

對於身處在西方學術圈裡的入江而言，並無站在日本位置謀
定西方優越性的問題意識，與其說他對日本漠不關心，不如說他
對日本的文化深具信心。

入江從來不認爲日本是西方國家，日本始終是個亞洲國家，
也因爲如此，所以也就沒有必要去設想回到亞洲的問題，因為日
本本來就在亞洲，他說：

歷史上有一段時期，人們談到了日本應當西方化，但
那段歷史並沒有讓日本成為西方國家，日本在文化上
仍然是亞洲國家，包括它的語言、宗教，佛教在日本
仍然很有影響力，文字也是受中國文明影響的。實際
上發生的是，日本在利用西方的影響來促進和強化自
身傳統的古老文明，就像中國、印度等國家一樣。日
本從來都不是一個文化上西方化的國家，它仍然是一
個亞洲國家。一些人認為日本過於西方化了，應當回
到亞洲。而在我看來沒有這回事，日本西方化的程度
從來就不是很深。日本文化只不過變得更為跨國性

81 石之瑜，《退出中國——近代日本對華思想中的普遍性方法與政治正確性問
題》，前引書，頁6。
（transnational）了，接受了别国文化的影响。82

脱亚入欧论者主张的「日本应当西化」其背后所隐含的是「落后亚洲与进步西方」的逻辑论述，此种近代西方对于东方的优越感主要来自西方工业革命的成功，连带影响了西方对于其他文化群体的观感。然而入江认为，在工业革命之前，东西方文明两者本就是都有著实际意义的独立的思想体系，两者都提供了使社会顺畅运作的知识背景，两者都同样重要83。因此「中心一边陲」并非入江看待东西文明的框架，入江主张的是自我与他者之间的平等的相对关系，因此属于亚洲的日本从来也就不必因为自己属于亚洲而感到自卑落后。日本的西方化不是为了要脱离亚洲，也不是为了要进入西方，而是利用西方的影响，更加巩固日本文化，显示入江对于日本文化的自信主张。

入江认为，日本的亚洲身份不仅是因为地理上属于亚洲国家，更在于文化上深受亚洲国家影响，他说：

18世纪之前传统的日本文化保留了下来，这种文化是受中国、印度、朝鲜等文化影响的结果。日本文化在西方的影响下经历了改造（transformation），但这并不是说日本变成了一西方国家。日本得到了跨国性的影响，世界历史上的许多国家，中国、韩国、土耳

82 记者刘波、马娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21世紀經濟報導》2006年11月11日，http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023_1.htm
83 Akira Iriye, “Asia and America,” op. cit, pp. 6-8.
其，甚至伊朗都容纳了跨国性的影响，包括科技、饮食、娱乐、体育，发生了综合的作用，但还是说同样的语言。

即使是在脱亚入欧时期，日本主张与亚洲文化切割，在文化上日本仍与亚洲有很深的连接，文化的日本仍是植基於亚洲，日本汉字的持续使用以及文学系统上受到中国的影㦊都是最好的证明，因此日本实际上并未脱亚。

未脱亚的日本能不能够向西方学习？如果身為亚洲身份的日本就不能够向西方学习，那该如何解释在1930年代象徵著回到亚洲的日本泛亚洲主義时期，日本西化仍持续不断的現象？日本在泛亚洲主義的概念下理應结合亚洲對抗西方，在概念上與西方尤其是美國在文化上有所切割，然而入江提到日本人在日常生活上受到美国的影响很大：「泛亚洲主義者的情緒不曾阻止過日本人群聚於卓別林電影或舞廳之前」。

显然，「脱亞」与「西化」這兩者不能等同，未脱亚的日本不代表不能向西方学习，向西方学习的日本也不代表脱離亚洲。日本向西方學習的「西化」政策本身並無錯誤，錯誤的是日本對西化结果的錯誤認知，西化的结果應是使日本更具跨国性，而不是誤認自己是西方国家。所以，日本自從未脱亚，也並未入欧，但
仍須向西方學習，因為只有相互的學習才能相互了解，減少衝突，促成一個更和平的世界。對於困擾著日本思想界的日本定位問題，「亞洲身份」固然也是入江為日本所設想的身份策略，但日本同時也必須向西方學習，「根植亞洲、學習西方」是入江的主要概念。

相對於日本思想界基於超越西方而主張日本需要亞洲身份的想法，入江認為日本需要亞洲身份的理由是為了與西方合作，促成東西文明的交流，因而需要亞洲身份取得與西方平等進行對話的位置。

亞洲身份的日本勢必得面對與中國的關係，入江主張日本應該與中國合作形成亞洲共同體，因爲亞洲不能沒有中國，入江看到中國作爲中華文明大國的身分，在亞洲共同體的建立來說是不可或缺的。中國的確是崛起中的大國，但是意指的是作爲中華文

86 「日本思想家一心發展日本成爲亞洲國家的主要動機在於能取得一個相對於歐美的身份。不過，亞洲作爲一個有意義的身份，原本就是被歐美殖民主義與帝國主義當成對象的結果。亞洲這個身份尋求與歐美平等，很容易陷入某種卑微的意識。……從亞洲這個身份出發的做法，造成亞洲國家之間失去相互尊重的基礎，在與歐美競爭的欲望驅策下，亞洲身份迫使亞洲國家先要面對自己人。」石之瑜，〈回到亞洲？──日本認識中國崛起的思想基礎〉，前引書，頁12-13。

87 「文化關係的定義也就是人們之間直接或間接的接觸，以及他們對集體的和個人的命運的影響，由於他們的經歷我們可以開始詢問亞洲人（這篇文章指的是中國人和日本人）是如何美國化，以及美國人是如何亞洲化的（中國化或日本化）。」顯見對入江而言，西方（美國）對話的對象是亞洲（中國以及日本），這似乎透露了中日必須合群才有辦法取得與西方對話的位置。Akira Iriye, “Americanization of East Asia: Writings on Cultural Affairs Since 1900,” op.cit, p. 45.
明身分的中國的崛起，入江曾表示：「國界依然重要，但重要性有所下降。無疑中國的國家特性將繼續存在，但是中華文明的地位將有所上升。中華文明將和其他文明相互交流、影響、互動，共同面對人類共同的問題，如環保問題、能源問題、抗擊疾病等等，海內外的中國人也將共同見證中華文明的崛起。」

儘管中日之間仍有所差異，但是中日近年來在一些全球性的議題上已有了一些共識，例如環保、物種保育等問題，「如果中國人以及日本人能在這些領域緊密地合作，將將不止鞏固了他們的關係，也對全人類的福祉有所貢獻，如果中日不願合作（指文化層次），而讓其他層次的雙邊關係主導，他們將在重要的轉捩點上錯過一個形塑世界命運的特別機會。」顯然入江主張的中日合作主要是指文化層次上的，這是因他看到文化因素的重要性。

中日合群的意義除了在於使中國更加了解自己、使日本取得亞洲身份外，更重要的意義在於中日合群所形成的亞洲共同體是亞太共同體的基礎。

「中日兩國將必須比以前更加對文化的互動作出貢獻，來解決共同的全球議題，以及促進一個更具人情味的公民社會的建立，不只是兩國的未來，亞太區域以及整個世界的未來都可能某種程度地決定於此」顯然中日之間是否能夠進行文化合作，不止關係著兩者的命運，還關係著亞太共同體是否能夠形成，以及和平世界是否能夠到來。關鍵在於中日能否合群形成亞洲共同體，進而與太平洋國家合作，尤其是美國，以形成亞太共同體，作為東西文明交流的基礎。「藉由消除可憎的西方與非西方、北方與南方、或強權與第三世界的區別，亞太地區可能對形塑一個新世界社群有所貢獻，而美國和日本可以共同分擔促進這樣一個事業的任務。」

追根究底亞太共同體的概念除了是作爲東西文明交流的溝通平台外，它也是入江為日本身份的進一步設想。日本歷史上曾經一度的西化政策，除了困擾著日本思想界對自身的身分認同，其他亞洲國家也對於日本是否為亞洲國家有所質疑。既然入江的日本本來就是亞洲國家，勿須迴避中國，又日本的亞洲身份與西

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92 Akira Iriye, “The United States and Japan in Asia: A Historical Perspective.” op. cit, p. 51.
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

化兩者可以並行不悖，這些都具體呈現在入江亞太共同體的主張上，成為日本身份的出路。在亞太共同體的觀念裡:

日本的位置與角色是清楚的，日本不需要如某些人所堅持的必須回到亞洲，因為日本總是在亞洲這個區域，日本也不必背向西方，放棄長達一個世紀的西化經驗，其他亞洲國家都正在以不同的方式西化，此外太平洋區域包含了西方國家，例如：美國、加拿大、澳洲、紐西蘭，亞太區域將包括有亞洲以及西方，並擁抱不同的文化以及歷史傳統，那將會是亞太地區的力量，而不是弱點，日本的角色就是認同這樣的力量，面對挑戰，與其他國家合作，以及扮演亞太區域溝通的促進者。

在亞太共同體裡，日本似乎不用為自己的西化感到困擾，因為亞太共同體的身份可以讓日本既是亞洲，同時也可以西化。對入江來說，亞太共同體的概念就在促進東西方文化的合作、溝通與交流，這是一個包含亞洲與西方的社群，因而兼具亞洲與西方文化特色的日本，可以適切地在亞太共同體裡找到自己的位置。亞太共同體身份的前提是日本必須先有亞洲身份，因為只有一個亞洲的形成，亞太共同體才有可能構成，而日本又必須與中國合作才有可能形成亞洲，所以中日之間必定得要合群。

93 Akira Iriye, “Stepping Out: Japan can help shape the emerging Asia Pacific. Is it ready?” op. cit, p. 60.
第三節 從中日關係史發現中日合群的方法

未來中日文化之間的聯繫將持續增強，這不僅是中日獨有的現象，也是全世界發展的趨勢。然而問題的關鍵在於人們是否能夠跨越國家疆界，跨越狹隘的國家利益而彼此合作？中國與日本能否跨越過往的歷史記憶彼此合作？

中國人以及日本人準備好要肩負起這樣的任務了嗎？我們只能希望他們準備好了，但是為了在未來能有效地合作，首先必須從過去學到教訓。對已經犯下經由戰爭和軍事擴張嚴重侵略中國的日本人來說尤其是如此，他們將必須表現出他們可以發展出一個新的文化觀念；這種新的文化觀念意涵著對於維護文明的共同承諾，而不是1930年那種自認正當的對他人生活型態的攻擊。

顯然，中日合群的最大阻礙在於中日過往的歷史仇恨，中日要能合群必須從過去學到教訓，因而理性地認識中日過往的衝突，理解衝突發生的原因，進而促進未來中日之間的和平發展是有其必要性的。

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94 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op. cit, p. 142.
第一章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識
――中日合群形成亞洲

一、一戰前的中日關係：美日競相改造中國

入江大致把中日關係史分成三個時間點來探究，認為一戰前在西方強權主導的國際大環境下，強權的標準在於軍事，日本在軍事上實力勝於中國，並因此日本躋身強權之列。

躋身強權之列的日本非但沒有幫助亞洲國家抵抗西方強權，反而繼承西方帝國主義對亞洲國家進行侵略，尤其是中國。「從亞洲的觀點來看日本的帝國主義比起西方的帝國主義是更可憎的，日本不是加入亞洲國家來對抗帝國主義，反而是加入西方來征服他們的領土。」日本對中國的行動除了引起中國的民族主義的情緒外，同時，日本對中國的行動無疑是一種對西方的挑戰，「比較少爭議的是日本扮演了雙重角色，一方面是做為一個西方形式的帝國主義者，另一方面是做為一個不管在政策上或行動上對西方構成挑戰的非西方強權，同時間又激起了亞洲其他地區民族主義式的反應。」

入江提到一戰前中國的命運取決於美日對於國際秩序所採取的策略。美國以國際主義作爲其外交政策的基礎，提倡經濟上相互依賴的世界秩序，以國際法來處理衝突，以及傳播民主的觀念，促進所謂的非文明地區朝向文明世界轉變乃是美國重要的任務。在此觀點之下的中國，既沒有強有力的政府，又遭遇一連串的難題。
戰爭失敗，猶如中國集合了所有前現代社會的缺點，但也正因為如此中國成爲最好的實驗對象。如果中國能夠現代化，理當會提升中國人的福祉以及對亞洲和平做出貢獻，則美國的聲望將因此得到提升，商業也獲得保障。

但進入西方世界躋身強權的日本，對於中國的轉變有一種特殊的利害關係，認爲美國正在干擾屬於日本的工作，這樣的情緒部分來自歷史，起源於中日之間共享的文化傳統，亦即感覺日本比其他國家更了解中國，因爲它們使用著同屬漢字文化圈，除此之外作爲亞洲唯一的一個現代化的國家，日本必須負擔起教育亞洲其他國家的義務。

美日不約而同地搶著肩負起現代化中國的任務，然而方式卻有所不同。美國以國際主義行之，而日本則以帝國主義侵略的方式促使中國轉變，因此在一戰前美日之間在中國問題上存在必然的緊張關係。然而儘管方法不同，無論是日本或美國都把中國鎖在有待他人的轉變落後位置，日本似乎落入了西方普遍主義的窠臼，要把西方進步的文明透過帝國主義的方式傳播給東方落後滯的文明，「明治時代的日本人認爲他們在世界上文化的角色是扮演西方與東方文明的中介者，或更詳細地說是傳遞西方文明給東方的傳遞者。」然而正是這種角色意味著日本並無原創性。

99 Akira Iriye, “The United States and Japan in Asia: A Historical Perspective.” op. cit, p. 35.
100 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
101 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op. cit, p. 38.
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

102. 日本改造中國的想法是以西方的思維脈絡來思考，因而自始至終都一直是中國與西方文明的對話。誠如小說家永井荷風（Nagai Kafu）所說：「明治時代的日本熱切地唱著西方的音調，但是卻不能夠發展出自己的歌曲」。

二、戰間期的中日關係：日本結合中國對抗西方

一戰後，美國主張的國際主義大行其道，一時之間國際合作成為國際社會的風潮，各個國家都主張溝通合作，而日本此時對中國的政策也暫停以往的帝國主義侵略，改採經濟與文化外交。但1920年代末期經濟大蕭條證明了西方資本主義的失敗，使得國際趨勢有所反轉，權力政治再度得到了原先的重視。日本最直接有效地解決經濟衝擊的方法，就是對中國軍事侵略，加上中國內部民族主義的高漲以及中國內部越趨統一的局勢，都使日

102. Akira Iriye, Ibid.
103. 轉引自：Akira Iriye, Ibid.
104. 一戰後歐洲國家開始重新思考國際秩序的定義，為了重建家園他們把目標放在各國的經濟合作上。同時也希望透過文化合作來構建一個和平的世界秩序，取代先前權力主義的國際架構。中日關係也受到這波國際趨勢的影響。中國內部利用國際對軍事權力重視度的減少，列強不願干預中國內部事務的機會，成功地完成北伐，統一四分五裂的中國，日本則響應這波國際趨勢開始裁軍。
105. 中日之間經濟上的合作與文化上的交流相當興盛，經濟上展現在日本提供的資本與技術與中國提供的勞力的合作關係，文化上則展現在大量中日學生的交流。
本警覺到再不採取行動將會失去既得利益，於是日本又回帝國主義路線，迅速佔領了滿洲，之後則演變為中日的全面開戰。

有別於一戰前日本帝國主義，其擴張是以西方帝國主義的語彙作為基礎，即暗示著日本也是西方的一份子。現在西方文明已經陷入危機，因此必須把西方文明的勢力從亞洲內部排除，建立東亞東亞的新秩序，也就是泛亞洲主義（pan-asianism）的主張。實際的行動是從對中國的侵略開始，「日本的宣傳家宣稱他們的目標在於在滿洲建立一個五族（漢人、蒙古人、滿人、韓國人、日本人）和諧的關係，如此一起為全世界的福祉作出貢獻」。這樣的信念是基於當時的日本人相信「滿洲的實驗可能可以建立一個避風港，一個取代已經不被日本以及全世界信任的資本主義者的方式」。侵略滿洲成了日本所設想的取代破產資本主義的解決之道。

入江提到當時的日本以文化為托辭，合理化侵略中國的行爲，他引述日本宣傳家所宣稱：「日本聖戰的目標是清除亞洲所受到的西方統治的影響，這種影響呈現現在現代文明當中，強調貪婪地競爭以及無生命力的機械化，相反地日本以及亞洲將會以集體的和諧以及人類的精神為特徵。」日本「官方上稱這場戰役為大東亞戰爭，暗示著東京的宣傳是日本是在為亞洲從西方的統治中解放出來而奮戰。」當時日本所設想的因應之道乃是帶領

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106 Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting*, op.cit, p. 74.
109 Akira Iriye, “*East Asia and the Emergence of Japan, 1900-1945*.”, op. cit, p.
第三章 入江昭的亞洲與中國認識——中日合群形成亞洲

亞洲，發揚亞洲文化來對抗西方文明，同時也要創建亞洲之間的經濟聯合來促成亞洲的共榮，因此侵略中國成爲一種必然的作爲。

為什麼當時的日本人這麼焦慮地想要在對中國的戰爭上，放置一個文化的架構？這似乎是因爲，只有文化才能合理化日本對中國戰爭的動機。「既然對中國的戰爭在一般的策略或經濟背景下不能被正當化，文化提供了一個貌似有理的替代方法，把這場戰爭稱爲文化上的作爲，使得日本人能夠宣稱這場戰爭不同於其他更具侵略性的戰爭。」在結合亞洲抵抗西方的大東亞精神下，文化成爲了日本對中國戰爭以及對其他亞洲國家戰爭的正當化理由。

入江認爲大東亞戰爭製造了數以百萬計的亞洲人的死傷外，也遺留給亞洲「對日本痛苦的敵意的後遺症，即使是戰爭結束後的五十年的今天，這樣的敵意仍未消除。」即使文化是日本最後可以合理化其侵略事實的理由，但是當時的亞洲人，特別是中國人，皆認爲大東亞共榮圈「是一個災難性的事業，基本上因爲在亞洲區域的國家以及人民拒絕接受這樣的一種新秩序，這只是一個建立日本帝國的僞裝，是爲了攫取這廣大區域裡的資源、空間以及勞力來爲日本的需要服務這樣一個單純的目的。」

110 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op. cit, pp. 81-82.
111 Akira Iriye, “Stepping Out: Japan can help shape the emerging Asia Pacific. Is it ready?”, op. cit, p. 57.
112 Akira Iriye, Ibid.
在無法說服亞洲人的情況下，日本發動大東亞戰爭不但沒有達成其原本期待的結合中國、亞洲的力量以對抗西方的目的，反而是背道而馳地更加分裂亞洲國家間的力量。「日本泛亞洲主義的基本問題在於它不被其他亞洲人所接受，至少不被中國人所接受。在少數的合作者以及多數的反對者之間，日本正在分裂亞洲的勢力而不是統一亞洲形成集體的力量。」

三、二戰後的中日關係：從冷戰格局到文化國際主義

二戰後嚐到敗戰苦果的日本，已經失去軍事上主導亞洲事務的能力，經濟能上則努力追求國家的復甦與重建。更重要的是在文化上，戰前日本領導亞洲對抗西方的大東亞精神失去信用後，除了亞洲國家普遍對日本充滿不信任感與敵意外，日本各界也因罪惡感而對於自身文化失去信心：「戰後日本經歷了一段自我修正時期，對於戰爭期間的宣傳的反彈或嫌惡形成了日本缺乏自信以及智識上的不確定感。」發動戰爭的罪惡感，使日本更加願意謙卑地聆聽中國以及美國對於日本戰罪的嚴厲批判，日本在二戰後對中美採取較為開放與接納的態度，若非當時的中國內部陷入國共內戰，以日本在戰後精神上的空虛狀態，中國很可能成

113 Akira Iriye, “East Asia and the Emergence of Japan, 1900-1945.”, op. cit, p. 147.
114 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op.cit, p. 96.
115 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 98.
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為日本的指導，從中國內部的情勢以及美國在戰後佔領日本的態勢看來，戰後日本無論在經濟或文化上受到美國的影響都比中國來得深，日本「精神上的真空大部分是由美國賦予的以及美國輸入的概念及形體所填滿」，「……就某種程度來說，在冷戰架構下日本的復甦、工業化以及貿易擴張的發展大部分是經由與美國的緊密聯繫與協助也不是中國。」

冷戰格局對於二戰後的中日關係有很大的影響，在意識形態上分屬共產與民主兩個不同陣營，在經濟上儘管中日之間仍保持某種程度的往來，但中國大部分是依賴蘇聯的資本與技術來進行中國的工業化政策，而日本則是依賴美國資本從戰後的破敗當中復甦，因此分屬於不同陣營的中日兩國是潛在的敵人關係。此時的中日關係不管在文化或經濟上都不如美日關係來得密切。對於日本的傾美政策，「北京持續地攻擊日本的帝國主義，是美國帝國主義反對革命的全球策略的一環。」當時中日之間確實存在著緊張關係，然而卻並未爆發正面的衝突。入江認為，這是因爲中國與蘇聯的決裂導致經濟的協助斷炊，因而與日本的貿易關係就顯得重要，而日本當時的外交政策則是在美國的保護傘下在多方面的經濟發展，而中國是亞洲最重要的市場。

經濟因素持續在 1970 年代全世界陷入經濟危機的當下，主

120 Akira Iriye, Ibid, pp. 115-118.
導著國際事務的發展，似乎各國重視的焦點不再是權力政治的考量。在這樣的國際氛圍下，美蘇關係持續穩定，加上 1971 年中美關係的正常化，連帶影響中日關係的重新定義，於是中日恢復正常外交關係。在中日穩定發展的趨勢下，雙方經濟上的連結更加穩定，加以邓小平上台後採取的經濟開放政策更加促進中日經濟上的合作交流。中日文化上的交流此後也更加密切，日本政府在 1970 年代特別強調文化交流，日本前首相大平正芳（Ohira Masayoshi）就曾在出訪北京時強調「外交關係的文化基礎，並宣稱中國人與日本人分享著兩千年的文化交流的歷史，中日兩國正確的關係必須建立在信任，而信任取決於兩國人民推心置腹的聯繫」。入江認為這或許是門面話，然而不可否認的在 70 年代末期起，便有大量的中日學生往來於中日之間進行文化交流，一直延續至今，呈現出現代全球文化更加互賴的現象。

中日合群最大的阻礙就在於中日過往的歷史所形成的敵人印象：（一）一戰前的日本，把中國視為落後，而以帝國主義侵略的方式想要促使中國轉變，不過日本所謂的好意，卻只是比西方更加可惡的一種侵略行徑。（二）戰間期的日本在泛亞洲主義的精神下打算以侵略方式改造並結合中國的力量，由日本領導，共同對抗西方，不過，日本實際上只是以文化名義來遂行帝國主義的政策。（三）二戰後日本受到中國內戰以及冷戰格局架構的

121 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p. 130.
122 入江提到在 1980 年有 1,500 名中國學生前往日本，而日本有 6,000 名日本學生、學者以及觀光客來中國參訪交流。參考：Akira Iriye, Ibid.
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影響，中日之間成爲潛在的敵人關係，北京政府認爲日本帝國主義是美國帝國主義的一部分。

儘管中日交往過程中不斷累積彼此的敵人印象，入江提醒讀者不要忘記，從 60-70 年代開始，經濟與文化就逐漸成爲權力之外的兩個影響國際事務的因素。在冷戰和解與中美關係正常化的 70 年代，中日之間在經濟與文化的交流逐漸增多，除了是中日兩國都意識到合作的重要性之外，更重要的是國際社會上超越國家的個人與公民社會力量的增加，中日之間要能超越敵人的印象最根本的，就是兩國人民對彼此觀感的改變。因此入江特別主張，應由非官方的個人以及匯集個人力量所形成的非官方組織從事文化交流，只有中日之間不斷地文化交流，才能促進彼此的了解，進而超脫過往的敵人印象。

第四節 小結

入江昭是在世界認識以及亞洲認識的基礎上對中國進行理解的。和平的世界需要文明之間不斷地溝通，才能減少彼此的衝突與誤解，而一個包含亞洲與西方的亞太共同體正可以促進東西文明的對話。不過，這必須先要有亞洲，亞洲又必須要有中日的合作。亦即，入江是先從和平世界，到亞太共同體，再到亞洲共同體，最後到中日合群的脈絡，來看待中國。因此在入江的學術主張上，少了中國，和平世界無法完成。

中國作爲一個文明大國，對於促進亞洲共同體具有重要功
入江昭對世界與中國的中間主義立場--一種多元身份的知識視野

能，既然亞洲國家之間需要有某種共同的亞洲意識，才能形成亞洲共同體，而追求和諧與穩定社會關係的中國儒家文明對亞洲國家影響甚大，尤其日、韓，因此儒家文明能夠促進亞洲國家間的共同意識。所以，入江的中國乃是文化意義上的中國，透過中國文化的力量不斷影響轉變著亞洲其他國家的文化，促成亞洲共同意識的出現，以及亞洲共同體的成形。

亞洲共同體的形成需要有中日的合作，而中日兩國也有亞洲身份的需要，因此中日合群形成亞洲遂成爲一種必然。不過，中日合群最明顯的阻礙，就是過往中日歷史交往中，不斷彼此塑造的敵人印象，即使是今天中日之間的歷史仇恨仍很難消解，入江提到「……很少的日本人意識到他們對發動以及持續如此之久的不文明戰爭的責任……」123」，而很少的中國人能夠超脫民族主義的情緒，了解到道歉的真意，即使是研究中日關係史的學者也很難避免民族主義的情緒，「除此之外在中國以及日本要超越個人經驗，或要避免運用政治教條以及道德標準來研究近代中日關係史是極度困難的124。」對於那些生命與侵略中國緊緊聯繫在一起的某一代日本作者，不帶感情的學術研究似乎與難以理解，同樣地對中國作者而言，他們不能夠把對日本人的羞辱感以及暴行從中日關係的研究中分離出來125。

如何化解中日之間的敵人印象？入江認爲必須透過文化國

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123 Akira Iriye, “East Asia and the Emergence of Japan, 1900-1945.”, op. cit, p. 150.
124 Akira Iriye, “Introduction.” op. cit, p. 3.
125 Akira Iriye, Ibid, pp. 3-4.
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際主義來看待中日兩國的關係，把中日都視為是一種文化結構
126，而彼此的交往關係著重在文化上的交流。國家也是一個文化
結構127，「國家是一個由個人組成的群體，把國家視為文化指的是
我们需要考慮人們所製造出來的形象、意義以及事物——也就是
人們的文化產物128。」以文化的角度分析國際關係，關注的議
題在於人們的形象、記憶、觀念、生活型態等如何跨越國界進行
溝通、交流？以及這些活動如何影響轉變其他國家的文化產物或
反而與其發生衝突？透過文化意義的探究，人們可能會分享著某
些觀念或關注某些共同的事物。不同地域的人們將開展出某種跨
國的或全球的意識，以及共同的行爲模式。作爲文化結構的中日
兩國，透過彼此文化意義上的探索，理解在歷史發展的過程中，
中日是如何被彼此所影響、轉變與發現雙方都有的共同認知，而
這很大程度上必須依靠中日兩國人民之間的文化交流，在非官方
的個人以及非政府組織的努力下，入江相信中日兩國人民根深蒂
固的仇恨能夠化解，進而成爲亞洲共同體、亞太共同體以及和平
世界的根基。

126 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op.cit, p. viii.
127 對入江來說國際關係基本上是三個層次的結合，意即權力、經濟以及文化層
次。國家可以是一個軍事上的強權，但是一個在國際社會上從事投資貿易
活動的經濟實體，同時也是個人、觀念、科技、文化產物之間的溝通交流所形成的文化結構。參考：Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the
Global Setting, op.cit, p. 4. Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The
Japanese-American War, 1941-194 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
128 Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting, op.cit, p. 4.
最後，以圖表的形式勾勒出本章整理的入江昭所設想的亞洲、中國以及和平世界的關係架構：

和平世界

亞太共同體（東西文明對話的途徑）

亞洲共同體（中日合群）

中國（中國文明促進亞洲意識的形成）

日本

西方（美國）
第四章 入江昭的身份策略

前兩章說明了入江是以較為廣泛的全球史與跨國史的觀點，以及著重文化因素的分析，對世界以及中國進行認識，而有別於美國學界貫有的現實主義史觀，與美國中心的世界與中國認識。這與他的學思歷程以及多元的身份背景有密切的關聯。費正清曾讚譽入江：

沒有文化成見，具有超越文化界限的世界眼光，並使用社會科學的方法，在審視歷史記錄的時候，不擔心把人類整體的利益置於任何特定的國家利益之上，以這樣的精神在研究跨太平洋關係，入江能夠超越統治著早期歷史書寫的民族主義與愛國的觀點。

入江博士的書最擅長的層面是他歷史的客觀性，以及他從不同面向的觀點理解國際尖刻與危機的能力，但是這樣的觀點是長期的努力，伴隨稀有的天賦以及特別的環境所形成的結果。

費正清盛讚入江著作中展現的客觀性與多元視野，並注意到應該是由他身份背景以及求學歷程所構成的「特別的環境」，有

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助於他超越文化成見的歷史觀點。

暫且不論費正清讚譽的客觀性存在與否，至少努力追求多元視野以求客觀，是入江昭一直所秉持的研究精神。入江在談到作爲一位日裔美籍的學者時，自己並不是日本歷史學者，也不是美國歷史學者，他將自己定位爲純粹的歷史學者。在其研究中沒有所謂的日本觀點或美國觀點的歷史，探討中、美、日關係時極力避免的，就是民族主義的觀點，甚而有意識地反對民族主義的歷史觀點。

入江昭努力想要呈現中立客觀的痕跡，展現在他自稱為中間主義的論述策略上。這種中間主義論述與他多元的身份有怎樣的關聯？身為研究對象之一的中國，對身為研究者的入江而言，在展開中間主義的論述時扮演怎樣的角色？入江是否真的沒有文化成見？而其自身的身份又該歸於何處？這是本章所要討論的內容。

第一節 中間主義的論述

一、文化混血者的論述策略

身份影響立場，二戰時的日本人與美國人看待中國的抗日戰

爭角度顯有不同，日本人認爲太平洋戰爭是把亞洲從西方的影響力釋放出來，建立屬於亞洲人的亞洲的聖戰；而美國人則認為是阻止亞洲受到日本奴役的義戰。戰後毫無爭議的是，日本在亞洲就是侵略者，如同德國之於歐洲。同樣的歷史事實有完全不同的歷史解讀，正如史景遷所說「關鍵在於耳朵，只聽想聽內容的耳朵」，與自身的價值體系不相衝突而能理解的內容，即是想聽的內容，因此研究者的不同身份對同一研究象會形成不同的理解。例如：在研究中國的議題上，西方學者常被批評帶有西方中心觀點以及種族偏見來看中國，而具有中國籍的學者也被認為不夠客觀，對中國有所偏袒，「大量中國赴歐美的留學生，以研究中國作爲專業，他們所研究的中國很難停留在一個客觀外在對象的層次……」。顯然東方人和西方人有不同的思維方式，不同身份在理解中國文化過程中，總會有母國文化的影響，加上


5 史景遷著，阮叔梅譯，《大汗之國：西方眼中的中國》，台北：台灣商務，2000，頁310。轉引自：李靜旻，《一個中國，兩種威脅：美國與日本知識界的文化策略》，台北：台大政治系中國大陸暨兩岸關係教學與研究中心，2007，頁37。

6 許多美國學者缺乏在中國的實地考察經歷。他們的著作往往只是從事幾年的中文學習，和幾年的圖書館經歷的產物。這僅能被視為美國學界學術訓練的成果，但卻不能稱之為研究，且美國學者常有種族偏見的思想框架，對中國研究產生偏差的認識。參考：侯且岸，《當代中國的顯學——中國現代史學理論與思想新論》，北京：人民出版社，2000，頁330-331。

7 魏之瑜，《社會科學知識新論——文化研究立場十評》，北京：北京大學出版社，2005，頁159。
意識形態的因素，都會造成不同的理解。

單一身份背景的研究者，由於受到各個學術社群的薰陶，不管有意或無意都留露出一種偏於一方的論述傾向，那麼具有多元身份背景的研究者，他們的論述策略又該如何？這些具有多元身份背景的研究者，同時具有多國語言的能力，其學術成長的過程中經歷了多國文化背景的薰陶，民族身份與國家身份的不一致往往使他們在從事學術研究時，呈現出與單一身份研究者不同的觀點。

在研究上，多元身份背景的研究者具有的優勢，是他們同時兼具原鄉（祖居地）與他鄉（居住地）的文化背景與語言，因此可以充分且深入地研究彼此的問題，並促成雙方的理解，宣稱自己是中立客觀，並扮演兩地橋樑的角色。但相對的多元身份也帶給他們研究上的阻礙，出生於原鄉，並接受他鄉學術訓練，在他鄉從事學術研究的混血身份者，他們時常受到原鄉與他鄉學者的指責與壓力。

這類似華裔中國學者所處的尷尬處境，他們同時要面對歐美的同事與國內的廣大聽眾的檢視，「這表示華裔教授的尷尬處境，不是因他們的中國身份引起的，而是因他們吸收了歐美的中國知識，並站在歐美的角度來觀察自己，參與中國的生
活實踐。」吸收了歐美知識的華裔學者成了文化混血的知識份子，也因而必須受到歐美知識界對於是否中立客觀的強烈質疑，以及忍受祖國對於其是否忠誠與愛國的壓力，因此形成一種居於中間的兩難。

這也類似於後殖民主義中，在殖民母國接受教育，並從事研究的殖民地知識份子對母國抗指的情況，他們抗拒母國意識也常遭殖民地知識份子的懷疑，因爲「萌生抗拒意識的知識份子，接受母國教育，很難站在殖民地本身的立場來抗拒母國，因爲所謂的本土的立場為何，也必須透過母國的觀念來理解……既然知識份子自己是受到殖民母國的教育訓練，所以不僅是價值系統，甚至主要政治對話的參照系，或最基本生活方式的參考點，都是從殖民母國學來的」。而身處在母國學術界的他們，也因為有著替殖民地辯護的心理，因而可能成為被母國知識份子歧視的對象，「假如試圖要引導母國對本土情境有所移情或同情，則令人擔心的是自己會不會因爲採用了母國所不熟悉的論述，而在母國人士的視野中，從同事關係的平起平坐，淪為奇風異俗的被歧視對象？」

由於處於尷尬的兩難處境，因此往往多元身份背景的研究者，在從事論述時格外小心翼翼，不管是為了解決原鄉廣大聽眾的需求，或者是讓自己在身處他鄉的學術界有一己身存之空間。

10 石之瑜，前引書，頁 160。
11 郭佳佳，前引書，頁 4。
12 石之瑜，前引書，頁 55。
13 石之瑜，同前註，頁 62。
他們可以採取一種中間主義的論述策略，亦即兼採眾說，並刻意地迴避自己的學術觀點以及身份意識，好讓其研究著作看起來正好是不偏不倚，兩邊都不抵觸，這是文化混血者時常運用的舞台手段，「即在外表上僞裝成大社會可以接受的類型，……將民族認同或宗教信仰加以隱藏或包裝，是對主流社會爭取被接受的重要手段」，目的在於避免受到廣大社群的指指點點。

如研究指出，具有混血身份背景的華裔學者趙穗生，在從事中國民族主義這類敏感議題時，採取的策略便是迴避自己華裔的身份背景與觀點。他乃採取中間主義論述，兼容並蓄地包含各種理論與立場，綜合性地呈現中國民族主義的輪廓，且試圖借用西方理論再進行局部修正的方式，來表達中國民族主義。中間主義論述的目的，或在於與西方的學術界進行對話。「可以說他的策略就是藉由西方的理論和觀點，來表示自己不偏不倚的學術專業，在走中間或綜述的途徑，顯示自己更包容的立場，……這也無獨有偶地是許多重要亞裔學者在美國的策略。」

例如同樣具有混血身份背景的韓裔美籍學者金淳基（Samuel Kim），也採取這種中間主義論述策略，來探討外交政策的形
成。他曾表示：「我不是一個單一原因理論的支持者，因爲很少的政策制定者的決策是單一因素所形成，相反地，我感到更自在地主張我所謂的『綜合互動的解釋』（synthetic-interactive explanations），也就是有不只一個的因素，意即由一個因素結合另一個因素，才導致了一個既定決策的形成」。金淳基認爲國關理論中的三大派別（自由主義、現實主義、構建主義）有無法解釋的部份，他指出國內政治領導者的更換，所造成的國內政治形勢的改變，就是國關理論無法處理的部分。於是他說：「當你在談論四人幫的粉碎、或鄭小平的崛起、或金大中的崛起、或新保守主義與小布希的崛起，都能導致一個外交政策取向建制的改變，領導者因素打壞了所有彼此競爭的國關理論，我認為這是國關理論無法處理的部分」。他並非認為理論無用武之地，而是主張要承認理論的限制，因此兼採眾說的綜合性研究路線可以更全面的理解中國外交政策。

業。1958 赴美就讀，於兩年後獲得國際研究學士學位。1960 年進入哥倫比亞大學就讀，於 1962 年獲國際事務碩士學位。1966 年獲得博士學位後，就一直執教於美國。其研究領域為中國外交關係、韓國外交關係、東亞國際關係以及世界秩序研究等議題。金淳基把自己歸類為美國中國對外政策專家的第二代，意即在 1960-1970 年代獲得博士學位的學者，第二代的學者雖然避開了第一代研究者所遭遇的麥卡錫主義的攻擊，但第二代中國研究者由於政治的趨勢，無法踏上中國進行實地研究，只能到香港、台灣，在域外對中國進行觀察。金淳基多元的成長背景，與操著多國語言的特色（精通英文、韓文，也學習過日、俄、法、中文），標誌著其文化混血的身份。

同前註。
日裔美籍的入江昭並不例外，在論述策略上，他採取混血身份者常有的中間主義路線，強調跨國史、全球史與文化轉向的史學研究，來兼容並包各種史學觀點，以追求中立客觀的歷史解釋，並有意識的排斥民族主義史觀的史學研究，因為那只會造成偏狹、誤解與衝突。入江曾具體自況：「我更像是個中間主義者（centrist）」，雖然在口述歷史訪談中，入江指的是在意識形態上他沒有特定的傾向，不過從他對世界秩序、亞太共同體、亞洲共同體的設想中，處處都可以看到他中間主義論述的痕跡，充分反映了混血身份的亞裔學者貫有的論述策略。

二、入江昭中間主義的論述策略

置身中間且扮演橋樑角色，努力建立起兩個看似處於天秤兩端的學術主張之間的連結，是入江昭學術著作中的特色。他習慣於找出立場對立的學術論述中的斷裂與間隙，然後試圖找出可以促成相互同情的話語。例如在看待國際事務時，他並非否定現實主義權力觀來看待世界，而是主張在權力觀點之外，仍有經濟觀點以及文化觀點的世界。他認為國際關係應該是這三者的共構，尤其是文化。在入江昭的世界、亞洲與中國認識裡，文化是各方可以經由交流培養知性共識的非物質領域，也是和平的最終基礎。

第四章 入江昭的身份策略

一 世界認識裡呈現的中間主義論述

在入江昭的世界認識裡，他希望建立一個和平的世界，意即建立在所謂文化關係上的全球共同體。此種以文化因素為構建世界的理想，首要面對的問題就是，如何在充滿不同文化群體的世界中讓彼此可以共存。文化多元主義與普遍主義這兩者看似不相為謀的理念，故而必須加以連結，才能使不同文化群體的個人，既彼此相同，也彼此不同。入江昭設想的連結方式是透過個人與國際組織，在世界上不斷從事文化交流活動，以培養出一種各文化群體都共同存有的普世價值，意即世界公民意識、全球意識，或稱人類共有的普遍性。他希望能在普世價值前提下，允許各文化分歧的存在，一個既分歧又相同的和平世界因而可以形成。

二 亞洲認識裡呈現的中間主義論述

入江昭對亞洲認識的起點，是從和平世界的理想秩序開始的。亞洲這一個不論在地理上或人口上都具有舉足輕重地位的區塊，是建構和平世界中不可缺少的。不過，代表東方的亞洲與西方之間一直是以垂直式的階層關係認識彼此，西方把亞洲視為落後的象徵，而過去中國也曾視西方人為蠻夷。因此，如何在東方與西方之間建立文化地帶，使彼此進行對話，乃成爲構建和平世界中必須處理的問題。就此入江昭主張透過中美日三國的合作，建立起一個包含亞洲與西方國家的亞太共同體，連接起本質上雖不同，但無優劣之分的東方與西方文化，使東西方文化可以在平等的位置上進行對話與溝通，以作爲和平世界的基礎。
(三) 中國認識裡呈現的中間主義論述

在和平世界的架構下，中國成了不可缺少的角色，因為若亞太共同體促成了東西文明的對話，那勢必要有亞洲共同體的先行出現。但入江認爲，亞洲過往的歷史糾結，一直是亞洲無法有共同體出現的原因。最明顯的是，二戰時的歷史仇怨始終圍繞著中日兩國，直到現在都還牽引著兩國內的民族主義情緒以及政治情勢，並連帶影響東亞、亞洲的國際秩序。因此如何讓看似宿敵的中日，可以合作共創穩定與和諧的亞洲，乃是建構和平世界必須面對的問題。入江於是努力地開創能擺脫國族立場的文化語言，一方面透過釐清中國與日本的關係，發現同屬亞洲身份的中日兩國，在文化上本就已經相互影響，以形成亞洲的知性共識；另一方面透過回溯中日歷史的糾結，逐步促成找出中日體會彼此敵意形成的根源，主張日本應對二戰的戰罪道歉，而中國也應理解道歉的真意，中日合群才有可能。

(四) 意識形態上的中間主義論述

混血身份背景的研究者，由於處在原鄉與他鄉之間，在意識形態這類可能涉及實際政治層面的敏感性議題上，更顯得格外謹慎，避免影射對國家忠誠度或中立客觀的懷疑。在口述歷史訪談中，入江表示不管在美國或日本的學術界，他都採取一種不偏右派，也不偏左派，而居於中間的中間主義路線。

1950年代興起的麥卡錫主義（McCarthyism），標誌了美國右派的極盛期，對於任何對共產中國與蘇聯友好的言論，都是被
譴責與驅逐的對象。費正清一代的中國通即遭受到麥卡錫主義的波及，入江雖沒有遭到波及，但他回憶這段過程，認爲那是一個糟糕透頂的時代。本來對中國有所研究的中國通可以幫助美國更正確地了解中國，作爲美國與中國之間的橋樑，卻遭到反共意識形態的批判。然而入江也不同於美國左派學者，如同 Mark Selden 等人自稱是毛主義者般地親近共産主義，他說：「在1960年代，我相當程度是個中間主義者（centrist），舉例來說，我支持中美安全條約（入江指的應該是中美共同防禦條約），事實上我不屬於反戰運動的一部，我沒有變成一個毛主義者，許多激進的學生像 John Dower、Mark Selden 都稱他們自己為毛主義者，而我完全不是。」因此在美國學界中，入江保持了一種中間立場的位置。

在當代日本學界，右派大致主張日本應該脫離美國佔領，並制定自己的一套憲法，恢復正常國家的身份地位，拒絕討論日本二戰時所犯下的戰罪以及天皇的罪責。對此，身處在日本之外的

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入江，有不同的看法：

我認為在日本我被視為是激進的學者之一⋯⋯，因為我仍然支持戰後的憲法（日本的非戰憲法），我是少數認為我們不應該改變該憲法的人之一。大部分的學者都認為我們應該制定一部新憲法，或者應該修改該憲法⋯⋯，支持戰後憲法是激進的，因為該憲法禁止武裝⋯⋯。戰後憲法是美國佔領日本下所制定的憲法，基本上是美國強加給日本的，所以許多日本的保守主義者和民族主義者，都認為這基本上是一部美國的憲法，他們要制定自己的憲法。日本人的憲法擁有武裝和自我防衛，以及任何其他的權力⋯⋯，所以我認為我們應該堅持戰後憲法，並繼續遵守第九條款的其中之一25。

在日本，我們沒有那樣的學術自由，儘管在教育上有了一定的轉變，許多學者仍痛恨去討論天皇的戰罪。如果你討論了，可以確定隔天會有一卡車揮舞著旗幟的右翼份子來到，譴責你是不愛國的，所以許多學者感到害怕，害怕提到天皇的戰罪等類似的問題。但是我會這樣做，我不在意他們到來，大部分的情況是，他們譴責我時，我是身在美國的，所以相當安全。在美國，我認為你只要堅持你所相信的，不必感到害怕。我想

25 錄前註。
第四章 入江昭的身份策略

更多地談談當代的情況，人們對於戰爭有不同的記憶，但是我的記憶是停留在解放，而不是羞辱。……
我不曾感到（美國佔領日本）羞辱，那更像是一種解放，因為我真的感到那是從戰時的宣傳以及偏執中解放出來。

不同於右派，入江身處在日本之外，對天皇以及日本的戰罪大加批判，並認為美國佔領日本是將日本從戰爭的不理性宣傳中釋放出來，而不是一種羞辱。他因而也支持在美國佔領下所制定的日本非戰憲法。相對於右派，日本左派則認為戰後日本太過美國化，並主張以中國為圭臬作爲文化論述的主要框架。故入江也不不同於左派的親中路線，主張美日的聯盟關係，支持美日安全條約的簽定。因此在日本的學界中，入江仍維持了不偏右，也不偏左的中間主義立場。

不管是學術主張或意識形態，入江都採取同時能與左右兩派溝通的中間主義論述，這也是混血身份的研究者經常擁有的視野。不過從中也間接反映混血身份的研究者所必須同時面臨原鄉與他鄉兩方面的檢視與壓力。正如入江所說：「我不認爲我改變

26 同前註。
了很多，然而整個世界、美國以及日本則往右移動，我認為基本上我沒有改變太多，但圍繞著我的世界改變了。」他自認自己在立場上並無太大沒變，但近年來一直在美日學界中被視為是一個激進份子，這是因為美日學界往意識形態左右兩端的天秤各邁進了一步，使得中間主義立場的他，在左右兩派的學者看來，都是個極端份子，左派看他是個偏右主義者，右派看他是個偏左的學者。

第二節 加入中國以求中間

入江昭採取的中間主義論述，以兼採眾說並加以連結的方式，使自己得以不偏不倚的處於中間的立場。尤其具有日裔美籍的身份，在研究美日歷史衝突過程時，更需份外謹慎地使自己看起來是中立客觀的。然則中國之於他個人的意義，便在於中國能使他得以退出美日的身份限制，看待美日關係。

入江在討論美日過往的歷史衝突時，顯少是單純針對兩者之間的問題作探討，大多是加入中國作為討論的對象，認為美日之間的衝突，是因美日在不同時期對待中國的策略上有所不同所導致。例如入江認為在一戰前，美日之間存在衝突的原因，是因兩者中國政策的不同步調，美國以國際主義為基調，積極協助

中國邁向現代化國家，而日本則以帝國主義侵略的方式，促使中國朝現代化國家轉變。又如二戰期間，他又提出是由於美國各自中國政策的差異，使得雙方邁向戰爭，美國以民主國家對抗極權國家的觀點，認為應該幫助屬於民主陣營的中國，來對抗極權陣營的日本，而日本則抱持亞洲對抗西方的觀點，認為中國是必須加以征服與結合的對象，共同排除西方在亞洲的勢力。更如戰後，他發現美日之間的合作關係也多次受中國因素所左右，戰後初期的日本原欲以中國作爲其精神依歸，後來由於中國內戰的原因又倒向美國。戰後初期日本與中國呈現出和諧的氣氛，但又因中國倒向共產陣營，使已經與美國緊密結合，屬於民主陣營日本，與中國成爲敵對關係。又隨著之後中美關係的正常化，中式關係也隨之恢復外交關係。近年來，面對中國的崛起，美國內部則出現了希望日本能夠提高軍事預算，增加軍備來平衡中國軍事力量的聲音。以上諸多例子，無不說明了入江在探討美日關係時，中國位於一個樞紐的位置。入江似乎是透過中國的角色來探討美日關係，沒有了中國因素的加入，美日關係的探討是相對片面與不完整的理解。

入江加入中國以探討美日關係的動機，或許是因為美日與中國關係的緊密性，使他無法忽略中國這一角色。但對入江自身來說，加入中國無疑也是他跳脫美日身份的限制，透過美日對一個第三方的認識角度，間接地認識美日自身，對具有日裔美籍的入江昭來說，這種間接的方式要比直接透過美日相互認識彼此，更能維持自己的中立與客觀。

以他者認識的理解方法或許更能說明這樣的情況，「他者認
識中具有“看即被看”，實即在實己的一面向。故對於他者的認識與評判，其實也正說明了論者對自己的認識與立場，因為在他者認識中，至少必須要有屬於自己與異於自己的他者兩個角色的存在，如此才能透過與不同於自己的他者比較，確認自己。

入江昭在探討美日關係時，由於同時具有日裔美籍的身份背景，美國與日本對他來說同時是自己，也是他者，何時美國是他者，日本是自己？又何時日本是他者，美國是自己？不論如何，他者認識「不能僅有自己和他人這兩種相互性（bilateralism）視點，多極間的視點（multilateralism）是不可缺的，即在自我認識和他者認識中，加入第三方或更多的他者的視點，對現實發生的事態，對於他國或他民族等他者的認識，常常不是單方面的形成，而是將複數的對象與伸向自己的鏡中相互反映的自我與他者的形象結集起來，複雜地交織而成的鏡像」。中國之於入江，就如同他者認識中的第三方，透過中國的加入，映照出不同於美日相互他者認識的鏡像，以修正美日相互認識中，所可能產生的誤解與不客觀。

故入江即使總以中美日作為共同的研究焦點，似乎美日雖是他研究的主角，但中國是位居配角的核心，亦即中間主義得以實踐的場域。他曾經分別以美國或日本為主題進行歷史研究，且出

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29 山室信一，〈面向未來的回憶──他者認識和價值創建的視角〉，輯於中國社會科學研究會（編）＜中國與日本的他者認識──中日學者的共同探討＞，北京：社會科學文獻出版社，2004，頁17。

30 山室信一，前引書。
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版過專書31，他對中國史雖也有著墨，則侷限於與對外關係相關的中國史發展，且多散見於對外關係史的研究著作當中。他不諱言的說，「我的中國史學習，基本上是我在美國的教育的結果，我在日本沒有學習中國史……，所以我是經過費正清學習到了中國史……，如同你們所知的，他基本的趨向是強調中國與西方的互動，中國對西方的反應，這種取向已經爲許多認爲研讀中國史應該要以中國自身條件來理解的人所批評……。但是，在當時那似乎是個好的研究取向，因爲對許多不曾研究過中國史的人而言，這使中國史的研究更加容易，那也是我過去研究中國史的方式……32」因此他仍隱約地受到早期衝擊一反應模式的影響，讓美日居於主動位置，而中國似乎只是被動地在配合美日演出。

入江昭說那是他過去研究中國史的方式，不過即使是在學術生涯成熟後的今日，中國仍然不是入江最關切的主題，入江主要的關切已從過去的美日轉爲全球性議題，因此他是以全球史以及跨國史的視角看待世界與中國。他說：「那是我試著在國際競爭的場域中理解中國的方式，我的中國研究大部分專注於此，意即中國和世界事務的關係33。」

31 以美國爲主要討論對象的專書，例如： From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914; 《劍橋美國對外關係史下卷：美國的全球化進程》等；以日本爲主要討論對象的專書與文章則有 Japan and the Wilder World: From the Mid-nineteen Century to the Present; “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status,”等。


33 同前註。
不過，對中國史的持續研究是他國際事務研究的一個部分，也是和平世界不可或缺的一部分。中國提供了中日之間相互影響並形成自我與合群的儒家文明，這樣的儒家中國大於中、日兩個國族，使兩者居於平等，認可兩者之間的差異。同時，中國也是美日書寫自我因而產生相互影響的文本，說明美日之間在知性上的平等，也促成美日認識且體會他們之間的差異。中國這樣一個看似角的研究課題，是入江的文化國際主義學說及中間主義方法得以獲得實踐的核心機制。

第三節 入江昭的身份意識

一、進出疆界的混血身份

面對「你是誰？」的問題，單一身份的研究者，通常不假思索的回答我是美國人、中國人或日本人等等，這似乎是再簡單不過而無須考慮的問題，不過對於文化混血身份的研究者，「你是誰？」卻是個必須考慮再三的問題，不僅需要考慮到自身心理的認同，所身處的大環境也成為必要的考慮因素。

如同在學術主張上，文化混血身份者採取中間主義的論述策略，面對「你是誰？」的問題，他們往往有意無意的巧妙避開。

同前註。
採取一種不直接針對問題的回答。一種常見的回應是把身份認同角色的問題，轉換為職業角色的回答，以避開敏感的身份意識。他們同時強調自己的中立客觀，並認為身份意識一點也不重要。他們也可採取一種依據當時情境而有不同回答的策略，在不同的時空環境中，他們的身份也在不停的轉換，這類似於文化研究對研究對象的主張。「文化研究中的研究對象身份可以變異，……身份的內容具有特定集體認同所不可壟斷的能動性」。文化研究中的後現代主義者，「傾向於解構任何身份的本質性，他們採取歷史相對論的立場，將所有的身份主張視為特定歷史情境下，帶有某種程度偶然性的文本。」相對的，後殖民主義者則強調兼具殖民母國與殖民地兩者混血身份的存在。期間得到共同強調的是一種身份的能動性，因此文化混血的研究者的身份意識，乃可以在不同時空環境中而有不同轉換。他們因而可以以身為原鄉的身份立論，並隨時轉換為他鄉的身份立論，隨著身份的隨時轉換，進出不同疆界。迴避或身份的轉換，都是文化混血身份的研究者，在面對身份意識這類敏感議題所能可能取的策略，這顯示出他們對自己的身份可以有所調整，亦或者他們有意的迴避自己的身份意識。

「近來，身份廣為人們所談論，他們問我如何認同自己？我的身份是什麼？我第一個反應應該是，最重要的身份是我是一個

35 董之瑜，前引書，頁 201。
36 董之瑜，同前註。
37 董之瑜，同前註，頁 202-204。
歷史學家。」入江昭以職業角色的身份，回答了人們對於混血身份研究者認同感的好奇。或許也能從職業角色當中找尋關於國家與族裔認同的蛛絲馬跡，例如以何種立場從事歷史研究，進而推敲出其認同的身份意識。但入江昭不偏不倚的強調自己史學研究上客觀與中立，「我基本上認為我自己是一個歷史學家，不是日本的歷史學家，也不是美國的歷史學家，而是一個純粹的歷史學家。」顯見在身份意識的敏感問題上，入江昭採取不正面回應，這可以是為了避免美國學界對其外裔身份的指指點點，亦或許當代缺乏從民族國家論述以外來自我定位的適切語言，以致於面對這類問題，入江沒有特定的答案。

除了強調自己史學研究上的中立客觀外，入江昭也強調，研究者的身份背景與史學研究的客觀與否之間，並無必然的關係。對他來說，研究者的身份背景從來不是史學研究上最重要的因素：「我不認為我的國籍、民族背景是一個因素，如果它是一個因素，也不是最重要的因素，因爲我沒有任何日本人的觀點。日本人的觀點是比較民族主義的，而我是反對民族主義的……。我試著更具跨國與國際性，而不是民族的。」入江昭確信「當一個人不但從內部，而且從外部來考察民族史時，就能獲得最佳的認識，在求索一種不那麼扭曲的歷史過程中，只要願意汲取各

39 同前註。
40 同前註。
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種觀點，那麼這個人是誰並不重要。」

採取迴避身份的態度，以及認為研究者身份意識的無關緊要，無獨有偶的也是同樣身處在美國學界，而具有韓裔美籍背景的金淳基的自況。金淳基「不認為種族問題是最重要的，或許它可能在潛意識的層次上運作著。」他具體的設想了身份的情境性

1970 年，一如往常地，我在德國慕尼黑參加世界政治科學大會（World Congress of Political Science），有一個陌生人，一個歐洲人問我：『你是誰？』我對是否會說我是韓國人遲疑了許久，而我可能會說我是一個從某大學來的政治科學家。或者如果在韓國有人問我：『你是誰？』我絕不會說我是韓國人。另一方面在甘迺迪國際機場一個陌生人問我：『你是韓國人嗎？』我會說是的，我是韓國人。

與入江昭相同，以政治科學家的職業角色身份回答，是金淳基面對身份意識問題時的答案之一。不過，金淳基更清楚地點明

41 入江昭、王建華等（譯），〈歷史學的國際化〉，輯於中國美國史研究會（編），《現代史學的挑戰——美國歷史協會主席演說集 1961-1988》，上海：上海人民出版社，1990，頁 541。

42 金淳基，〈台灣大學與中山大學政治學研究所合辦之口述歷史訪談搞——記錄二〉，2007 年 6 月 5,7,12 日。http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/RAEC/act/Sam%20Kim%20Interviews.doc

43 金淳基，〈台灣大學與中山大學政治學研究所合辦之口述歷史訪談搞——記錄三〉，2007 年 6 月 5,7,12 日。http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/RAEC/act/Sam%20Kim%20Interviews.doc
他所採去的迴避策略，「我認為我有不斷轉變的身份，……如果有人問我：『我是誰？』那是一個非常難以回答的問題，而我的答案總是根據特定的情況而改變。」他可以是政治科學家，也可以是韓國人、美國人，因此在不斷身份轉換的過程中，使得身份意識也變得有彈性。在進出不同身份的過程中，迴避了「你是誰？」的問題，使其不具本質上的意義，因爲即使回答了也等於沒有答案。文化混血者的身份意識仍是介於其間。

相對於金淳基在不斷轉換各種身份的過程中，迴避了身份意識的問題，入江昭似乎也透露了身份轉換的可能。

我的希望是，我們可以談論溝通歷史，而不必總是意識到民族認同，那只是一個身份……，我出生於日本，那是我身份的一部分，但是我不認為那是最重要的，仍有其他的可供思考，在美國時常有人問我：你從哪來？大部分，我不會說我來自日本，我通常說我來自中西部，或來自芝加哥，因為我在中西部和芝加哥區域待的時間，比美國其他地方都要長，大部分的美國人了解我的想法，他們不會追問我。

沒有一個單一身份是足以說明入江昭的身份意識，正如他一所，日本人的民族身份只是他身份的其中之一，他還有身為美國之內的區域身份，也還有歷史學家的職業身份。除此之外，入江

44 同前註。
更認為還有人類身份的存在。「在公身份與私身份之間，也許有一個第三層次的既存的身份認同，也就是身為文明的人類的一員。」入江也屬於全人類的一份子，也理所當然具有人類的身份。多元的身份構成了入江昭的身份意識，因此任何一個身份都是他的身份意識，但相反地任何一個身份也都不能完全代表他。在這些多元的身分之中，入江昭似乎也有如金淳基般，可以依據情境，不斷地選擇是否轉換自己的身份，因「如何認同自己，或強烈地感覺到些什麼，那都是個選擇的問題。」

從入江昭的學術主張裡，可以看出他自由進出不同身份，轉換立場的痕跡，例如入江主張的亞洲共同體，其實隱含了以日本人的立場面對中國的可能，認爲日本本就是亞洲，而主張中日合群形成亞洲。在此，美國人的身份邊緣化了，否則若是美國人的立場，不會願意看到一個排除美國的強大亞洲的出現，因「西方對於非西方有種深切地恐懼，特別是中國和日本如果兩者結合在一起的話，似乎能夠使西方文明的優越性毀滅。」然而入江主張的亞太共同體，也透露出他以美國人的身份意識來面對中日，因為在東協排除美國的情況下，亞太區域共同體的建制乃是美國與東亞國家持續保持聯繫的管道，不管在經濟、政治或文化

上，美國都不願被排除在亞洲之外。在此，他分別進入日本身份與美國身份後，所主張的排除美國的亞洲共同體，與納入美國的亞太共同體，之間似乎存在着矛盾。又亞太共同體不能沒有亞洲的先行出現，因此勢必需要將亞太共同體與亞洲共同體連結起來。此時，入江昭又轉換爲人類身份的立場，主張全球共同體，以世界公民的身份追求和平的世界，因而亞太共同體乃成爲東西文明溝通的橋樑，而亞洲共同體乃是中日對話交流的管道，因此兩者在追求和平世界的大目標下，並行不悖。

入江學術主張上不斷轉換身份立場的論述，與文化混血身份者貫有的論述策略雷同，不過不同身份立場的觀點乃會有矛盾與對立之處，在入江的論述中似乎也有美日身份立場的矛盾。但他又能發展出一種更宏觀的人類身份，連結了原本處於對立的美日身份論述。

二、吸收美國學術養分，開展出包容多元身份的學術觀點

入江之所以能夠不斷轉換身份，進出不同疆界立論的原因，或與他多元的身份背景有關。尤其是在美國的求學與研究，讓他吸收了美國學術成長的養分，開展出具有包容性的學術觀點，使他得以在不同身份之間似乎遊刃有餘。入江和平世界的構想，正是建立在西方公民社會的觀念上，強調個人在文化交流上，可

49 入江提到：「如阿納托利·托克維爾（Alexis de Tocqueville）、詹姆士·布萊（James Bryce）」
以促进不同文化社群间发展彼此之间的共享价值。这种共性是所谓真正普遍性的存在，不仅参与了中国、日本与美国，也包含了全世界的其他文化社群。因此，入江乃是从西方的学术概念为起点，发展出包容多元文化价值的世界观。

入江自己也认为他的学术成长，与身处于美国的求学与治学经历息息相关，学术主张的内容也大多汲取自美国学术土壤的养分。在美国求学的阶段，他感受到美国人民的热情与好客，在Haveford大学的求学期间，他常常在同学的家中度过各种节庆，「他们是极度的友善与好客」。入江也感到到美国学术风气的开放：

在Haveford College，知识自由的气氛是完全的，我们

可以研讀許多主題，範圍從馬克思主義到蘇維埃政
府，而沒有限制，我主要的指導教授，一位歷史學家，
沒有注意到我是個外國學生的事實，對待我就像對待
其他人一樣，他告訴我一個人從哪裡出生並無差別。
不只是大學提供了一種開放與熱情的氛圍，許多費城
地區的教會以及非政府組織，都會邀請外國學生參與
教會服務、晚餐以及社會服務50。

入江在美國求學期間，正值冷戰時期民主與共產意識形態的
對立，但他所認識的美國卻有別於政治層面，而全然是美國的公
民社會，包括民間社會的友善好客以及學術風氣上的開放，
想到在美國求學期間，當時冷戰仍是美國
對外關係中的主要的主題，我感到驚訝的是，我認識
的美國幾乎完全是它的公民社會：教會、田園、私人
家庭、學院，回頭看，我對當時國家和社會之間的截
然不同感到驚奇，當國家正在進行冷戰時，公民社會
也正在持續進行自己的事務，自由地、開放地且很少
與地緣政治相關51。

或許是因為求學階段的入江昭，所感受到的美國民間社會是
友善、自由且開放多元，與政治上美國對共產國家的敵意截然不

50 Akira Iriye, “The Role of Philanthropy and Civil Society in U.S Foreign
51 Akira Iriye, Ibid, p.52.
第四章 入江昭的身份策略

同，使得他意識到國家層次與民間社會之間的裂隙，國家有可能在權力政治的考量下處於敵對狀態，然而在公民社會裡，不同族裔、國籍的人們卻都分享著某些共同的價值觀與期待，透過個人與民間組織不斷從事跨越國界的教育、文化交流，使得彼此更加了解，也對和平世界有所貢獻，入江自己就是得利於美日之間的教育交流機制。

即使美國自由開放的公民社會，讓入江從來都不覺得自己是個外國人，但在美國學術土壤上茁壯的入江昭，的確也意識到自己的亞裔身份。

當人們知道我來自日本，他們都會問我各式的問題，例如在日本有冰淇淋嗎？有熱狗嗎？這類基本的問題，那沒關係，我可以消化這些問題……。但是我意識到，我的確來自亞洲的事實，我是班上唯一的亞洲學生，沒有其他人了，所以我做的任何事都被認為是亞洲人。有時那是個問題，也就是偏見，如果我做了某些事，他們會認為那就是典型的日本人的行為，或日本人的思考……。所以我開始注意到此類文化上的成見，那還不至於是種族歧視，但也是一種刻版印象……。因為有了這類的經驗，我認為我應該研究些

52 入江說：「當我在美軍結束佔領不久後，來到美國學習歷史，我得到了同其他學生一樣的待遇，我非常感激大學和研究所的教授們，因為他們從不認為我的外來者身份是學習歷史的障礙。」參考：入江昭，王建華等（譯），《歷史學的國際化》，前引書，頁541-542。
跨國的、文化的、種族之間的問題。

可見他對於文化種族因素產生敏感度，和他置身於在美國，身為一個亞裔學者，對於文化種族因素產生敏感度，和他置身於在美國，身為一個亞裔學者的身份是有關聯的。他表示在他 65 年美國的生涯當中，很慶幸並未真正遇過任何形式的種族主義，即使在他學者的生涯發展過程，也並未受到美國學術界不公平的對待，若是否能取得教授終身職的取決標準，主要在於是否有出版書籍，而與日本的身份背景無關。但入江也意識到美國人種族偏見的存在，仍有許多損害少數人種的歧視事件在美國發生，故他自己從與美國人一起生活的經驗中，對自己的亞裔身份有所自覺。

對亞裔身份的自覺，使得入江對於跨國的、文化的以及種族的議題特別感興趣。因此儘管入江與其他美國學者一樣，受到美國學術概念很大的影響，但卻開展出與西方主流學術觀點不一樣的研究方法與主張。在研究方法上，大多數美國外交史學者仍然從國家層次出發，以現實主義史觀來作爲主要分析的依據，而入江則更強調從個人層次出發，文化轉向的外交史研究。對中國的研究也是如此，入江有別於西方中心觀點的中國認識，而主張去中心觀點的論述。學術主張上，入江從西方的公民社會的概念中開展出包含多元性的真正普遍性，而不同於以西方為主的普遍性，以和平的世界取代必定衝突的世界。在中國的認識上，入江與美國學界盛行的中國威脅論也持不同觀點，他視中國的崛起是文化力量的和平崛起，主張中日合群，對和平世界做出貢獻。

的確入江確實受到美國學術界很大的薰陶，並以美國的學術概念開展出他的觀點，但是又因為他的亞裔身份，使得他看到許多美國學者不曾關注的議題，因此開展出不同的觀點與研究方法。簡單來說，入江似乎對西方的主流學術觀點起了修正的作用，他對主流學術觀點並非完全抗拒，而是加以補充或者修正，例如他並非排斥或貶抑現實主義史觀的分析，而是強調在此之外還有文化觀點的分析；他雖然主張去中心觀點的論述，但認爲以往西方中心觀點的論述仍具其價值所在；他大力提倡以文化交流建構的和平的世界，卻不否認有權力世界與經濟世界的存在；他雖然主張中日合群形成亞洲共同體，卻也主張納入美國的亞太共同體。這種種都反映，入江是在美國學界既有的概念下，進行修正補充，這是文化混血身份者的共有特性——「『可修正性』（revisability），亦即不論什麼概念、制度、價值，即使有意願學習並遵循之，其結果常常是不經意地起了修正作用，以至於看似固定的意思都還可以被繼續轉變」。

三、對日本的關懷：以西方的學術觀點，開展出日本進入世界的途徑

儘管入江在學術上起源自西方學術概念，但混血的身份背景使他修正了主流觀點的看法，尤其在其學術著作中，都隱隱可以看出亞裔身份的影子，日裔美籍的他始終保存有對日本的核心關

石之瑜，前引書，頁 64-65。
入江對日本的關懷

入江對日本的關懷之情，可以從兩方面得知。首先在研究對象上，入江在美日之外，將中國納入了討論，而不是歐洲，這似乎說明了入江對於日本的關懷超過對於美國。因爲按邏輯推斷，如果入江是以美國作爲核心關懷的對象，那大可不必非要將中國納入討論不可，然而卻必定得選擇歐洲與日本，因爲美國除了是西方國家外，也是太平洋強權，分別隸屬於太平洋與大西洋兩端的日本與歐洲，不管在歷史文化、經濟合作或政治事務都與美國有緊密的關係。不過在入江的學術生涯當中，中國一直都以是他的研究對象之一，選擇中國與美國，顯示著入江其實更以日本為關懷。事實上，不管朝東方的太平洋去發展，或朝向西方大陸去發展，美國與中國都是日本必須遭遇的對象。倘若入江以日本為核心的關懷，便幾乎非要有中國不可，因爲在歷史文化的根基上，日本根植於儒家與佛教，是一個無法擺脫的事實，故他指出，「若沒有中國文化這個前提，日本文化是不可能存在的」，中國是日本近代知識界介入最深的國度，談論日本就不可能少了中國。

其次，是他一直持續對日本的國內政治情勢有所關心，例如

55 子安宣邦著，劉京華編譯，《東亞論：日本現代思想批判》。長春：吉林人民，2004，頁 78。
他近年曾對日本前首相安倍晉三（Abe Shinzo）大加批判，認
為他是個不負責且沒有智慧的政治人物，相對地入江對繼任的福
田康夫（Yasuo Fukuda）大表支持，因為其在民族性議題上採取
較為低調的姿態，且處理外交政策上也較安倍穩定安全。在安倍
辭職後，福田康夫與麻生太郎（Aso Taro）之間的競爭中，入江
則希望福田能夠勝出，因為相較於福田，麻生太郎太過民族主義
與情緒化。可知入江一直對日本的政治情勢保持關心，這是文
化混血身份者常有的特徵，即對於原鄉的政治情勢有著強烈的關
心，因文化混血身份者「不但從大的社會的標準是屬於顯然不
純的混血，且其自身混血意識明確，經常涉入祖居地的政治。」

(二) 從西方的學術概念，展開出日本進入亞洲與世界的方法

「經濟上的巨人，政治上的侏儒。」一直是戰後日本所面臨
的問題，儘管經濟上的超強實力，但在亞洲的政治事務上，日本
是處於邊緣位置的，於是「走向正常化國家」乃成爲日本國內的
共識，透過追求軍事與政治事務自立的目標，提升日本在亞洲政
治事務上的影響力。但歸根結底日本的不正常，及其亞洲政治事

56 入江曾對安倍有極為嚴厲的批判，他說：「安倍比我年輕大約 20 幾歲，他
跟我讀同一所高中，他是我的高中教育裡最糟的範例，是我學校畢業生裡最
糟糕的，……他非常無知，他和小布希可能是當今世界上最無知的領袖當中
的其中兩位。」參考：入江昭，〈台灣大學人文社會高等研究院舉辦之口述
act/interviewJ+Iriye+1-2.doc
57 同前註。
58 石之瑜，前引書，頁 59。
務影響力的薄弱，乃在於其他亞洲國家對日本的不信任感所導致，這種不信任感來自於二戰時日本所給予被侵略的亞洲國家的歷史傷痛，使得日本一直不被亞洲國家所全然接受，尤其正如入江點出的「道歉的問題，這個日本是否應該為戰時的所為道歉或補償的大問題」，在日本學界一直還不是那麼開放自由可以討論的問題，「有一些人持續認為日本應該道歉，給予補償，但當他們在一些公開會議中這樣主張時，就會被右翼份子所攻擊……
59」。由於日本這種規避且不願討論的態度，更使得亞洲國家更加對日本不信任，儘管彼此有著經濟的合作關係，但在政治事務上，日本卻始終無法發揮出與經濟實力相等的影響力。

入江的世界認識、亞洲認識與中國認識，雖然是站在全球的角度來思考，但很大一部分透露了日本進入亞洲與世界的可能，呈現出一種對日本的關心。他把世界定義為一種包容多元文化群體的文化世界，不能缺了世界上的任何一塊文化區域，因為如此就不能稱作是真正的普遍主義的和平世界，當然也不獨漏亞洲。但是日本至戰後以來不被亞洲其他國家所接納，一直是亞洲得以形成的主要障礙，日本必須做的就是重新被亞洲所接納，進而進入世界，關鍵就在於中國，因為中國對日本侵略者的形象感受最深，至今中國內部許多的反日運動，仍透露出對日仇恨的民族主義情緒，所以入江主張日本要進入亞洲，首先就必須與中國合群，方法則是透過個人與國際非政府組織在中日之間來回穿梭，不斷進行文化、教育層次上的交流，促進彼此的理解，化解敵意。

惟有如此日本才有可能從戰時的情緒中（不管是對中國的愧疚感，抑或是對中國的敵意感）解脫出來，這樣的問題意識反映了入江想替日本設想的愿望。

此外，入江對二戰期間中美日戰爭的態度，似乎也有替日本辯護的蛛絲馬跡。他認爲中美日三國之所以會爆發戰爭，是因爲在他們之間缺乏了溝通的管道，使得彼此產生了誤解。他因此說，「1941至1945年，日本和中國、美國之間發生過戰爭，原因之一就是當時沒有這種網路，沒有哲學家、學者的網路。戰爭的一些問題是可以通過單個組織之間的溝通得到有效解決的。」入江雖然主張日本應該為發動戰爭行為道歉，但是又認為戰爭的爆發是因爲彼此的溝通不良，似乎意謂著戰爭之所以會爆發，不是日本單方面的原因，受限於大環境的美國與中國也有責任。在此他似乎採取了外在環境使然的立場，間接地在替日本辯護。

四、與日本思想史的隱約傳承

入江昭以中間主義者自許並非沒有思想史基礎的自創，因為日本近代身處在東方與西方方間的自況，一直以來孕育著類似於中間主義的風格，亦即不已於東方或西方的改造融合作為歷史演進的必然目標，而已他們之間的平等共存作爲合理甚至高明的境界，這種中間主義與受到黑格爾辯證哲學影響的線性史觀思維截

60 記者劉波、馬娟，《文明的交匯：讓我們更加互相依賴》，《21世紀經濟報導》，2006年11月11日。http://view.news.qq.com/a/20061212/000023.htm
然不同，因為在黑格爾的認識論裡，正與反之間相生相成，最後終體於合，然後再生成正反，如此辯證不息，直到歷史終點。在中間主義的認識論裡，正反兩端和平共存，彼此平等，並不是相互構成的一體的兩面。可以說中間主義的思維，具體而微地體現了明治以降日本近代史的生活實踐與哲學組成。

在這方面集大成的日本思想家群體，是以西田幾多郎為首的京都學派。西田提倡場所哲學，與入江在不同情境下推動不同層次的共同體若合符節。西田開創了無的場所哲學，用以說明東西共存如何在日本成為可能。無的場所又區分為絕對無的場所與相對無的場所，前者是邏輯的產物，指行動者所必須進入的一種無偏好的純粹經驗之所在，因而無所謂對立、優劣的意識；後者是指藉以擺脫具體的有的場所，並進入其他有的場所的轉換機制。則有如入江所謂的「文化承載地」，亦即通過退出民族國家的立場，學習認知彼此立場得以形成的文化話語，免於基於特定位場產生的文化中心主義或優劣想像。西田哲學將厚塗日本夾在東西之間的國境，轉化成了超越東西的普遍性身份實踐，將保留東西差異並自由進出的文化能動性，當成是日本進入世界面對


入江昭的身份策略

西方的一種「世界史的立場」，取為思想史上中間主義的哲學濫觴。

入江提過進入「文化承載地」的溝通能力，是他的中間主義與其他亞裔學者可以比較之處。首先，入江沒有任何文化改造的意圖，即使他對於和平主義、多元文化的執著來自西方知識傳統，但在他的理解與詮釋之下，不論和平或多元都不具備哲學上的最優地位，而多元文化的多元之間，則是不拘泥於固定內涵的多元，因而避免了必須臣屬於某定一元才能得到認可的排他性多元。入江的論述中也沒有建立綜合模式來理解現象的傾向，他更願意用不同的視野提出不同的解釋，採取並列，而不是採取綜合，因而又不同於取精用間或汰舊換新的文化進化論。這樣能夠擺脫對單一學說、模式、觀點的依賴，隱約所繼承的正是西田哲學或京都哲學。

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第四節 小結

中間主義論述是許多文化混血身份研究者經常採取的策略，這便可以因應原鄉與他鄉對他們的雙重檢視，藉由中間主義的論述，退避從民族立場選擇自己的學術觀點與身份意識，以便能宣稱自己是中立且客觀，進而扮演好雙方之間的溝通橋樑的角色。不管從入江昭的世界認識、中國認識或意識形態，都呈現出他小心翼翼的整理其中對立的觀點，並試圖將其連結起來，成為一種兼採眾說的中間主義論述，或金淳基所謂的「綜合互動的解釋」。藉此入江昭才得以宣稱：「我不覺得我從事的研究是特定的日本人，或其他的觀點，我學術上所吸收的，我認為更多地受到美國的歷史學家的影響，但在學術上我不把自己看作是一個美國人」意即強調自己歷史研究的客觀中立。

在此之下，日裔美籍的他，在研究美日關係上，如何在美日之間達成中立客觀也成為棘手的問題。中國之於入江昭自身的意義遠在此現身，入江透過把中國做為在知識論上美國與日本的第三者，從而超越他所處的身份限制，間接地透過美日與日中關係之間的比較，探討美日關係。中國提供一個退出美日身份的視野，藉此得到一個對歷史較客觀的理解。

入江昭之所以不斷努力強調自己在研究上的中立客觀，這無

第四章 入江昭的身份策略

非是因為文化混血的身份，引起人們對其研究客觀性的質疑，因此入江昭連最根本的身份意識也都必須採取迴避的態度。如此透過不斷轉換身份立場，站在不同疆界的立場立論，試圖迴避或隱藏自己的身份意識，不也是韓裔美籍學者金淳基，面對身份意識問題時採取的策略嗎？

中間主義論述是否就等於中立客觀的論述不無疑義。入江的世界、亞洲與中國認識，無疑是建立在西方的學術概念下所開創出的，意即建立在公民社會概念下所形成的真正普遍主義的和平世界。這種普遍主義雖有別於過去以西方為準繩的普遍主義，但追本溯源，還是建立在西方的學術概念之下。正如王立新教授所言：「雖然入江沒有明言，但他所說的普世價值觀無疑來自西方，特別是美國……因此共同文化價值觀形成過程，可能仍然不過是西方，特別是美國文化的全球擴散過程。」因此和平世界的概念一開始就始終是奠基於西方概念之上。不過即使入江昭師承西方的學術傳統，但亞裔身份的自覺卻使他有別於西方，而對日本有著根本性的關懷，強調以追求普世價值為前提的世界觀、亞洲觀與中國觀也恰巧是入江爲日本設想進入亞洲與世界的途徑。這或許是種偶然的巧合，但重要的是，也許應該將入江所謂的「純粹的歷史學者」放回不純粹的歷史脈絡。

第五章 結論

第一節 亞裔美籍學者的身份策略

處在他鄉從事研究，並有著原鄉身份背景的文化混血身份研究者，在從事研究時必須同時接受他鄉與原鄉雙重的檢視。在他鄉，必須面對從事相關研究領域的同僚對自己研究客觀性的質疑，因而必須注意他鄉主流的論述，是否自己會淪為異類，而無法與其同僚有平等對話的位置。在原鄉，必須忍受想像的廣大族民對自己忠誠度的懷疑，畢竟站在他鄉的位置對原鄉的任何指指點點，都容易遭到原鄉民族主義者的強烈批判。

在美國學術圈裡的亞裔學者也面臨類似的處境。Frank H. Wu指出，「我們或許都能列出至少一、兩位受人尊敬的美籍亞裔學者，但他們幾乎都不是家喻戶曉的人物。沒有一位亞裔教授的知識影響力，能遠及校園之外。沒有一位亞裔的電視評論員，能定期分析現今的危機。整體來看，沒有一位亞裔專欄作家所提出的觀點，能直達美國社會的主流」。這當中有多少是因爲美
籍亞裔學者的研究與美國主流論述不同，使其研究的客觀性遭到質疑，有多少是因為在美國人心底層次上，亞裔始終只是遊客或是入侵者，故而被視為「永久的外國人」(the perpetual-foreigner)。

除了要努力適應他鄉（美國）的大環境之外，吸收了歐美知識的亞裔學者，站在歐美的角度對自己的原鄉進行觀察，以致於任何對於原鄉的評論都會疑似在歧視祖國。

就此，便有美籍亞裔學者回應，由於自己多重的身份背景，兼具雙方的文化傳統與語言，因此使其能同時兼顧雙方的立場，處在一種不偏不倚的客觀立場，並作爲雙方溝通的橋樑。他們於是採取中間主義的論述策略，來維持研究的中立客觀，以因應多重檢視的壓力；甚至採取不停轉換身份立場的方式，使得身份意識變得不相干，從而避免了人們質疑其認同的歸屬。王愛華（Aihwa Ong）就認為「華人或亞裔美人，是帶著多重護照，出入於國家關口，雖有其家庭分裂、距離、適應上的問題，但是只要靠近機場，便可充分發揮其太空人的彈性公民權，獲得最大的利益。」彈性的公民權說明的正是文化混血身份者，進出不同疆界，不斷轉換身份的情形。

日裔美籍的入江昭並不例外，研究上採取中間主義的論述策略，以及在身份意識上的迴避與彈性，都是亞裔美國學者在因應兩難處境時，所會採取的策略。從入江的世界認識、亞洲認識、

2 前註。
3 廖炳惠，《在全球化過程中的海外華人離散社會：政治與文化公民權的分野》，轉載哈佛燕京學社（編），《全球化與文明對話》，南京：江蘇教育出版社，2004，頁286-287。
中國認知以及他的意識形態，都可以發現他很習慣在對立的眾說，或兩個看似極端的學術觀點之間，建立可以相互體會的知性連結，使自己處於中間，協助西方退出狹隘的族群立場，即使批判或辯論時，也都能因此相互尊重欣賞，故他主要是反對極端的或一元的觀點，而不是高舉自正的一家之言。入江就像在寫教科書似的諸端並列，很難從他的著作裡抽譯出他有立場的偏頗，無怪乎費正清會認為入江沒有文化成見，並能如實的從事史學研究。

在身份意識上，入江不排除轉換策略，以因應人們對其如何認知自己的好奇。亞太共同體、亞洲共同體的學術主張，隱含著入江在美國身份與日本身份之間的遷移。若單純將亞洲與亞太共同體分開來看，兩個概念是有所矛盾的，亞太共同體似乎是在為美國留有進入亞洲的途徑，而亞洲共同體似乎是在排除美國，並藉由與中國的合作，使日本得以進入亞洲。但入江從人類的身份出發，將亞太與亞洲兩個看似矛盾的概念，整合在和平世界的概念下，於是亞太與亞洲共同體便不是平行式的對立概念，而是在和平世界的概念下的不同階段。意即日本必須偕同中國形成亞洲，亞洲形成後，必須與西方（美國）偕同形成亞太，進而為和平世界做出貢獻。在此之下，亞太共同體即便有著以美國身份出發的意涵，但以亞洲共同體為基礎的亞太共同體，也同時成為日本進入世界的途徑。在日本身份、美國身份、人類身份之間不斷轉換的過程中，學術概念的矛盾是必然的，但也因身份的轉換，使其獲得合理的解釋，更由於身份可以轉換，使入江可以不是那麼困難地採取中間主義的論述策略。這似乎同時也是韓裔美籍學
者金淳基，以及華裔學者趙穗生所採取的策略。可見在學術內容上以及身份意識上，亞裔美籍學者可以有意識保持某種程度的模煳與轉圜地帶。

第二節 仍有立場的中間主義論述：西方的思維，日本的關懷

或許是因為文化混血身份研究者，有著因應他鄉大環境生存的壓力，也或許是因為連他們自己也不確定自己的身份意識，因而採取一種中間主義的論述策略，不過不管如何，中間主義的論述始終是他們在他鄉學術圈中時常採取的方式，藉此建立自己研究的中立客觀性。

如何跳脫身份限制，以達成中立客觀的中間主義論述，乃是文化混血身份研究者一個重要的課題。早期，入江昭研究的重點還是傳統國關史研究時，他著重在美國－東亞關係（中日）的探討上，雖然他認為他花在研究中國史的時間比日本史還要多，但從他的著作中，以美日兩者的探討數量最多，中國方面則缺少專本著作，且多是散見於其他美國東亞關係的專書當中，可見美日才是入江昭關心的兩個主要對象。日裔美籍身份的他，將焦點放在原鄉的日本與他鄉的美國，但也使他在看待美日關係上，面對是否客觀中立的問題，因此遂有必要加入中國的角色，使他得以透過中國間接地看待美日，以達到客觀中立。入江昭後期的研究以全球性議題為主，中國也仍然不是他主要的關切，他是透過和
第五章 結論

平世界的概念來理解中國的，若缺少了中國的和平世界，就無法宣稱是建立在真正普遍主義的和平世界，也無法完成自己的中立客觀。中國似乎是他達到中立客觀、超越美日身份限制的一個重要因素。不过也是因為入江加入中國的角色，更隱約透露出，他其實對日本的關懷更甚美國，若是以美國為中心，扮演第三者角色以達客觀中立的應該是歐洲，而不是中國，只有是以日本為核心，中國才成爲一種必要。此外，入江主張中日應該合群以形成亞洲，但中國實際上並「不必」一定要與日本合作，取得亞洲的身份，入江在和平世界的概念下，則認爲中國「應該」要如此，相對於日本必定需要與中國的合作，以進入亞洲，進而進入世界的途徑，入江似乎有著對日本的偏袒，而中國則是主要關心之外不可或缺的論述機制。

入江既是東方（日本），也是西方（美國）的身份背景，充分展現在他和平世界概念的構築上。追根究底，強調公民社會與個人的和平世界，乃是源自西方的學術概念。但入江和平概念下的世界觀與中國觀，可以被視為是在日本的身份困境尋求出路。日本曾經的西化政策以及二戰，造成與亞洲國家，尤其是中國，結下的仇怨，這是日本無法完全被亞洲接受的原因。又日本原就不是西方，在不是西方，也無法進入亞洲的情況下，日本便處於身份困境當中，而入江和平世界概念下的中國認識，乃主張中日應該合群，使日本能夠進入亞洲所接受，之後進入世界，可以說入江是在西方的學術概念下，開展出真正的普遍主義，以此作爲日本身份困境的出路。
在入江中間主義的論述下，隱約可以發現入江的中間並不代
表他所謂的中立客觀，他仍隱約有著對日本的特殊之情，有著對
日本的核心關懷。故即使入江努力地想維持中立客觀，但日裔的
血緣身份仍隱隱地對他造成影響，不只是因爲在血緣上與日本有
連帶關係，在文化上入江也深受日本傳統文化影響。在美國完成
大學教育以前，他是在日本成長接受中學教育的。正如杜維明所
言：「我們深深根植於自己的各種傳統紐帶，它們給我們的日常
生存賦予了意義，如果說人們不能透過刻意選擇變成一個完全不
同的人，那就更不能任意抹去他與傳統的關係。」果如此，入
江自也無法完全抹去他與日本之間的血緣紐帶關係。

吸收了西方的學術土壤，又無法抹去與日本血緣關係的入江
昭，以西方學術傳統的概念，開展出對亞洲，尤其是日本的核心
關懷。的確，入江意識到自己亞裔身份的存在，是其在學術上能
夠開展出與美國外交史學界不同研究取向的原因，歷史學國際化的
目的在建立消除西方中心觀點的史學研究，並邁向去中心觀
點；文化轉向的外交史研究，則在現實主義史觀當道的外交史研
究之外，另闢蹊徑，補充了現實主義史觀所無法解釋的現象。但
總的來說，入江追求真正普遍主義的立基點，從一開始就是西方
的觀念，他雖然沒有中心邊陲的貶抑概念，但仍是藉由西方的思
維。

日裔美籍的雙重身份，使入江昭有著政治認同與文化認同不

4 杜維明，《全球化與多元性》。輯於哈佛燕京學社（編），《全球化與文明
對話》，南京：江蘇教育出版社，2004，頁81。
一致的現象，因為「國家的政治公民權，與某市民的文化公民權
並不一定是吻合統一，也非以地方為基準，這種狀況在全球化的
人口流動，放逐、牽涉日漸頻繁複雜的互動之下，更難以指定國
家及地方為其基準」。」入江昭中間主義論述中呈現出「西方的
思維、日本的關懷」的特色，正說明他在政治認同（美國）與文
化認同（日本）之間的不一致，並隱約透露對祖國日本有着更多
的關懷，顯示出入江所謂的中間主義論述，仍是出自於他自己的
歷史脈絡，未必適合以中立客觀稱之。

第三節 和平世界對入江的意義

日裔美籍的身份限制，讓入江在面對美國與日本學界的雙重
壓力下，不得不採取中間主義論述的策略。為了與美國學界同
仁對話，他採取西方的學術語彙與思維，避免自己的見解太過不
同，他又有日本的廣大聽眾在心中，因此在西方的學術思維下，
採取修正的方式，對日本的出路有所重視。不過，入江並非只能
被動的因應，只維持一種雙方面之間的平衡而已。

入江刻意強調自己身份意識的不重要，似乎證明了他的確感
受自己日裔美籍身份所帶來的限制與困擾。他試圖想從西方
的學術概念中，為自己的雙重身份找到合宜的生存之道，和平世
界之於入江自身的意義，就在於此，它是一個透過文化力量所建

5 廖炳惠，前引書，頁 286。
構的和平的全球共同體，由於個人與國際組織不斷從事文化上的溝通與交流，使全人類開展出人類社會共有的普遍性。在此之下，人類將不在因爲誤解或身份的歧異而導致衝突，如此身份意識也就變得不再重要，這樣一個和平的世界，乃是具有文化混血身份如入江昭者，可以安身立命而不受盤問的場域，入江想從根本上消除美日身份的限制。

不過這種和平世界是否有可能達成？文化交流真能發揮作用？這或許是許多人會對入江的質疑，認為「文化接觸的本身，並不能確保友善和平的外交關係」，畢竟中國和日本比中國和美國維持了更廣泛的文化連結，但是那並沒有阻止日本侵略中國，或阻止雙方更深層的敵意發展。」但入江認為「重點在於文化關係，不能沒有個人的努力，來扮演其中的中間者或溝通者」，而中日之間敵意增加的原因，正是因為雙方在文化交流的程度不夠，缺乏在中日之間來回穿梭，並努力於促進雙方文化理解的中間者。中日之間在文化上的交往過程，越緊密的關係就越有可能產生摩擦與衝突，因此中日必須比中美對文化的溝通與交流下更多功夫，如此誤解的消除才有可能。

況且入江認爲完整的世界應該是權力世界、經濟世界與文化世界三者的共構，文化、經濟與權力三者的力量是同等重要的，過去學者常常忽略文化的力量，而只著重經濟與權力因素，入江

7 同上引。
則重新讓讀者認識到文化因素的重要性。因此入江所謂的和平世界，固然是建立在文化世界的基礎上，但這並不是說權力世界與經濟世界就此一點也不重要，若沒有物質力量的作用（權力平衡或者因利益而維持表面的和平），戰爭的確容易發生，但人們如何使用物質力量，會依據人們對文化認知的差異而有所不同，文化因素影響了人們對權力與經濟利益的定義，因此入江重視文化的影響力更甚於權力與經濟的世界。若和平是建立在軍事力量的威脅，或建立在經濟利益的考量，那只會造成人們之間的相互仇恨，增加不同文化群體彼此污名化的可能，形成更多的誤解。只有當人們打從心理，自願地去理解與包容彼此，所形成的和平，才能是長遠的，而這也是文化交流與對話最主要的貢獻。文化的交流與對話的目的不是改造，而是學會以對方的角度看世界，進而對自己建立更多元的認識，這也是一種促使和平世界的到來，但一個和平世界的維持卻必定需要人們之間的對話與溝通。

也許有人認為入江過於理想主義，認為文化國際主義會帶來一個烏托邦式的理想世界。入江始終堅持，人們之間持續的溝通與對話，將會使人們意識到其實彼此都屬於人類的

王立新教授就認為，即便自由、公正、平等、民主都是各民族所追求的普世價值觀，但不同的文化背景下，它們的意義也頗為不同，誤解還是可能存在，再者，誰來保障普世價值不被破壞？顯然，僅僅依靠個人的善意以及文化國際主義者的努力，是不足以促使世界和平的，還需加上制度的保障，意即物質力量的支持，包括經濟力量、某種程度的軍事力量或地緣政治思維。參考：王立新，〈一個文化國際主義者的學術追求與現實關懷：入江昭與美國的國際關係史研究〉，《美國政治與法律網》，2006 年 4 月 14 日。http://www.ciapl.com/news.asp?Newsid=6840&type=1010
這個主體之下，進而發展出一種普世的價值，文化的歧異將被包容，轉而強調彼此之間的相通之處，意即「文明的分歧性仍然存在，且很可能直到這個世紀的末存在，或許是永遠存在，但令人鼓舞的是，這樣的分歧性似乎可以在人性的主體下被承認與接受」。

文明的對話與交流可能要花費許久的時間，因爲「在陌生人之間，尤其在其中一方被視為堅持極端立場的他者、對手乃至敵人的情況下，認爲這種對話不僅是不可能的，而且可以立即實現，那未免太過天真了。可以肯定的說，要在個人、地方、國家和國際等不同層面上，徹底實現有益的對話聯繫，或許要花費數年乃至數代人的時間。」但是基於透過文明對話可能為人類整體帶來的利益，（意即不同文化群體的人們，學習到如何欣賞他者，並以相互尊重的態度向他者學習，最後意識到其實人們之間有著共同的關心與遭遇共同的問題，我們反而會感謝他者分歧


杜維明也認為「無論是歷史的遭遇還是遭遇的變遷，也無論是膚色、民族、語言、教育背景、文化遺產還是我們所屬的宗教傳統之間的差異，都不應當削減我們共同的人性，我們的遺傳密碼清晰地昭示我們，我們具有共同的根源。」参考：杜維明，前引書，頁85。

10 杜維明的想法與入江相同，認為對差異的寬容是任何有意義交流的先決條件，此外也須對他者保持敏感的意識，意即對於他者的狀況保持關心，最後認知到他者與自我的共同存在，乃是一個不可否認的事實，而他者的信仰、態度和行動與自我密切相關，當雙方建立起足夠信任後，一種相互尊重且有實質意義的對話才有可能。參考：杜維明，前引書，頁83-84。
性的存在，因為它使我們擴大了視野，也使我們更了解自己），則入江對於文明間的對話所給予的耐心與樂觀，便值得深入學習。
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一、英文專書


二、期刊論文


American-East Asia Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg.


三、網路資源

In 2002, we received a small amount of funding from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation to do an oral history of senior China experts in Japan. We have not started until this year, although we received funding in 2002, because we have been coordinating the funding procedure and also trying to convince people to agree to accept interviews. At the beginning of this year our research started in Korea and Singapore, because we have had a research team in Korea since last year. I hope this grant will last for four years. The whole idea, of course, is to reflect upon the mutually constituting relationship among China, China scholars, and China Scholarship. Most American political scientists consider China to be an objective reality in which we are studying China, and believe that scholars present China in their scholarship in a clear, honest way. Instead, we adopt a more constructivist philosophy, believing that foreign scholarship and domestic study are mutually constituting.

That is why we are doing the oral history. We hope to better understand the history of individualized intellectual growth, how that comes into being, especially for well-respected scholars, including yourself, who are from all over the world. We started from East Asia because we believe this area is caught between China and the West and is looking for language not just to study China but also to place itself between East and West. So we start from this peripheral area around China, hoping to create some
more controversial or perhaps creative, productive rhetoric for future generations to study and reflect upon. This is where we are, and that is the project that brings you here. We are glad to have this chance but also a little bit sorry you can be here only for three days.

Yes, I know. I am, too.

But I am sure that you will come back someday and teach us more. Or perhaps some of us will visit you in the United States or Japan.

It is Mr. Iriye’s first time back to Taiwan in three decades.

I first came here in 1960. The second time was 1964, and this is the third time. So I have not been back for 43 years. Long before you were born, last time I was here.

Many students have already returned back to Taiwan. They are looking forward to having Mr. Iriye back. So I think the situation might change, he will come back very soon.

Yes, I have wanted to come back but have not quite had the chance. But it is never too late to come back, so I am very happy to come here. Forty-three years is a long time. Things have changed quite a bit about scholarship and other aspects. So, I just want to ask you, these sessions are going to be held today and tomorrow? Three sessions in English and one session in Japanese? Do you have any idea about how I should organize in terms of the three English sessions?

We should probably be negotiating in the beginning. Your rational course is to start this first session today. Perhaps you can introduce yourself from as early in childhood as possible and just go on with your natural flow that we are just going to write down. We do not have to have tight structures, so people here can just jump in with questions.
It would be more interesting that way.

*And perhaps we will keep on doing this tomorrow. And then you will have a lecture, and then we will do the oral history again. Perhaps toward the later sessions we will have more questions, and the last session in the morning on Friday would be a Japanese session. Hopefully you will be able to bring up your experience in Japan more at that session. We hope this arrangement can bring us back to your memories of beginning in Japan.*

Yes, I think that is an excellent idea. Everyone brings his own or her own background into their communication in the scholarly world, and I hope I will get to learn about the backgrounds of you people here, as well as let you hear something about my background. I think these kinds of personal interactions are extremely important.

I could start by situating myself in the history of twentieth century society, twentieth century Japan, twentieth century China, and twentieth century world history. I was born in 1934. This is interesting because it means that between 1934 and the year 2000, which is the last year of the twentieth century, I have lived two-thirds of the twentieth century, about 66 years or so. And then when you consider that 66 years before I was born in 1934, and 66 years before 1934 is 1868, that year was the Meiji Restoration. Yes, so I come 66 years after the Meiji Restoration and another 66 years before the end of the twentieth century. I do not know why that is so interesting, but I think we have something of interest there. The way I view myself is that I came into the world in 1930, but I did not make this world, the world that I came into was a world that others had made, after 1868 or whatever, so the people who had led Japan, China and world to this stage had made the world. This is what I think.
Let us say from around 1832 to around 1930, that is a funny world and we can talk more about it. But I think in many ways there is one word that characterizes the world between about 1870 and 1930. I think the word has to be imperialism, which was the most significant phenomenon of that time. So I did not create that world of empires, but people consider my generation, my father’s generation, and my grandfather’s generation to have created this world. I think in retrospect we can say it was a terrible world. I still think it was a very devastating world, if only because imperialism means that a tiny minority of the world’s people control the rest. I think something like 25% or one-fourth of the world’s people, mostly in Europe, North America and so on, and in Japan controlled the rest, the other 75% of the world. That is totally unhealthy, unjust, but that was the world I was born into, and so I think it is a very interesting starting point. After 1934 there was a war, of course, but I think that the world our generation tried to make in the remainder of the twentieth century was not as bad and vicious as the world I came into. But we can talk about that later. I just want to situate myself, where I was, and the time period in which I was born.

Of course, the 1930s were a very horrible decade, in terms of imperialism, in terms of the wars between China and Japan, Japan and the United States, and the whole world, and the wartime destruction. Then, after the end of the war, you have other tragedies such as the Cold War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. But I think the world in 2000, or even the world today, is not as devastating, not as destructive, and not as unjust as the world that existed in the first half of the century. I mean, probably because these kinds of cultural exchanges and scholarly exchanges are becoming very common now. Nothing like that happened earlier. Well, it may have happened, but it was very limited, I think. Education exchange, culture exchange was much more limited, whereas now I think it is taken for granted that you try to learn from each other across national boundaries.
We went to China last summer. I was in Tianjin and Beijing in September, and in June I was in Seoul, Korea. I also go to Japan three to four times a year. Now I am Taiwan for the first time in 43 years. Of course, I spend most of my time working in the United States. I do not work anymore because I am retired from teaching, but I still do work in the sense of reading and writing and supervising dissertations and so on. And often I go abroad, and the kind of international scholarly exchange is just amazing. It used to be, I think, in the heyday of empires and imperialism you studied your colonies. I mean, I think that is how the Japanese began to study China, Korea, and Taiwan and so on. You studied each of these areas’ geographies so as to make use of these areas for the empire. That is how the Americans began to study the Philippines and the British studied India, and so on. I think they were all aspects of this coming imperialism.

We do not have that anymore, of course. Today I think it is in a much more genuine sense that we believe in scholarly exchanges for their own sake, and I think it is a good idea for scholars to get to know each other and that kind of thing. And it is much more global. In other words, it Used to be that the Europeans and Americans would be the sort of leaders, they would be the scholarly masters and they would develop their own disciplines of history, sociology, and anthropology and encourage the rest of the world, China, Japan, and elsewhere, to learn from that way. The scholarship was pretty much Western-oriented. I guess that is why I also studied in the United States, because I thought there was more I could study there.

Nowadays it is not that way anymore. One assumes that when you try to bring together historians, you want to make sure that you are not just limiting yourself to inviting Americans, Canadians, and Europeans. You also want to include Indians, Chinese, and Koreans, and so on. So I think it is a much better world, and I am happy I have been some part of it, the
better world. I think I can say that 1934, when I was born, was a much more terrible existence, and I am very happy that my children’s generation, my grandchildren’s generation can live in the twenty-first century. Despite all kinds of problems, it is potentially a better world.

But you are interested in my personal background and things like that, so let me tell you a bit about my background before I went to the United States. I went to the United States in 1953 and this is my fifty-fifth year in America. The International House in Tokyo wanted me to come give a talk under the title “55 Years in America.” It is quite a long time, 55 years. The reason I went to the United States is 1953 is basically because my parents and I thought that to get a good education at university level, it made sense to go to America. The United States at the time was the most powerful country in the world, the richest, and so on. It was actually promoting the education of students, which was the one good thing the U.S. was doing in 1950s despite the Cold War. Perhaps you could say that it was because of the Cold War, but I think there was some genuine interest in bringing in foreign students in the 1950s, and of course there is still that same interest today. I was very fortunate because this was right after the war. 1953 is only eight years after 1945. The peace treaty between Japan and the United States had only been signed in 1951.

The Americans at the time were very generous, very eager to bring in students, especially from the former enemy countries such as Germany and Japan. I think they were very eager to bring in Germans and Japanese, because they had this idea that to really bring about reconciliation, it was not enough just to have a peace conference, a peace treaty. You needed to bring particularly the young generation, young people, and get them exposed to American life, develop all kinds of networks with Americans. I think that it was really the correct agenda; it was a wonderful thing the Americans decided. And they had the money. I could not have come to the United States by myself. I mean, nobody had that kind of money, even
though at that time college tuition was much less expensive. I remember
when I went to college in 1953 the tuition was $600. Today, as you know,
it is something like $30,000 or even more prohibitive. But even $600 was
way beyond what anybody in Japan could afford at that time, and it was
only because a very generous foundation gave me the money to go to
America and because the college I went to gave me a tuition scholarship,
that I went abroad. The Americans were very generous in that way.

You had both foundations’ support?

Sorry?

You had the support from both the foundation and...?

I had support from the Joseph C. Grew Foundation, Grew as in G-R-E-W,
the former ambassador from the United States to Japan. Joseph Grew was
ambassador to Japan between 1932 and 1941. When Pearl Harbor came he
was still America’s ambassador. So it happened that when the war started,
all Americans in Japan were put together in some kind of hotel confine,
some kind of hotel. The Japanese in America were also put together
somewhere, and they were exchanged. There was an exchange
arrangement arranged through Switzerland, a neutral country. So what
happened, this American crew and others were put on this boat and taken
to some coast of Africa. The Japanese in America, not the
Japanese-Americans who were interned, that is a separate story, but
Japanese who were businessmen and others who were in America were
also confined, sent to the ship and then taken to the same location where
they were exchanged. This was the exchange arrangement.

So Grew came back to the United States in 1943 I think, 1942 or 1943,
and wrote a book called Ten Years in Japan, which is based on his diary, a
very good document of what he did as ambassador in Japan, trying to
prevent war at that time. Then a Japanese publisher decided to publish that
book in a Japanese translation and Ambassador Grew decided to donate
the money from the sale of the Japanese edition. The Japanese book sold
quite well because everyone wanted to read up his diary in Japanese, and
Grew took his income from that and donated the money to start this
foundation. It was just a wonderful gesture on his part, and I was
incredibly lucky that when this foundation was established, I was chosen
as one of the four people, all high school seniors, to come to study in the
United States.

So that is how that happened. I went to America in 1953 and graduated in
1957. Of course, then I went to Harvard for graduate training and study.
But before I get to that, I think I need to say something about my father
and grandfather as well, because they also had China connections. My
father was a correspondent for the wire service called the Dumi press.
You know the Dumi Press?

I am not sure.

D-U-M-I. The Dumi Press was a major press. Today you have Reuters and
AP. I guess AP does not exist anymore except for America’s UP and AP.
It was wire services that sent correspondence all over the world, and
newspapers got their news about foreign countries from such services. The
Dumi Press was the major Japanese wire service at the time, the 1930s.
My father was sent to China, either by Dumi or by one of the
organizations linked to Dumi in the late 1920s. I think my father first went
to China in something like 1928 or 1929, before he was married, and then
in 1930s he was sent to Europe and he worked for the Dumi press as a
correspondent first in Switzerland and then in France. When war broke out
in Europe in 1939, he stayed there for a while. As you know he was
working in Paris. But Paris, France, was occupied by Germans, so he was
in a sense working in occupied France. But because Japan and Germany
were allies, it was allowed and he was able to continue his work there. But when the Soviet Union and Germany went to war in June 1941 after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, things became pretty dangerous and unpredictable, and the Dumi Press wanted him to come back to Japan. So he went back to Japan from Paris at the end of June 1941, or something like that.

Then he was sent to China from 1942 through 1945. I think he mostly worked as a correspondent in Nanjing, where, as you know, Wang Jingwei ran a collaborationist government. In May 1945, he was told to come back to Japan, which was a very lucky thing, because he got on the boat leaving Shanghai for Kobe, Japan, and the ship that he took was not sunk. Other ships began to carry Japanese back from China while the war was still going on. There were many Japanese wanting to go back to Japan, their ships were always sunk. Fortunately my father’s ship was the last ship that was not sunk, and he made it back to Japan and stayed in the dormitories for a while after the war.

And then a bit about his own father. Actually, my father was adopted by his uncle, who was a lawyer in Shanghai for about ten years between 1900 and 1911 or 1912. His uncle worked as a lawyer in Shanghai, where my father used to visit him during summer holidays. I think that is how my father picked up Chinese, when he was a very young boy. My father was born in 1903. The 1912 revolution, the street demonstrations—things like that he still remembered and used to tell me about. He died in 1978. Because of my father’s uncle who became his adopted father, his working in China and my own father working there, too, there has always been this kind of China connection in my family. My father really became quite fluent in Chinese, and he liked to read Chinese texts in Chinese, the way many Japanese do. Many Japanese read Chinese texts but do not pronounce Chinese in Chinese. I mean, Chinese characters are pronounced in Japanese fashion. Even after the war, my father was always reading
Chinese texts in Chinese to practice Chinese before going to bed. Unfortunately, he was unable to go back to China, and he died in 1978. I remember receiving some letters from my father’s former friends in China who had learned about his death and wanted to express their condolences. He was unable to go back to China, so the last time he was in China was in 1945. But anyway, we have that kind of background.

On the other hand, my study of China and Chinese history did not really begin until after I went to Harvard. As an undergraduate at Haverford College, which is a very small college in Pennsylvania, I studied European history. It is a very small college, and there were only two members of the history department: one was teaching American history, and the other one was teaching European history. I studied European history because European history was more interesting than American history. In those days in the 1950s, very few colleges taught Asian history. History was European and American history. Nowadays, when I think of history department with only two people, where are they? I think if there were only two people in a history department today, one of them would have to teach world history or something like that. If you had three people in a history department, the third person is bound to be an Asian expert or an African expert. American education has changed a great deal since those days.

In any event, I studied European history. My European history teacher really became my lifelong teacher and mentor. He was a great, wonderful teacher, and he taught me how to study history. I had not studied history professionally until I went to college, so I did not really know what it meant to be an historian, how to read a document, or how to write a history monograph. He taught me that, so when the time came for me to graduate from college, I could not go back to Japan. I mean, initially the Grew foundation scholarship was for four years, and after four years I was expected to go back to Japan and look for a job. But then my history
teacher thought that because I was doing fairly well, I should go to
graduate school and continue to study history, and then become a
professional historian. I initially applied to Harvard in European history,
thinking I was going to continue studying European history.

I think luck or coincidence really takes place in your life, and sometimes a
lucky break or a lucky coincidence is involved. I was very, very lucky
when I entered Harvard. When I applied for Harvard in 1957 to go to
graduate school, it did not have a China historian, so the other historians
in the Harvard history department decided to start a new program for
America in East Asia. At that time East Asia was called the Far East, so it
was called the American Far Eastern relations program. The intention was
that graduate students in American history and East Asian history could
develop some kind of a competence in American history and Asian history,
and write a dissertation is in English about the relationship between the
United States and East Asia. John Fairbank was very much behind it, I
think. When I went to Harvard, I decided to apply for that program, and I
was admitted. That is I how I met John Fairbank for the first time and
came to study Chinese history. My interaction with Chinese history was
from John Fairbank.

That was in 1957. John Fairbank sent me to Taiwan in 1960. He happened
to be in Tokyo at the time, and said that while he was in Tokyo, I should
go to Taiwan and study Chinese. I could not quite say no to my teacher,
and my teacher told me to go to Taiwan to study Chinese and of course I
said that I would do that. I came here to study Chinese, but it was a very
brief trip, for just two weeks or so. I should not say I made a mistake, but
I decided to bring my wife with me because we had recently married. That
was May 1960. I did not want to leave my wife behind to come to Taiwan,
so I wanted her to come as well. That was a mistake because my wife and
I talked in Japanese all the time, and that was not quite helpful for my
Chinese. Also, there were many people in Taiwan who spoke Japanese
then in the 1950s. Many Taiwanese had grown up in the Japanese system of education or had learned elsewhere to speak Japanese, so that was not terribly helpful for my Chinese, and I can say I was disappointed that I had not really studied Chinese hard.

So in 1964 Fairbank said, this time you go to Taiwan by yourself. Do not take your wife with you, but go to Taiwan and stay there until you master—well, not quite master—but until you learn something about Chinese. So I came here by myself and stayed close to two months, September through November of 1964. I was doing research at Academica Sinica in Nangang, and while I was doing research I also got a very nice young historian to be my teacher and teach me Chinese conversation. That was how I became able to communicate in Chinese. I think within two months I did reasonably well, and on one occasion I was even able to give a paper at Academica Sinica in Chinese. I think it was awful Chinese, but I decided I would try my Chinese anyway. That was 43 years ago, and I have never prepared a presentation in Chinese since then, I have not tried that. That is my Chinese background.

My study of Chinese history is therefore essentially a product of my American education. I did not study Chinese history in Japan, and I did not study that here either. I came to Taiwan basically to do some research. So the kind of Chinese history I learned was through John Fairbank. I think he was quite influential to the people in my generation, almost everybody. He had come to Harvard, though he did not go to Harvard, and was extremely influential. As you know, his basic approach was something that emphasised China’s interactions with the West, Chinese responses to the West. It has been criticized by other people who say that Chinese history should be studied in its own terms and not in relation to the West. But we can talk more about that.

At the time, it seemed it was a good approach, because it made the study
of Chinese history somewhat easier for people who had not studied Chinese history before. We studied the end of the Opium War, missionaries in China, all those missions of Great Britain to the Chinese Court, all those things. He stressed those kinds of interactions, sometimes violent interactions. He built an understanding of modern Chinese history in terms of how the West made an impact upon China, and how Chinese responded to that. Challenge and response, it was called then.

That was how I studied Chinese history. When the time came for me to write a dissertation, I studied Chinese history and also American history. I did not study Japanese history as such because Edwin Reischauer, who would have been my teacher in Japanese history, left Harvard to become U.S. ambassador to Japan. When John Kennedy became president—you do not remember this because it was long before you were born—there was much excitement within the American academic community that a young, energetic, influential politician like John Kennedy, who was only in his forties, became president. And because he was a Harvard graduate, he took a lot of Harvard faculty with him to Washington as advisors or ambassadors. Edwin Reischauer was appointed ambassador to Japan, and so he left Harvard. Partially for that reason, and partially because of other reasons—I guess I was so busy studying Chinese history and American history—I did not study Japanese history at Harvard. So my Japanese history is basically self-taught, other than what I studied at high school in Japan. I did not really have any professional expertise in Japanese history, other than what I researched on Japanese foreign affairs.

When the time came in 1959 for me to choose a topic, Fairbank said, well, why do not you study the events leading up to the Manchurian crisis in 1931, because American documents were just beginning to be opened up at the time. The U.S. State Department archives were just beginning to be opened up for those years. This was in 1959, and there is the thirty-year rule. After 30 years documents began to open up, so at last I could read
and use U.S. documents. But that would not be enough. I needed Japanese and Chinese documentation, and with Japanese documentation, fortunately as you may have heard, after Japan’s surrender, the Americans took all these documents to Washington, and made copies and microfilm copies. I mean the Japanese tried to destroy as many documents as they could, because when the war ended the Japanese knew there would be a war crimes trial. Particularly the military wanted to destroy them, but the Americans got there first on this occasion. So, fortunately for researchers anyway, the U.S. occupying forces got to these archives, the Foreign Ministry archives and other archives, and took them all to the United States, kept them in Washington, and then made microfilm copies. Later the Americans sent the documents back to Japan, so you can read the documents, even in Japan, on microfilm made in the United States. And the available documents, not all the documents, but those documents that had not been destroyed were available, and I was able to read those for the 1920s leading up to 1931.

But I needed to read Chinese documents as well, and Fairbank of course said that I should do this, too. So that is what I was doing when I first came to Taiwan in 1960. Even though I was here to study Chinese, I was also able come down and read some Chinese documents. Fortunately, given that the Kuomintang documents were often up through 1927, I was able to read some documents. I remember copying by longhand, and my wife came with me and she was helping me copy Chinese documents, too. Those documents must have been from 1920s because that is what I was working on. Those documents that were put together and published in Taiwan were called guomin wenxian, the nationalist documents in Mandarin. I was able to read some documents then, and wrote my dissertation in 1961. My dissertation was basically about the coming of the Manchurian crisis from about 1926 to 1931. I wanted to study how the crisis came about and what had been the signposts of the stages through which the relationship between China, Japan and the United States
deteriorated.

But I did not publish the dissertation right away because I felt it was too narrow. It only discussed China, Japan, and the United States between 1926 and 1931, focusing mostly on the period 1929-1931, the immediate background of the Manchurian Crisis, and the Japanese ambition to take over Manchuria. It did not go much beyond September 1931. I felt it was not enough just to focus on those two years. I understood something of a broader context and felt that I had to use other countries as well, because it was not just the United States and Japan that were involved in China. I could not ignore the role of the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, Germany, and so on. So I decided that I should study Russian before I published my dissertation. Because of the role of the Soviet Revolution, the Soviet Union in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and everything else, I really needed to include the Soviet Union in my study. The Russians had just published documents, Soviet documents, on international affairs. I did not use any archival documents, but the documents that had been published, and because they were there, I had no excuse not to read those documents.

So, how do you read Russian documents? Well, first you have to study Russian. That is a language! In 1961, I decided to study Russian. Fortunately, diplomatic language and diplomatic documents are not that difficult to read. They are not like Nobel literature; diplomatic documents are pretty predictable. So I was able to read that. Then I read some German documents. German documents were on microfilm, just as Japanese documents were. So I read German documents, and some French and British. I could not use British archival documents. At that time, I do not think British documents were offered yet, so I only used published British documents. Eventually much later, in 1965, I published a book which was broader than my dissertation. My dissertation covered just a few years before Manchurian Incident, but this book covered a full decade,
the 1920s, and that in a sense became my approach to studying international affairs. I would talk about the ways that different countries come together to try to establish some kind of an order, an East Asian order or an Asian-Pacific order or something, and how that order breaks down.

I decided to characterize the 1920s in terms of the Washington Conference treaties. I felt that I had to go back to 1921-22, which was attended, as you know, by China, Japan, the United States, and many other countries. They signed all kinds of treaties, and my whole prescription on that was that to understand something like the Manchurian crisis, I needed to go back at least to 1921-22 to talk about the ways the Japanese, the Chinese, the Americans, and everyone came together and organized this regional order, and how that broke down. The most immediate reason for the breakdown was because the Japanese army in Manchuria decided to get rid of the Washington Conference order. But it was not just the Japanese army. There were many other partners. So I tried to develop that and also study Chinese domestic politics, Chinese communism, the Kuomintang, and those kinds of things, and also something about the economic situation, because the impact of the depression on Asia was quite severe. That is how I tried to understand China in the international arena. My study of China has been mostly focused on that, on China and world affairs.

I have been talking too long! So let me add one more thing and then I will stop. There is an institute called Japan Institute of International Affairs, which is a sort of research organization founded by the Foreign Ministry. I think it may have become more privatized now. Anyhow, they wanted me to write a book on how Americans and Chinese view each other, a study of mutual images, and I felt that was interesting. It was in the middle of the 1960s, 1965, just before the Cultural Revolution in China. The Japanese Institute of International Affairs felt that because I studied
Chinese international affairs and American history and so on, I could write some kind of study in Japanese about this, about how Chinese and Americans have been viewing each other. So I wrote a book in 1965, then three years later I published a book called *Across the Pacific* that was my second book written in English. In that book I included not only Chinese and American mutual images, but also Japanese—a harder subject. I will talk about that tomorrow, I guess.

At the time that was my interest. It seemed to make sense to go beyond foreign policy decisions and those straight-forward diplomatic affairs, and also be interested in how certain images emerge, images not only held by policy makers but by other people, scholars and educated people, mass media, and so on. I felt that, quite often, the emotional response, sometimes misunderstanding, lack of communication, those kinds of things also transpire in international affairs. As for the book, I really wanted to call it in English *Misunderstanding across the Pacific*. But the publisher decided that a book like that would not sell too well, if I called it *Misunderstanding*, so he got rid of my title. The publisher decided to replace *Misunderstanding* and call it *Across the Pacific*. That was how the book was published in 1967. I think my first book was called *After Imperialism*. It started in the 1920s and was called *After Imperialism*, even though it was still an age of imperialism. What I tried to imitate was the influence of the Soviet Union and the United States becoming active in the 1920s after the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson began to support self-determination, nationalism, and so on. My thesis was that even though imperialism existed, the end of empires was coming. It seemed in the 1920s that the British, Japanese, and French were aware that new challenges were posed from the United States because of the self-determination principle, and the Soviet Union. Eventually the age of empire, the heyday of imperialism, might come to an end. That is why I called it *After Imperialism*, although in the 1930s imperialism comes back again. Anyway, that was my first book.
The second book was significant, I think, because both of those books in a sense represent my approach to history at that time. That is, for a while in the 1960s and 1970s, I was very interested in the question of regional order, as I said the Washington Conference system and its breakdown. I also became very interested in mutual perceptions. These approaches were summarized in those books. So I tried to study as much as I could how the Chinese viewed the outside world, the Japanese, Americans, and so on, and how the Americans viewed the Chinese and Japanese, and so on. When I wrote and published those books in the 1960s, I was just beginning my career in the United States. After I received my degree, another lucky result for me was that in 1960s it was so easy to find a teaching job in the United States, because in the 1960s there was an economic boom and everyone was trying to expand the campuses. Every institution was hiring more and more people, more people than there were qualified candidates, so very fortunately I was able to find a teaching job, first at Harvard for a while. Then after I left Harvard I went to Santa Cruz, California. I went from there to Rochester, from Rochester to Chicago and so on.

In 1960s I had four teaching jobs. It was very easy in those days to move from one place to another. I mean, the term we used to use was “musical chairs,” we kept moving about all the time. All this dramatically came to an end in the 1970s. If you received your degree in 1970s, you had much more difficulty getting a teaching job. I was very lucky I got a job. At the time I moved to Rochester, it was my third job. I had published two books, and normally two books are enough to give you a more established tenured position. Many people knew me because of those two books. I did other publications, but I will come back to that later. I just want to describe how I came to study history, also Chinese history, and how I tried to develop my own approach to the study of China in world affairs. I will stop here and ask for your comments or questions if you have any.
I am curious. Do you have brothers or sisters?

Do I have brothers?

Or sisters?

I have just one sister. Do you know Mark Selden? My wife is married to...not my wife, my wife is married to me, but my sister is married to Mark Selden.

Your younger sister?

Selden?

Younger sister?

Yes, she is my younger sister. She is three years younger than I am. They met at Yale. My sister had a Fulbright Scholarship and went to Tokyo University. Unluckily, I never went to college in Japan. I only went to high school, then to the United States. My sister went to Tokyo University, and after graduating, she had a Fulbright and studied at Yale University. Her major was English literature, and that is why she met Mark Selden. He was studying Chinese history then, and she decided to get married somewhat later, I think it was 1963, something like that. They are still married, which is rather unusual nowadays. So many couples we knew in the 1960s have spoken terrible experiences about their marriages. Today I think more than 50% of marriages end up in separation or divorce. In
those days, this was not supposed to happen, but I think that every couple I have ever known, every graduate student who got married in the 1960s, I think they have all be divorced. The 1960s were a real decade of change in many ways. I do not have any brothers, just one sister. Mark has retired from the State University of New York, but he is quite active still. We remain on good terms, even though politically he was much more radical than I was. I mean, in the 1960s, he was very much involved in anti-war student activism in the United States. Suddenly Mark Selden, Edward Friedman, even though Edward has become much more conservative since, John Dower the Japan historian, as graduate students in late 1960s established a committee called the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars.

Can you say that again?

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Initially they established an organization because they felt that the leading scholars, such as John Fairbank and others, were too establishment-oriented, were too much a part of the American establishment, and were not doing enough to change its foreign policy. Their organization supported a more radical foreign policy course, ending the war in Vietnam, establishing connections with the People’s Republic of China, all those kinds of things. I was much more centrist, so Mark and I were not quite together ideologically. But still we have maintained our relationship. He has become somewhat more moderate and I have become more radical in recent years, so I think we have become closer.

You have become more radical?

I think I have become more radical, yes. I mean, I was pretty centrist in 1960s. For example, I was supporting the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and I was not actually a part of this anti-war movement. I did not become a
Maoist. Many radical students like John Dower and Mark Selden became tempted to call themselves Maoist. They were very much impressed with the Cultural Revolution in China, things like that. I was out of that, totally. I do not think that I have changed that much, but rather that the whole world, the United States, and Japan have moved to the right. I have not changed that much, but the world around me has changed. I was viewed as a centrist in the 1960s and 1970s. In Japan, I am viewed as one of the really radical scholars.

Really?

Yes, because I am still supporting the postwar constitution. I was one of the very few people who said we should not change the constitution. Most scholars said we should write a new constitution, we should rewrite the constitution.

That is thought to be radical or conservative?

To support the constitution is radical, because the constitution prohibits armament. We will talk more about that. The postwar constitution is an American-made constitution. During the occupation, America wrote a constitution and then basically imposed it on Japan, so many Japanese conservatives and nationalists say this is an American constitution. They want to write their own constitution, a Japanese constitution, with the right of armament and self-defense and everything else. Article Nine of the postwar constitution prohibits armament. I am one of the very few people who said we should stick to the constitution and continue to abide by Article Nine. I have become more critical of the United States, but in 1967 I was still mostly mainstream and supporting the U.S. Now I am much more critical of U.S. foreign policy. Anyway we can talk more about the contemporary situation.
China was a new topic for me. I had not studied Chinese history at college, so I got my starting knowledge at Harvard University studying with John Fairbank. My own continuation in the study of Chinese history was part of my study of international affairs. By the time I came to Chicago in 1969, I was being viewed as an American historian, because I had done these books that dealt with the United States as much as with China and Japan. So the jobs I got at Chicago and at Rochester as well were in American diplomatic history. For people in American history, I am known as someone who tried to bring Asia into the study of American history. American history or American diplomatic history almost always talked about the United States, Europe, and perhaps Latin America. Not too much had been written about the U.S. and East Asia. But when I began to teach courses in American diplomatic history, I did a great deal with East Asia. And when you study something like history, you should try to understand other countries’ perspectives and documents as much as possible. So you should try to read documents in German, French, and Chinese.

Nowadays there are many Chinese students from Taiwan and Hong Kong studying in the United States and doing China-American relations. But when I was doing that in the 1960s, there were very few students, and no students from the PRC. There were others from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but very few people were doing work on international relations and history. I was seen as somebody who was doing something new because nobody else was doing that. It is not the case anymore, because many people are doing these kinds of things.

You were born in 1934. That is the same year as other famous writers. Mizoguchi Yuzo, Nakajima Mineo, and Ishihara Shintaro were also born around 1934.

I think maybe about the same year, 1934.
And I read your recollection that the writer Mizoguchi was confused when the war was over and thought everything seemed to be upside-down. Nakajima was full of fear, because he was afraid that he would be arrested by occupation troops. Do you recall anything from that time?

Nakajima is maybe a couple of years younger than I am. Nakajima of course totally fell apart. He certainly is a real reactionary, a positive reactionary. From his point of view, I was impossibly radical. We have never met, but it is interesting that people of the same generation have these two rather different views about identity. Ishihara is pretty hopeless, from my perspective anyway. People say that feelings in the past are very difficult to certify unless there is documentary evidence. In my case, I kept a diary. On August 19, 1945, which is four days after the war ended, I started keeping a diary. I am pretty sure it was because my father told me. My father, as I have said, was a correspondent, so he was very sensitive about these things. He said it was an historic moment, so he must have told me, even though I do not remember that part. It would have been a good idea for somebody like me. I was born in October 1934, so in August 1945 I was still ten years old.

The tremendous changes that could impress a ten year-old boy would be a very interesting phenomenon. That is why my father wanted me to start keeping a diary. So I wrote my first entry on the nineteenth of August 1945, and have written more or less continuously after that. I wrote in my diary yesterday, so it has been going on for sixty-something years now, which is pretty good in the sense that at least there is some evidence there about how I felt in August 1945. There is very little about war. Instead, what I talk about in August 1945 is food: what I ate, what I did not eat. In those days, the food shortages were so severe that there was basically nothing to eat. It is not surprising for a ten year-old boy to be primarily concerned with what he was eating. I wrote down that today I had one
potato for dinner, that kind of thing. If I had a bowl of rice one night, it was spectacular news, because we did not really eat that much rice.

On most days the stores were still not selling anything. Things were under tight control during the war, and after the war some farmers actually began to sell some vegetables, but not important stuff like rice. So we would get rice by going to the farming area. We were living in Tokyo, my grandmother and I, because my mother was very ill at the time in 1945. My grandmother and I would take the train for two hours to the country every day for rice. We were not beggars—we wanted to buy some rice from farmers who had rice to sell. They would sell it only in exchange for fancy clothes or things like that, so my mother and grandmother kept selling their clothes. They still had some formal and fancy clothes, so we would go and offer these things to the farmers, and say, “We give these clothes to you, you give us some rice.” Sometimes that would be successful, or sometimes not and we would go home empty handed. That is what I write about in my diary.

The only entry in August 1945 that is related to the war was on August 28. I remember this because I wrote a little personal memoir two years ago in 2005 about my education as an historian and the kinds of things I have been talking about here. I also said something about the coming of the war’s end, the occupation, and I quote from my diary from August 28 in which I say that was the first day of the U.S. occupation of Tokyo. The American troops landed but had not occupied Tokyo yet. I wrote down in my diary that the first day of the U.S. occupation of Tokyo had American aircraft flying all over the city. I said it was awful but that there was nothing I could do about it, and that all I could do was to study. That was interesting. So I decided to study. That may have been indicative of something; I mean there was nothing to eat, and if there was nothing to eat and nothing I could do about the U.S. occupation, I might as well go home and study. I mean I was very studious and very good in mathematics. In
my diary I kind of write about that, that I did math questions today. I do not write much about history. I do not think I really studied history or was very fond of history.

From my diary I do not get the sense that Nakajima did, that it was actually very terrible. I mean, I did feel that when American aircraft started flying over the city it was kind of terrible, but I was not afraid of the Americans GI’s. I do not talk or write about them, and I do not remember anything about them, about ever feeling fear or anything like that. They looked so big and so healthy compared to us who were hardly eating anything. I think they were objects of our envy rather than anything else. They would be good to us. They saw us kids and threw chewing gum at us. Americans throwing chewing gum and chocolate—that was my first exposure to Americans.

Then, of course, there was the textbook revision. The U.S. occupation wanted to rewrite history textbooks to make them much less chauvinistic and emperor-centered than they had been during the war. I thought that was very interesting, even though I was still too young to realize what was going on. The fact was that, until yesterday, until August 15, we had studied one kind of history. That kind of history was the only history that our teacher taught us, and it basically consisted of memorizing the names of emperors. Japan is supposed to be the country of the undivided line of Imperial succession, right? So Japanese history meant the history of emperors, even though some of those emperors may never have existed, we needed all of them. The emperor at that time was supposed to be number 124, so we had to memorize the names of all 124 emperors. That was history and what we were doing until August 15. And in the next step, Japan is defeated and the Americans come and say that this is not history, this is the wrong kind of history, we have to study history in a totally different way. They decided to write textbooks, or at least to force the Ministry of Education to write new textbooks.
The new textbooks were about the march of the nation, the development of the country, the development of our country. They were more of what today you would call social history, about how the Japanese people, not the emperors, had moved over the centuries and so on. It was a totally different kind of history. This taught me, even though I did not write it down so I may be wrong about it, that there is more than one way of studying history. I believe even today that there is no such thing as “deep history” that everyone should study. Rather, there are many different ways to history. Secondly, it depends on who is controlling the country or who has the power. What is taught at school and what goes in textbooks, these can change from time to time. In this sense, up until today or yesterday, your government and teachers wanted you to study one kind of history, and now you have new leaders or occupying forces who want you to study another kind of history. In other words, politics or the state can influence the way you study history, and can be very harmful to the study of history, too, depending on who is in charge. They can tell you that what you studied up until yesterday was all wrong. There should be something like freedom of scholarship and freedom of inquiry. There is no freedom if the state comes and takes that away from you. That is another thing that I strongly believe in: that you cannot engage in any kind of scholarly pursuit unless you have the freedom to engage in what you are doing.

Fortunately in the United States, there was that kind of freedom, academic and scholarly freedom. I think it is even here today. People say that after 9-11, some of the liberties have been taken away from the American people. That is quite true, the government has become more powerful, they read your email, and listen to your telephone conversations. But by and large there is scholarly freedom. The government or Congress is not going to interfere with what you do. Sometimes they do, there are exceptions, but by and large I have never been told by U.S. government that I should write a different type of thing or do something else. I have
been very fortunate that in the United States we have academic freedom.

We do not have that freedom in Japan. Despite all the change in education, many scholars hate to talk about the emperor’s war guilt. If you talk about it, you can be sure the next morning that a truckload of flag-waving right-wingers will come and denounce you as unpatriotic. So many scholars are afraid of that, afraid of raising the emperor’s war-guilt. But I do that and do not care if they come. In most cases, if they denounce me, I will be in the United States and pretty safe. But in the United States as well, I think you have just have to stick to what you believe in and not be afraid. I want to say some more about the contemporary situation. These people have different memories about the war, but my memory is in terms of liberation, not humiliation. Once I had a conversation with one of the first postwar prime ministers. He was about ten or fifteen years older than I am and belonged to that generation. He referred to the occupation as a humiliation. I told him that I never felt humiliation, and that it was more like liberation, because I really felt liberated from wartime propaganda and intolerance. Complete freedom in America to learn and study was to me a liberating experience. In prewar Japan we did not have freedom, and I felt the same way in the United States in the 1950s.

During the Cold War between 1950 and 1954, McCarthyism was a powerful force. McCarthyism denounced you if you said something nice about the Soviet Union or communist China. I remember that many China scholars were bought before Congressional hearings because they had said nice things about the Chinese communists. Many of them went into exile or left the country. One went to Great Britain, someone else went to China. It was a very horrible decade in that sense the 1950s. But I was not studying China. I was just an undergraduate. Whatever I was studying, I never felt much impact from McCarthyism. I felt I was completely free to do what I wanted to do. McCarthyism became such an excessive force that it came to an end in 1954. Even some senators denounced him as having
become too oppressive, too extreme. Okay, are there any other comments or questions?

You mention that when you were born was a time of imperialism? Do you remember your first encounter the term imperialism and how you came to known about imperialism?

That is a very interesting question. It may have been after the war. During the war you did not quite refer to what Japan was doing as imperialistic. You were supposed to be supporting it. The term then was East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere—that was the way they referred to Asia. Wartime propaganda said that Japan was fighting this war to liberate Asia, to establish an Asia of co-prosperity so that all Asians could prosper together. Well, we swallowed that propaganda, I think, so I never came across a word such as imperialism. I think only senior scholars or members of the Japanese Communist Party would have used the term imperialism and denounced the war. That was a very tiny minority. It may have been in the United States where I first learned the term imperialism or studied about that. I think empire was a word we may have learned at school when we studied the new kind of history, in which we no longer studied emperors but Japanese history, modern history, and so on. In high school, I must have studied something about the Japanese empire and the war, but I am not sure if I had the term imperialism.

To view the period that is about sixty to seventy years long at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in terms of imperialism is a rather recent development. I do that, but not everyone does. I just find it a very convenient and comprehensive way to study world history. It is very important to keep the global context. Even when you talk about China, China-Japan, China-Japan and the United States and so on, you should be aware of global developments somewhere else, and you should open your eyes and look at the whole world. It is quite obvious
to me that the one key theme from the mid-nineteenth century to the twentieth century is imperialism. Empires were there. China did not become a colony; on the other hand, it was controlled by the imperialist powers. Of course, you could argue that imperialism continued after 1945, but more or less it did come to an end, not only the Japanese empire but the British and French empires came to an end, and by the 1970s most of the former colonies had become liberated, independent nations. The age of empire, colonization, and imperialism was, roughly speaking, from 1830 to 1970. If you read it this way people in my generation were born right in the middle of it and had to start from that. Then people who came after my generation—that includes all of you—those people who were born after 1945, in particular those born after 1970, have really come into a very different world. I think we need to keep that in mind, many of you are going to be living the bulk of your life in the twenty-first century, just as most of my life was in the twentieth century. Today is a rather different world from what it was when I was born.

You said you look at China or Japan from a much larger world history or world background. When did you start doing that?

That was more recent. Initially I was focusing on China, Japan, and the United States. I was hooked on the subject of American history and relations, and all my monographs, that is, monographic studies based on archival research, used to deal with China, Japan, the United States, or East Asia, the Asia-Pacific region until around about the 1980s. In the 1980s I became interested in some broader picture, and since that time I have been writing without that regional focus. The books I have published are not focused on East Asia or the Pacific but more on global issues. That may be because of globalization. You know the term globalization came to be used in the 1980s. Because of economic globalization, global information technology, the internet, and all this global connectedness, many people today I think share a feeling that the entire world has become
interconnected, so that no region is totally separate from the rest of the world. These days, historians have caught up with that. Many historians are beginning to say that if they focus on a country or a region, they should view that as part of the world, a part of world history. When this came about this is very hard to say. There have been world historians, people like William McNeil, people who write about world history. I am not talking about world history when you go back to Mesopotamia or the origins of humans in Africa and try to trace it to the present. I am talking about world history in the sense of trying to understand the twentieth century, or contemporary and modern history in terms of interconnections, not simply in national terms, not just focusing on one country or two countries, but trying to understand the inter-relationship with the rest of the world.

I see this happening among American historians, because American historians have tended to be very much behind the times in terms of that. Most American historians talk about the United States and nothing else. They talk about the United States in a domestic context, an American context, sometimes with what you call exceptionalism. They hold that the United States is really unique, and you do not get much by comparing the United States to other countries. Of course, the United States is very unique, but I think this trend is coming to an end, because even American historians understand the fact that they cannot ignore the rest of the world, not Latin America and not Asia. You cannot really understand anything about slavery without addressing where the slaves came from in the first place. They came from Africa, so you have to know something about Africa. Many of the slaves came from Western Africa to the Caribbean, and from the Caribbean they were shipped to the United States. So to really understand slavery, you have to understand something about the Caribbean economy and things like that. I think this is the way that they developed their understanding about global interconnections. Also, many foreign scholars have come to the United States: foreign scholars
interested in American history, Chinese scholars who are very interested in Chinese-American relations, Japanese and European scholars who do American history. I think they recognize the fact that not only North Americans, but also many non-Americans, study American history.

Of course that does not mean we can do that. None of us can master more than a very small number of languages. Even when we talk about global connectedness, we do not know the subject. We have to specialize in maybe one or two countries or one region of the world we do know fairly well, because we know the documents. I think that is very important for historians. In terms of archival sources, documentary evidence and so on, I know more about Chinese, and Japanese, and U.S. history than other countries’ history. I know something about the world in Great Britain, but not much. So that I think all of us are limited in what we are really capable of doing. But it does not mean we should not try to understand these countries, the U.S., China, and Japan, in some global context as an aspect of global development. I know nothing about India, I know none of the Indian memories, but it seems to me that to understand what is going on in Asia and the Pacific, it is very important to keep in mind what has happened in India, with the British Empire and so on. I do not have any kind of professional understanding of the Ottoman Empire, but more and more people are saying that to understand the Qing Empire, we should understand that the Ming and the Qing coincided with the Ottoman Empire. These are ways that one end of society dealt with different minorities and how empires ran and so on. I think these kinds of questions, global questions, are becoming very important now.

There have been historians who have tried to do this, but not everybody can do it. My favorite historian who tried to do this is Christopher Bayly, a teacher at Cambridge University, who recently wrote a book called *The Birth of the Modern World* focusing on the period 1750 to 1914. It is a very important global history. He is a specialist in Southeast Asian history,
he knows a lot about Indonesian language and history, but he also talks about China, Europe, and Latin American. Much of what he gets about these other countries is from secondary works, and he has not done any archival research. He writes a history of the world after 1750 in terms of certain themes that he thinks cut across national boundaries, for example, the industrial revolution. The insular view is that the industrial revolution began in Great Britain in eighteenth century and spread to other countries and places and made the modern world. He says that is wrong, and that similar developments and economic transformation, even if different in character, were taking place all over the world, in China, in the Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere. Also, about social orientation and religion, in many ways he says that certain developments that took place in one part of the world would spread to the rest or that certain developments occurred simultaneously. You could not say it just happened in Great Britain or that England exported its industrial revolution. Similar developments could be found elsewhere.

To me it is a very fine way to understand modern history—to put Chinese and Japanese history in some kind of context, so that we would be able to say Chinese and Japanese national histories are very much a part of global historical developments. It is hard to do that. When you first write your dissertation, you stick to some area or country or something about which you have languages, because you have to do archival research. But eventually it would be interesting to develop some kind of comparative—it could be global, it could be transnational—and really bring it all the way to the present. I have become very interested in what they call transnational history. There is national history, whether it is China, Japan or the United States; there is something called regional history, which is the history of a particular region such as East Asia or Europe; then there is international history, and that is what I began to do. International history is the study of relations between different countries. American international relations are an aspect of international history.
And there is global history. Global history is the study of interconnections across national boundaries, for example migration, industrialization, and urbanization, as global phenomena. Then some of us are talking about transnational history, in the sense that we are interested in themes and developments that are not bounded, not confined to specific countries or specific regions.

Migration is a very good example. Migration really is a transnational development. The fact that so many Chinese left China and went abroad in the nineteenth century is an aspect of Chinese history, but also of world history and transnational history. Something like 50 million Chinese left their homes in the nineteenth century and migrated to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the United States, and Canada. That is as many people as the Europeans who left their countries and went to North and South America. Sometimes we tend to forget that and only think of migrations as Europeans leaving Italy, France, or Germany to go to the United States. But just as many, maybe even more people in the same period were leaving China to go abroad. About the same numbers of Indians were also leaving their homes to go abroad. If you look at this not as some subject of Chinese history, but as a subject of global history, you may get some kind of different perspective. This is the kind of thing I am beginning to be interested in: migration and all kinds of other transnational themes, for example, religion. Religion is transnational, not simply in a Chinese context of talking about Chinese religion. Japanese religion is a global phenomenon. We need to compare different religions.

There could be the theme of diseases. There is no such thing as Chinese smallpox— smallpox is smallpox. Somebody made the point recently that more people died of smallpox in the twentieth century than died of wars. Horrendous casualties resulted from the First and Second World Wars, something like 200 million people died, but more people than that died from smallpox. If someone wants to study smallpox, that is fine, but
nobody can study smallpox by doing it nationally. You cannot just study smallpox in China; you have to study smallpox in the world. Just to dwell on this phenomenon, smallpox has been almost totally eradicated. The smallpox that killed many hundreds of millions of people does not exist anymore. Very few people, if any, are killed by it. This is because somebody has done something about it. After 1945, the World Health Organization, which is part of the United Nations, and other agencies, really went after smallpox by inoculating people. By 1980, smallpox had become totally eradicated, meaning that we do not have to worry about dying from smallpox. We still worry about dying from war. That is the amazing thing: the most devastating, dangerous disease in the twentieth century no longer exists. On the other hand, we still have to worry about wars and other kinds of disasters. And that is interesting. I think you get a different type of perspective by focusing on these non-national things.

My next publication is going to be a dictionary. I am not writing it, I am editing it. It is called *The Dictionary of Transnational History*. Today, October 17, was the deadline for finalizing the manuscript and sending it to the publisher. I did everything before I came here yesterday. The other editor—a French historian—and I have worked on it for the past four years. It has 430 or so articles, they have all been put together, and we will publish the book by either December next year or January 2009. I hope you will take a look at it because it is interesting. It is not like other dictionaries of world history. When you get a standard dictionary of world history, like the one I used to use when I was a graduate student to memorize, it tells you what happened in the 1800s in a given part of the world. You know the 1800s in India, the 1800s in China. This dictionary has different entries, not chronological but semantic. We have an entry on smallpox, and that is why I know something about smallpox. We have an entry on food, talking about food across the world, not talking about food in China or in this country or that country. Somehow some common themes have been discovered about how food has developed and
Common foods?

Sorry?

Something to do with potatoes?

Potatoes, yes, the Irish famine, those kinds of things. Hunger would be an interesting theme. Not everything can be discussed. In terms of foreign policy, you know the transnational and global contexts when you talk about foreign policy; you know China foreign policy and U.S. foreign policy, for example. But when you are talking about things that are becoming very important today, such as the environment, environmental degradation, and global warming, it is different. Global warming is global warming. It is not Chinese warming, it is not Japanese warming. It is global. So dealing with it has to be global, too. Global warming has to be treated in a transnational way in a global context. I started out in East Asia and the United States, in terms of professional knowledge, archives, and so on. But in terms of my understanding of history as such, and my understanding of how East Asia values fit into the larger picture, they are more and more globalized and transnational. The wonderful thing about transnationalism is that you can exchange ideas with scholars of other countries. There are lots of people in the world. There are very good scholars who are not experts in Chinese or Japanese history, but nevertheless it is interesting talking to them. If you read up on a subject like smallpox, everyone has some idea about what smallpox is like.

That is the fun part of doing transnational history or transnational subjects. If you are a very interested in a topic having to do with a specific country, you can learn more by talking to specialists. If you are talking about the Opium War, for example, you cannot discuss that topic intelligently with
people who have not heard about the Opium War or who have not studied it. People tend to be interested in these other topics like migration, disease, and the environment, even if they do not quite have expertise in the subject. Biodiversity is one of the more recent entries into the dictionary. Biodiversity is very much concerned about the degradation of the diversity of life and many animals becoming extinct. But if you are doing history in the national framework, if you are doing Chinese history or American history, I do not think you mention something like biodiversity. You would be interested in a topic like biodiversity or climate change only if you are doing world history. I am not saying you should just do that, but you can do national history, regional history, and some such semantic transnational history as well.

Before I continue I would like to…

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I also want to add that another part of my family has a connection in Taiwan. My wife’s uncle used to teach at this university, before the war and after the war, too. He was in botany and specialized in something like plant epidemiology.

We will show you something about that later on, perhaps around 5:30. We have a special collection left by the Imperial University.

It is not so much small talk. Plant epidemiology is important because that is the study of plant diseases. It is a specialist area. So he was teaching here before, during, and many, many years after the war. Many Japanese faculty members went back to Japan after the war because they had to go back, but he was such a popular teacher that Chinese students wanted him to stay and teach. So he was one of the very few Japanese who taught here after the war, until his death in the 1960s.
He died in Taiwan?

He died in Taiwan. He was so attached to Taiwan, he wanted to be buried or cremated here. Everything he had had was with this university, so there may be some kind of record of that here.

Well, we can find out. His name was Matsumoto?

Matsumoto, yes. When my wife and I first came here in 1960, we stayed at the house. I still remember that, even though I do not remember the house or the street or anything like that. So we have some wonderful memories of that experience. That is how I made most of my connections with this university, through my wife’s uncle.

He probably had some record back then. I am sure there should be some record of it.

Maybe.

I am interested in your language ability. With such a command of the English language, did you encounter any problems when you first arrived in the United States?

Absolutely. I was totally illiterate! I was able to read to some extent, I had studied English in grade school, middle school, and high school. But that kind of school English is really not serious English. You study something about English grammar, but you never learn how to speak, how to express yourself, how to write. So when I first went to the United States, I did not understand anything. I mean, I had no idea what people were talking about. I went to a small college which was very fortunate, because at a small college the people could help me.
Haverford?

Haverford College. If I had gone to a bigger university, like a state university or a graduate school like Harvard, it would have been more difficult because I would have been lost in a huge mass of people. But Haverford College had only 400 students then, so I guess people came to know me and tried to help me out. I was very fortunate in having a wonderful roommate; the roommate who was assigned to me was such a lovely person. He really taught me English, and he and I still remain very good friends 50 years after we graduated. My English was very poor then, and in a small college like that, teaching is almost always through discussion. There were few formal lectures, and you mostly went to tutorials with around four to ten people, a very small group, and discussed things. Even history was taught that way: a small group of no more that ten or twelve people would discuss the week’s reading.

Every week you would be called on by the teacher to read this book or that book. I continued to keep my diary, and every day I wrote a record of what book or books I was reading before I went to bed. Quite often I stayed up till 1am or 2am because I needed all the time to read, but at least I could finish it. When I went to the next day’s class meeting with the other students, the teacher wanted us to discuss the reading, and I had no idea. I was unable to say what I had read because all the ideas came up to me in Japanese, and I did not know how to translate those into English. I did not understand what the teacher was talking about, I did not understand what the fellow students were talking about, and that was the case for about the first month and a half. I was totally lost and had no idea about what was going on. And then I took my first midterm exam in history, and I still remember it because I kept it. It was my first essay in English, and it was pretty bad, very bad English, not terribly impressive in content. My teacher gave me a C+, though I do not think it deserved a C+. 
it should have had an F. But he gave me a C+ and said that at least I could
write something, but that was really not enough, I also had to speak up in
class. So I decided that unless I spoke up, it would be the end of my
American education. At the next class meeting I just said a few words. I
had no idea what I said, I do not think the teacher understood what I said,
but that broke the ice, so to speak.

Once I said a few words, it became a bit easier to try to express myself,
and I became less afraid of making a mistake. Initially I was afraid that
whatever I said would be grammatically incorrect, or that I would
mispronounce a word, but after that I realized that grammar was not
important, it was what I was trying to say that was important. It took me
around a year, I think, to feel comfortable in that situation and begin to
write. I think it was probably at the end of my second year that I was able
to write a history essay that was half-decent and able to impress the
teacher to some extent. But language takes a long time. My English is still
imperfect, but it is way better than it was 50 years ago—that was pretty
awful. I think it is important to tell foreign students in the United States
that what is important is writing, particularly if you are coming to
graduate school. Writing is more important than speaking. Although you
should be able to express yourself by speaking English, the most
important thing is writing. Writing is how the quality of your dissertation
or monograph is judged. So that is what I tell my students from China and
Japan and other countries. Writing is so vital. You cannot write anything
unless you have something to say, something that is important. You
must formulate your own ideas and writing those into English. Most people can
do that.

I am not a very good linguist. I go to France from time to time, and my
French is pretty inadequate. There was a time when I was able to
understand Chinese, but that was forty-something years ago, and I am
unable to do that anymore. I like foreign languages, and my father was always studying foreign languages. If I had some time, I would like to try and study some new languages, but I am just so busy with other work.

I am very interested in the program you went to at Harvard: the America-East Asia relations program. But, as you mentioned before, Fairbank gave you a very strong background. So far as I know, that program’s approach was very different from what Fairbank was teaching. Do you have any thoughts on that? I wonder if you received something different from the program.

The program was established in the history department, and besides Fairbank it had some other people on the committee. There were two people in American history: Oscar Hamlin and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. The great diplomatic historian William Langer was also on the committee at one point. After I was admitted to the program, I was bought over to Cambridge and interviewed. I remember the people who interviewed me were Langer, and Fairbank, and Hamlin. I was very much influenced by Oscar Hamlin, who was an American historian.

Could you spell the name?

Hamlin, H-A-M-L-I-N. He started out being an historian of American immigration. His book on American immigration was most famous. He was a teacher at Harvard and also the head of the department when I entered as a graduate student in 1957. He may have also been the chairman of the America-East Asia relations committee. This committee consisted of people in American history and East Asian history, and they wanted the new students like me to study both American history and Asian history so we could develop some kind of expertise across both. I learned much Chinese history from John Fairbank, and I learned a great deal of American history from Hamlin. It would have been the first year
seminar when Hamlin taught me how to write a monograph.

Earlier I was talking about writing. In terms of what I was writing in the seminar, Hamlin said it was fine, but that I had to be more careful about the style and punctuation. He was very concerned about things such as how I would break up my paragraphs, for example. Some people write very long paragraphs, some people write very short paragraphs. He asked: why do you want to start a new paragraph? You had to give some very good reason for your decision to start a new paragraph. I told my students at Harvard to be very careful when they wrote, and that paragraph breaks are particularly important. Hamlin was very fussy about how you broke a paragraph, or where you used a comma and did not use a comma, things like these types of technical details. Even if you have something to say, you are not able to convey what you want to say if you write it in very poor English. I think I was okay in terms of grammar, I was no longer making grammatical mistakes, but I had all kinds of paragraph breaks and commas, and he thought I should improve on those things. That was what Hamlin showed me how to do.

Other American historians taught me a great deal about American history. Because I had not studied that in colleges, they were my influences. Then, when I began to write my dissertation, Ernest May became my advisor. That was wonderful! Ernest May, as you may know, was and still is an American diplomatic historian. I was fortunate once again in 1959 when I began my dissertation research. Ernest May was still very young, he was only about 31 years old, but he wanted to stay at Harvard, so I asked him to be my advisor. Although a bit fussy about things like style, he was very good in terms of advising me how to move my dissertation, where to end, and that kind of thing. Again I have remained very close professionally. His kind of diplomatic history focuses on decision-making. Most diplomatic history is a study of decisions, how a government decides on war, for example, breaking down which member of a government was
pushing for war. In fact, Pearl Harbor is a very good example. He studies things like Pearl Harbor, in terms of who was pushing for a war against the United States, who was opposing it, and what happened in the end.

Decisions are not made automatically. Somebody has to say: we will make the decision to attack Pearl Harbor and Chinese forces in Manchuria. Decisions and who makes them have to be pinpointed. Ernest May was very good at decision-making studies. Why was it that a certain decision was made? Sometimes it is not just a matter of three or four people. Sometimes in the United States it involves Congress. Public opinion is very important, because quite often the President makes a decision in response to public opinion, so that you cannot understand American foreign policy by just focusing on the President or the State Department. Congress is very important, too. That is what Ernest May has been very good at that: he studies public opinion, and he does that in other countries as well. He reads Russian, German, French, and so on. When he talks of decisions of other countries, he can read the documents and do that.

I have not done that kind of decision-making very much. I have done some of it, but I have been far more interested in broader questions and forces. There are two kinds of diplomatic history: one is to focus on decisions, who said what, who did what, and why; the other is to talk more about forces. Imperialism is a force. A decision-making person would be very interested in specific decisions like bombing Pearl Harbor, why certain decisions were made, by whom, and to what purpose. I did not ignore those things, but I was also interested in the broader questions of Japanese imperialism, Japanese ideology at the time, American ideology. So Ernest May and I may have had somewhat different approaches.

So how long did you focus on America and East Asia?
Well, I started in 1957. They admitted two of us, another student and me, into the program. The second student came from the East Coast. His name was Barth and was originally from Germany. So it was very interesting: I was from Japan, he was from Germany, and we were the two students who were admitted into the program. Again, it shows you how hospitable, how open-minded American institutions were. They thought we were better for this program than the other American students who applied for it. He became mostly an American urban historian, even though he wrote his dissertation on Chinese immigrants in San Francisco. His dissertation was called “Bitter, Strength” translated into English. Later on he wrote more about American cities, not about American-Chinese relations, so he did not quite stay in the field. In the second year they had two more students. One of the two was Marilyn Young, who at that time was unmarried. Young was her married name. Later on she became very famous because she was very radical and wrote about the Vietnam War.

Bruce Cumings?

Bruce Cumings. I think he was at Colombia. He was not at Harvard.

He is younger, right?

Sorry?

Cumings is much younger than you.

Yes, he is younger. He is in his 50s, maybe about twenty years younger than I am. At Harvard I think they ran out of money and were no longer giving fellowships. But there was some money left that after I got my Ph.D., and they hired me for a couple of years to teach a course called “American International Relations.” That was not sustained because they did not quite have enough money to make this a permanent appointment.
When I went back to Harvard in 1989 it was not through that program, because that program really did not have much money. That was good, I am still glad I was there at the right time to help. Afterwards, other universities like Colombia, Washington, and Seattle also began to have specialists in the field of American international relations, so that there were various other universities offering courses in America-East Asia relations. Many Chinese students were getting to the United States in the 1980s, and stayed in the U.S. to study in this field.

*About this program, do you know how it was funded?*

There was a lady called Dorothy Borg. She was very famous because she wrote the book *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, which was her dissertation at Columbia on the Chinese Nationalist Revolution 1925-1928. It is about the United States’ response to rise of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists. She was also very wealthy, and she wanted to help Harvard develop a program. Nobody told me this, but my sense is that Dorothy Borg gave the money to Harvard, but it was not enough to really make this a permanent position. Then the American History Association also decided to establish a committee called the Committee of American East Asia Relations. I do not think they gave us much money, but just a little bit of money so there could be a nation-wide committee on American and East Asian relations to promote the study. But by the 1970s, the committee had run out of enough money and probably was just about non-existent. I have the archives and documents. They were in Ernest May’s hands, and he gave them us, but they do not really contain that much. But there is something there.

In 1991, Anthony Cheung, a former graduate student from Hong Kong, started a new journal called the *Journal of American East Asian Relations*. I have been reading it since its beginning, but it has not done too well financially. It is always running out of money and falling way behind
publishing schedule. It may be that someday somebody picks it up and sets up a more aggressive program.

*Does that mean that American interest towards East Asia is still not strong enough to support certainly an American relations study program?*

It is certainly stronger now. I think the American Institution for Higher Education supports East Asia programs and that other money is going to East Asia programs, Chinese history programs, Japanese history programs, etc. The growth of Asia studies in 1980s and 1990s is just amazing. Today, as I said, if three people are in a history department, one of them will be an Asian historian. Now there is a sense for everybody that you should know something about China and something about Asia. Economically they are where so many things are happening. Many American students are beginning to study Chinese because they want to get into Chinese-American trade. Remember, until 1991 or so, in terms of foreign languages, most Harvard students would study French. French was number one and Japanese was number two, of course, because of the Japanese economy. It seemed that more students wanted to study Japanese than even French, but then the bubble burst and no one wanted to study Japanese anymore. Pretty soon afterwards students took up Chinese. Now far more students are studying Chinese than Japanese, not in order to become China scholars, but because they want to enter business or law firms and work in China or in connection with China.

I was at Harvard as a very young junior scholar until 1966, and came back in 1988, so I was away from Harvard for 23 years. What impressed me most when I came back in 1988 was the number of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese students. When I was there in the 1950s and 1960s, there was nobody from China, and some from Taiwan and Hong Kong, but not many. And there were very few Chinese-American and Japanese-American students. Maybe then there were one or two. But when
I went back to Harvard, something like 20% of the student body was either Asian or Asian-American, and today it is even higher, about 23%. That is quite interesting, if you consider the fact that in terms of the American population, Asian-Americans account for about 1% in population, African-Americans account for about 12%, and Mexicans and Latino-Americans account for 13%. Asian-Americans are maybe a little over 1%, yet account for 23% at Harvard, 40% at M.I.T., 40% at Berkley, maybe higher at U.C.L.A.

*Columbia?*

Yes.

*I think it is 40% at Columbia.*

Yes, Columbia. I mean it shows what they think about Asians: they are very serious about education. Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese may not always be in agreement, but at least they agree about one thing.

*Another 20% might be Jewish.*

Now the Asians are doing what the Jewish-Americans used to do. At M.I.T., for example, there are more Chinese than Jewish-American students. It is quite phenomenal. I think if Harvard, M.I.T., and all these private institutions were to take Africans, it terms of just their qualifications, grades, and performances, there would be more than 23%. These universities are resisting it because they want diversity, and diversity does not mean more Asians, it means fewer Asians so there would be more African-Americans. It is really quite amazing, because if you start taking students in order of their qualifications and grades and so on, 90% of students at Harvard would be Asians. They do not want that, they want others, they want diversity. I mean, 10% of students are African.
Asians do not play football too much, and they also want football players and basketball players.

*Well, we've had a long day...*

I may have said everything I wanted to say in one session. I do not know what we will be doing in the next two sessions, but we can think of things to talk about.

*We have a lot of questions.*

That is fine with me. But I was worried that I may have said everything I could have said.

*We can come up with questions, or ask you about China.*

I would be happy.

----------Ends-----------------
Akira Iriye – Oral History (10/18/2007)

(Tape unclear)

It is very important to look at the archives state by state and study foreign ministry archives. Studying diplomacy has many opportunities for professional historians: they can study political history, the formation of states, governments, and nations, or how countries such as Germany and France developed as modern national states. But in the twentieth century, people began to say that we need to study more than just political and diplomatic affairs. In the second half of the twentieth century, many historians said we ought to begin to study about the masses, about the people, about social organizations, and so on. I think they were influenced by other disciplines such as sociology, economics, and anthropology, because these disciplines look at society and human organizations, and historians came to be influenced by them. From the 1960s and particularly in the 1970s, historians in the United States and Europe developed social history as a major area. Political history and diplomatic history seemed too old-fashioned, just as focus on governments, states, and public affairs appeared to be not terribly exciting or important.

I think this has to do with the fact that the 1960s were a decade of real turmoil. In the West, there were student uprisings and anti-war protest movements. In China, you had the Cultural Revolution, which was not part of it, but if you look at 1960s today, it seems that all over the world there were these protest movements and new turmoil. In Japan and Korea, it took the form of some kind of democratic movement. In Korea there was political democratization after Park Chung-hee. By the way, I think democratization in Asia is an important topic. If we go back to the 1960s in Korea, there were some demonstrations which were eventually
repressed by Park Chung-hee, and there were further democratization movements through the 1980s. In Japan, there were huge protest movements against the U.S. Security Treaty. In the United States, there were massive demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, and in Western Europe likewise against what was known as the “establishment,” against the leadership of the country.

It was not confined to Western democratic societies, but reached Eastern Europe as well. Remember 1968, in Prague, Czechoslovakia, there was a movement to democratize and make liberal reforms through the government. It was suppressed by the Soviet Union. But politically it seemed that there might be some change in Eastern Europe. We know now that it was not just in Prague but in Eastern Europe, too, that there were some beginnings of democratic movement. So in many ways the 1960s was a decade of turmoil and change. It also took the form of social change, gender equality and women’s rights in the United States. In the United Nations, women’s rights become very important as an agenda, and there were all kinds of projects focused on the rights of women around the world. There was also the civil rights movement through which African-Americans began asserting their rights. Although they were technically equal, they really had not enjoyed their rights, and there were so many cases of discrimination against black Americans in terms of voting, housing, and education.

We have to keep in mind that everywhere in the world there was a questioning of the basic ways in which countries were being run. There was questioning in democratic countries such as the United States, and in socialist countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. We now know that in Poland and East Germany there were forms of underground protest movements beginning in 1960s. And it is not surprising that scholars, too, began to be affected by this. Many historians in the United States and Europe presented the view that, given this kind of social change and
transformation, it was not enough to focus on political and diplomatic affairs. It would be very important to study women, gender, ethnic history, and African-American history. African-American history should not just be understood in terms of slavery and victimization, which has been done, but also in terms of how African-Americans have been a part of American history as a minority with their own ideas and interests. That was the beginning of women’s studies, minority studies, ethnic studies in the United States, and now you have similar kinds of developments elsewhere.

It seems to me that social history was confined to Marxist historians. Marxists always talked about class structure and class struggle, and those ideas were quite well developed among Marxist historians. What we had in 1960s and 1970s was that non-Marxists too began to be interested in these kinds of issues—not just in class, but in gender and ethnicity. It was not enough to focus on class, for instance. You had to be concerned about gender issues and ethnicity. So history began to be redefined, so to speak, as a study of the past, of ordinary men and women, of different groups and how they have lived their lives in America and elsewhere. It was a new beginning, and historians were affected by it. They would begin to raise questions about ordinary people, about how they were affected by foreign policy, or whether they had an impact on foreign policy, or how they may have developed cross-national connections, or how different ethnic groups and women’s groups began to develop ties across international boundaries. All kinds of social and cultural questions were being raised by historians in the 1960s and 1970s. That is when diplomatic history began to look very old-fashioned, for the tradition of diplomatic history was to focus just on governments and how they dealt with each other. It seems to me even when we are talking about diplomatic affairs, international affairs, or the coming of a war, that it would not just be enough to focus on diplomacy and foreign policy. You would need to focus on the emotional aspect, public opinion, the development across national boundaries, and
This kind of social or cultural input into the study of diplomatic history began to affect the way we studied. It seems to me that when I began to write about mutual images, perceptions, and misunderstandings, I was not quite conscious that it was a product of the 1960s. As I said yesterday, I have been very interested in how different nations misunderstand each other and develop stereotypes, which sometimes leads to prejudice, ignorance, and miscommunication. I see these kinds of failures—how people have failed to understand each other—as a very important aspect of international relations. That is why I wrote a speech called “International Affairs as Intercultural Affairs.” That was a speech I did in 1978 for an organization of American historians and diplomatic historians called the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. There were many members of that organization from China, Japan, and Korea.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations gathered together people who were very interested in American diplomatic history. But they called this society the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, so I think it realized that foreign relations was a better term than diplomacy, because with foreign relations you can study all kinds of relations, not just diplomatic relations, but economic, cultural, and other kinds of relations. It only had around 400-500 members in the United States, but now it has grown much bigger. I do not know how many members it has now, but it probably has more than 1000 members and members from other countries as well. I think it just had its thirtieth anniversary. It was founded in the 1970s as an aspect of this kind of development. I served as the president of this organization. In all these professional organizations there has to be a president and vice president and for some reason I was elected president for the year 1978. At the end of the year, as I was ending my term, I was asked to give a presentation at the conference and decided to talk on the issue of international relations and intercultural relations. So at that time people were beginning to
understand the importance of studying some cultural aspects of international relations. If you are interested, you could ask some questions about how they integrate these relations.

Culture is very important. That is why, when I wrote my book about the coming of the war between Japan, the U.S., and others, I called it *Power and Culture*. It is called *Power and Culture* because war is a context of power—Japanese power, U.S. power, etc. But I wanted to see what lay behind that—cultural assumptions, ideology, and things like that. So I established something about leaders, public opinion in the two countries, how they were viewing each other, how they viewed what they thought they were doing—their wartime images. In many ways, diplomatic history has become broader and people have begun to include intercultural relations when talking about American foreign and international relations.

*I think I have quoted that book. There is a journal called the Journal of Intercultural Relations. Is that right?*

There is the Journal of Intercultural Relations, which is right. I have not had too much to do with it, but I think that it is very important. It is mostly by cultural historians. The journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations is just called Diplomatic History, which is rather old-fashioned.

*I remember that in 1985 when I wrote my dissertation, I quoted this international, intercultural concept. I do not specifically remember if that comes from you or from others...*

It may have come from any source.

*Only seven years after your speech...*
I think it is interesting that people have begun to see culture as an important theme. But at that time I was mostly interested in mutual images and ideology. Many people now go far beyond those things. Today many young historians in the U.S., Europe, and Asia are going in that direction of culture. The change started by bringing in gender. Gender is very important. It is mainly a social question, but also cultural, too, because gender, which means the relationship between men and women, is culturally defined. What women are supposed to be in society is not biologically determined, it is more determined by what society expects of women. Bringing in gender was an early step, and made people think about, for example, the question of whether women on the whole are more oriented toward peace than war. Wars are usually fought by men and the soldiers are men. Things have changed a lot, but traditionally 100% of soldiers are men, generals and admirals are all men, and political leaders are almost all men, too. So it is surprising that when we historians used to write about wars, we totally forgot 50% of the population, the women. You cannot talk about war without keeping in mind that there are women who are part of the war, and that the role of the women is a very important issue. What were men doing, and what were women doing during the war? In any war, the war in China and Japan, while men were doing the fighting, what were women doing? How did they respond to the war? What were they thinking about the war? How did they try to manage their home front? What happened to their daily lives when their sons and husbands went away to war?

The tragedy about wars is that men end up being killed, so when the war ends there are very much fewer men. It is well-known that after the First World War, in the 1920s and 1930s, the populations of Germany and France were unbalanced. Something like one-fourth of the men between the ages of 18 and 27 had been killed. Twenty-five percent of the men did not come back, and another 25% come back with all kinds of problems, they had lost their arms or legs, gone blind, or had lost their minds. Many
of them were just shell-shocked and could not readjust to postwar life. Fifty percent of young men were no longer there, either because they were dead or injured, and that put immense pressure on society and on women, too. Young women might not get married to men, so what happens to them? There were twice as many women as men, which had all kinds of implications for society after the war. Also, if a wife loses her husband, it creates all kinds of problems. Just how is she going to make a living? How is she going to educate her children?

If you are going to study international relations, you have to study these kinds of issues and have this kind of awareness. Sometimes you have to bring in children to the study of international relations. And then there is that question of whether women have been a greater force for international understanding and peace. In 1993, a woman by the name of Harriet Alonso wrote a book called Peace as a Women’s Issue. It is the story of the peace movement in America. Alonso tries to argue that American women had been more orientated towards peace than men, that the peace movement had been led by women, and that they tried to connect with women’s groups in other countries. It is an interesting study. I am reading a manuscript that should be published as a book fairly soon about German women and French women who, during the First World War, were trying to establish contact and prepare for postwar reconciliation. It is an interesting study. When war comes to an end, there is a process of peace and reconciliation, and it can be argued that women are better at reestablishing contacts. I think this is something that has to be studied and examined. After the Second Sino-Japanese War, did the women do better than the men? Do they establish contact after the war? Did they succeed in restoring peace in Asia better than the men were able to do? Many men were killed during the war, and many Japanese men were tried and so on, so men probably found it much more difficult adjusting to the postwar situation than women.
This particular subject has not been studied. However, there has been work done on postwar U.S.-German and U.S.-Japan reconciliation. It is interesting that these studies have been conducted by women historians. A Japanese woman historian teaching in the U.S. at Brown University recently wrote a book, and a German woman by the name of Goedde teaching at Temple University has written a book on postwar Germany. These are women historians writing about postwar reconciliation between the U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and Germany, and they focus on women. It is very interesting. They focus on women because when American soldiers occupied Germany and Japan, they saw more women than men. That was quite natural because most of the men had been away fighting, and at the end of the war many of them were still abroad. They had been captured as prisoners of war or tried as war criminals, or they had even died, so they did not come back. Therefore, when Americans occupied Germany and Japan, there were more women to choose from in numbers. One could argue that the American GIs encountered little resistance because most of the local people were not men but children and women. That sort of thing affected the American postwar perception of Germany and Japan. I mean, they had expected that they would be met with all kinds of resistance, by Japanese and Germans, but they were not, in part because most Japanese and most Germans were women.

So there are these gender issues. Then there are the ethnic studies, which, as another aspect of social history, really took off in the seventies and eighties. They are the study of different ethnic groups. In the case of Europe and the United States, the dominant ethnic group—the white male—has been termed “dead, white male.” Historians used to only study “dead, white males.” Now they study so much about women and non-whites. In American history in the 1970s, they really began to take ethnic groups seriously—not just black Americans and Asian-Americans, but also Native Americans. I think that Native American studies are a very recent development as well as a recognition that Native Americans have
been in America a long time before the Europeans came. We cannot afford to ignore them in the study of American history, and so people, educators, and historians began to include Native Americans in their studies of American history. Likewise, blacks had always been studied in terms of slavery. But, as I said earlier, it is very important to view them as individuals, not simply as an institution of slavery. It is relevant to know how individual slaves behaved, if they left any record or if their masters left any records. Slaves were individuals with their own emotions and ideas. As with Asians and Native Americans, black Americans are not simply a group but individuals whose feelings and ideas are as authentic white Americans’. I think this is a very important development to be taken seriously.

The term which some researchers use is “agency.” Agency means that everybody has his or her own agenda, interests, and ideas, and that people are no longer seen as an amorphous mass. It used to be that when you studies racial prejudice, it was how white Americans developed prejudice against Chinese-Americans and Japanese-Americans. Chinese-Americans were simply viewed as a mass of people, not as individual Chinese Americans. The trend since the 1970s has been to emphasize the individual. That is to say, for instance, one particular Chinese-American in San Francisco has been doing this and that, and to relate what he thought about life in America, and to study his life not simply as an object of white Americans’ concern, but how he viewed himself as well. This kind of research has been a very important development, and the same goes for other minorities in America. Now we talk about gender, race, and class—I think class is still there, but in the old-fashioned Marxist way, class has not been as influential as these kinds of gender and ethnic studies.

Quite clearly, you can bring ethnic studies into the study of international relations. International relations are not only inter-cultural relations, but also inter-ethnic and interracial. You have to go beyond Europe in the age
of imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The study of imperialism would be incomplete if you were only focusing on what the “dead, white male” leaders were doing in London, and not also on the people in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. I mean, that is how it used to be studied. The study of empire-building was simply focused on these old people’s decision-making in London and not in India. In the 1970s we started examining Africans and Asians to see how they fit into the picture. That was very important. When you bring them into the equation, then imperialism becomes not just determined by the leaders in Great Britain, France, and Germany, but also by interaction between Europeans and Africans, Europeans and Asians, and so on. Actually, this was in all countries. Fairbank and other Chinese scholars have of course been doing that in China. What is interesting is that historians of imperialism and European expansionism and international relations have taken non-Western countries much more seriously.

The Second World War was a global war involving all kinds of ethnic groups and races, which raises the question of how an interracial war was fought. Even when you talk about the war in Southeast Asia between the Japanese and British, it was not simply Japan against Britain, the Japanese Empire against the British Empire; it involved individual human beings. Individual beings on the British side included not just the British, but Chinese, Singaporeans, Hong Kong residents, Malays, and, who is particular interesting, a growing number of mixed-race peoples. Previously the offspring of interracial marriages used to be totally ignored in the study of international relations. But international relations mean different people coming together, and one way they come together is by marrying across racial boundaries. Imperialism in its initial phase mostly consisted of young men going to India, China, and elsewhere without their women. Quite often what happened was that these men connected with local women. They did not marry them because most cases of interracial marriage were prohibited by British law. But while they could not marry
and live together, they still produced children, and the children were seen as outcasts. If you were a European you were at the top, then Asians were second in the hierarchy. If you were mix-parented then you were at the bottom. You did not belong to British or the local Asian society, and so there was always the problem of discrimination.

The history of international relations has to include the history of racial discrimination. That very severe phenomenon began to be recognized by historians in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. The same historian whom I mentioned yesterday, Christopher Bayly, who is really one of the great historians today, has written a couple of books about the war in Southeast Asia. It is quite amazing because the Japanese had this propaganda slogan of “Asia for Asians.” The Japanese said that they were getting rid of the British, Dutch, and French so that the Asians could be free from European imperialism. That was the Japanese propaganda, and people believed in it. The military leaders talked about it, but I do not think they believed in it. Anyway, that was the propaganda line.

The British continued to discriminate against other minorities. Even when the Japanese attacked Singapore in February 1942 and the British had to flee somewhere, the British discriminated against Asians. Their Asian wives, children, and employees all wanted to leave with them. But they bought a bus that was only for them, leaving their servants, mistresses, and wives. They did not want to go in the same bus and instead sought to leave separately. The Japanese were right there attacking Singapore at this time, and you might have thought that they should act together in this moment of crisis. They did not do that; instead, to the very, very end, they discriminated against Asians. It is a very interesting phenomenon. British oppression survived and persisted in national crisis, war, and conflict—that is just amazing. Historians have been paying attention to this kind of interaction that makes history that much more interesting. History and international relations, too, become much more interesting
when you are dealing with interactions between these kinds of people at the very bottom of the social hierarchy.

These are the kind of developments since the 1970s that I find very encouraging, developments that have gone way beyond all the preoccupation with great powers and their white male leaders and what they did to each other. That is no longer interesting. And, of course, in the age of globalization, with the rise of China, the rise of India, the rise of Brazil and so on in the global economy, no one can talk about international relations without taking Asian countries more seriously. So I predict that in the next several years in the study of the history of international affairs, one cannot just focus on Europe or the West. For a long time, that was the usual way of understanding modern history or modern international relations, to put them in the context of the rise of the West. The world historian McNeill wrote a book in 1963 called *The Rise of the West*, and that was okay in the sense that he argued that the West only ruled in the nineteenth century. Traditionally Europe was not the center of the universe anymore than India or China was. It for a number of reasons—the industrial revolutions, the enlightenment and so on—that Europe ruled the nineteenth century and the West rose. But then he argued that things in the twentieth century changed again. That was a very important perspective.

For many people, modern history was the history of the West, how the West rose and became rich and powerful, how the West ruled the world and then tried to influence other countries. That was the Western century, the Euro-American century. One important consequence of this development in social history, ethnic history, and globalization is the change away from this Euro-centric perspective. You cannot talk about anything by just focusing on the West. History, diplomatic history, and international history have become more attentive to the bottom of the social hierarchy, to ordinary women and men and how they impact world affairs. International relations study has become broadened and is no
longer confined to Europe or North America. It has become globalized, so that now it covers the entire world and goes beyond the top level leaders to the low levels of the social hierarchy. This is where we are now, I think. My own role in this is a very modest one, and I am just one of thousands of historians in the world. But I do try to take this into consideration, our broadening and deepening study of international history. Let me stop here and ask for questions.

This is very interesting. Do you think your sensitivity towards these cultural, ethnic, racial factors has anything to do with you being a foreign scholar?

I think so, yes. Actually, very fortunately, in the 65 years that I have been in the United States, I do not think I have encountered any kind of racism. That is one great thing about American society since 1945. I cannot say there is no racial prejudice; there have been attacks against ethnic minorities, and there are still attacks. It used to be that as soon as people found out I came from Japan, they would ask me all kinds of questions—Do you have ice cream in Japan? Do you have hot dogs in Japan?—you know, things like that, very primitive types of questions.

It was a long time ago when that sort of question was sensible?

That was the 1950s. These questions were very typical, because at that time ice cream was rather rare in Japan. I had never eaten anything like corn flakes for breakfast when I came to the United States. I had never had corn flakes, and I do not think I had encountered anything like potato chips in Japan before I went to the U.S. I do not think I had had a cup of coffee before I went to the United States. So it was not surprising, I did not know what coffee was, I did not know what potato chips were. So if Americans asked me if I had these things, did I want a coffee? No, I had never drunk that. Now I do, I drink coffee.
Do you care for a coffee just right now?

No, it is fine. When I went to college, I ate dormitory food for breakfast, lunch, and dinner every day for four years, because I never went back to Japan. In those days it was too expensive to go home for Christmas or summer vacation. And I do not think my parents had any telephone at first, so the only communication I had with my parents was by writing a letter, maybe one or two letters every week, and that was about it. There was no telephone call, no internet, no email, no hugs, no nothing.

You still had.

I am sorry. I think it would be very interesting to compare with foreign students today who have all kinds of choices. Of course you need some money, but if you want to eat some Chinese food, today there are hundreds of Chinese restaurants in American cities. I am sure there are some Chinese restaurants in Philadelphia. My college Haverford was about twenty minutes by train from Philadelphia, and I am sure there were a few Chinese restaurants then. I do not think there were any Japanese restaurants at that time. But I did not have money to go and eat at those restaurants, so every meal I had in the dormitory. It was some kind of culture shock to go in there and be given a breakfast consisting of eggs, corn flakes, bread, orange juice, and coffee—I do not think I had ever had an orange in my life! Of course I had had eggs in Japan, that was quite true, but that was about it. Every day you had this same kind of breakfast, which it was for four years. I did not really know what luxury was in those circumstances. Breakfast, lunch, and dinner were pretty much the same thing. In those days, American food was much less internationalized than it is today, and everything consisted of a diet high protein diet. That was what you ate for lunch and dinner, with nothing in between, and that was what I had for four years. I guess I started talking about this because
people still ask those questions about whether there are those things in Japan. That did not offend me. I was out of Japan and in the United States, so it was usual.

But I was aware of the fact that I did come from Asia. I was the only Asian student in the class. There was nobody else, so that whatever I did could be seen as Asian. The prejudice was a problem at times. If I did something, they might consider that as typical Japanese behavior or thinking. You encounter that even today, and you have to be prepared for it. If I behave in some fashion, they say, is that how they do it in Japan? So I became aware of this type of cultural stereotyping. It is not so much racism as stereotyping. I mean, once I was visiting a friend of mine in Cleveland, Ohio. I was staying in his home, and decided I needed to get a haircut at a local barbershop. My friend’s mother, the wife of the family, made an appointment for me at the local barbershop. As soon as she did that, the barber called up so many people because the barber had never had a Japanese customer before, and the whole town came to watch me get my haircut, because I guess they had never seen Japanese hair. Of course, Asian hair tends to be straighter and darker. The barber had never given a Japanese haircut! He thought it was an interesting experience and he wanted everyone in town to come and watch how he gave me a haircut.

Did he charge you?

Nowadays, so many Asians and foreigners come to the United States that I do not think a barber would be bothered. But at that time it was so unusual. It is quite a cultural question. There must have been so much ignorance. The Americans were ignorant about Japan, and I am sure the Japanese were ignorant about America and other countries as well. So this kind of mutual ignorance, misunderstanding, and miscomprehension was quite real. The question about whether this had something to do with my own experience, some of that is quite clearly correct. Because of that kind of
experience, I have studied these kinds of transnational, cultural, interracial questions.

I just want to pursue this...

Mutual images became very important to me because I have been treated so well. The Americans were so generous, and by and large they were not guilty of ignorance and stereotyping. But even when countries are at peace, there is an underlying misunderstanding that surfaces when war comes. I think that Americans are prejudiced against Japanese, and that Japanese are prejudiced against Americans. The same goes for the Japanese and Chinese, even in peacetime. Then war comes and this prejudice becomes a part of wartime propaganda, which is so serious. My thought is that to avoid war and serious international tension, it is very important to do something about prejudice. I do not think you can totally eradicate it, but at least you can do something about it to open up communication. I still feel that people should communicate and share ideas with each other, even when they have different ideas. Hearing different ideas is okay, at least you can know what ideas there are.

You said that you did not feel there was much discrimination against you. In contrast, many of my Chinese colleagues in the States complain that they are discriminated against at a very deep level, in terms of opportunities to sit on committees, to make decisions on research, grants, and books, and on whether they are published and reviewed. They do not get to sit on those committees to make final decisions; they are always the ones waiting for decisions. In your career, did you have the opportunity to be part of those so-called committees?

Yes, I have been very lucky for the reason that I have never felt that way. I have always been on committees. Actually, I have been on more
committees than I wanted to be. I mean, there were about 25 people who received their Ph.D.s in the same year from the history department at Harvard. After I got my degree in 1961, I was one of seven people who were asked to stay on. The rest of the people left Harvard and took jobs somewhere else—as I said yesterday, it was very easy to get teaching jobs. Harvard asked me and about six or seven other people to stay, so I was very happy that they gave me the chance to stay on. That is when I began teaching a course on American International Relations. That was a three-year appointment, and after three years the department had to decide what to do with us. Some of us, maybe two or three people, would be promoted to assistant professor. If someone was not promoted, he was told to leave Harvard and look for a job somewhere else. I was not promoted, but I was not told to go away either. What happened is that, of the seven, two were promoted to assistant professor, and four people were told to leave Harvard and look for a job somewhere else. I was the seventh, and Harvard gave me a free appointment as a lecturer. When I look back on it, Harvard must have decided that I was not as good as these two others to be promoted to assistant professor. On the other hand, I was not so bad that I should be told to leave. I was better than the four people who were told to leave.

There were a number of meetings at which they were deciding whether to promote me or not. I had Fairbank’s support, but that was only one vote and the committee contained about 25 people. Some I am sure were not supporting me, but I guess that most people were undecided. To be fair to them, I had not published much. When I came up for assistant professor in 1963, I had not published my book and had not published much else. I was just beginning my career, and many people in medieval and ancient history had no idea who I was or what I had done. So I do not blame them for saying I should not be promoted. I do not know the result of the voting, whatever it was. Now, if I had been terribly sensitive about racial prejudice, I could have said that the seven others were all white males,
and that there were no females. It never occurred to me that my Japanese background had anything to do with it. Nowadays, people are much more sensitive about equal opportunity and prejudice. If I had been an Afro-American and passed over for promotion, then I might have had a problem. In the committee, some people supported me and others did not. I just blamed myself. I had not published a book, and that was a totally fair judgment. It was nothing to do with prejudice or anything else. It simply had to do with the fact that I had not published my book. So I was quite grateful that they were keeping me for another three years so I could publish a book, which I did. In 1965, I published my first book.

At that time the Harvard system was not normally giving tenures; not even the assistant professors were given tenures. Eventually we all had to leave, so all we junior department members left. Nowadays we have had what we call internal promotions. In other words, if you start as assistant professor without tenure, there is a chance, perhaps one out of two or three, that you might be kept. So it is quite serious. If a woman assistant professor is not kept and given tenure, then she can complain that this is against affirmative action because of the fact that she is a woman. A case like that has happened—a woman was denied tenure, so she sued the university for gender discrimination and eventually won, and now she is back in Harvard. Things like that could happen to African-Americans, perhaps. There was a case of a Japanese woman who went to college in Michigan. It was not the University of Michigan, but the one university in Michigan without a history department. This was in 1980s. She was not given tenure, so she sued the department for racial discrimination and gender prejudice, because she was Asian and a woman. She was given some kind of compensation or damages. She did not stay, and went somewhere else.

So I think it has become more complicated. Going back to your Chinese friends, it is difficult to say, is it not? Sometimes it is very hard.
Sometimes it is a case like me—if you have not published anything, it is pretty fatal. Publication is still the rule. If you have not published something good, the chances of getting tenure are very slim. Whether you are Chinese or American, it does not make any difference.

But in your own case, when you sat on a committee, would you be conscious of or sympathetic to people with Asian backgrounds, and give them more consideration?

I have had very few, if any, cases like that. Harvard has had only one other. I am now retired from Harvard, but at the time there was one other Vietnamese woman who had tenure just before I went back to Harvard in 1988-1989. I do not think there was another case of an Asian woman who came up for consideration. I think there may have been one or two African-American cases, but not Asians. There are a number of publication committees and things like that which I do sit on. Right now I am on the board of Harvard University Press. That meets once a month, and there are always Asian books and manuscripts that are admitted. Of course, Harvard is so good for Chinese. They want to publish so many books by Chinese scholars from China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong, or by Chinese in America. So if your friends are looking for a publisher, I suggest Harvard. It is extremely friendly towards Chinese. I think Harvard really wants to establish connections in China. They have been publishing books by Chinese philosophers, for example. They are also willing to publish translations, though it is very expensive to translate a book. Whether it is grants and committees, I do not think there has been any conscious prejudice against national groups or Chinese. Maybe you feel unconscious prejudice.

I have sat on Fulbright committees; I have sat on a number of nationwide E.C.I.F., N.E.H., and exam committees. They are very fair. If anything, they try as much as they can to be fair. Sometimes they try to be fairer to
minority candidates than to white candidates. That has been my experience, that whenever there is a Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, or Korean, such a person tends to be given more of a chance so to speak, and committee members tend to read their cases much more carefully. So I do not know. I do not want to be unfair to your Chinese friends, but one has to assume that at least that the American academic environment it is very fair. I do write recommendation letters for all kinds of Chinese and Korean students, and I have not heard that they felt discriminated against because of their Asian background.

I have had more Chinese students. I have only had four Japanese students who have finished their Ph.D.s in the past 43 years of teaching after I got my degree and before my retirement. I taught for 44 years, but I only had four Japanese students. They all teach in Japan, so I have not had to write recommendations for them for American positions. I have more Chinese students, and I think they have all found academic jobs in America if they applied for them. Some have not applied and gone back to China, but those who have applied for American jobs have all received them.

My first Harvard student from China was Yang Daqing from Nanjing. He is at George Washington University now, in Washington D.C. Yang Daqing was born in 1964. I remember his age because that was the last time I was in China, in 1964. He would be 43 now. He started to teach at Harvard in 1988-1989. The amazing thing about him was that his major field was Japanese history, but he was also a Chinese scholar of Chinese history. He applied for a job at George Washington University, which is one of the top universities in the United States. A lot of people applied for the job—Japanese, Americans, actually hundreds of people applied for the job—and he got the job. He was the best, absolutely no question. People thought it was a fair choice. I thought he was the best, and he has really proved himself, which is wonderful.
I had another Chinese student named Xu Guoqi. Do you know him?

_Xu Guoqi_

He wrote this wonderful dissertation that has since become a book, about China and the First World War. It is about the Chinese entry into the war, China sending hundreds of thousands of workers to Europe, and China at the Paris Peace Conference. He applied in Chinese and East Asian history at a small but very good liberal arts college in Michigan called Kalamazoo College, and he is teaching there now. He is now writing a book about China that he wants to publish next year. It is going to come out in Chinese as well as in English. But in the end he got a job. I think just about everybody who has applied for a teaching job and has been my student has got something, not just my Chinese students but my Korean students, too. As I said, I have not had any Japanese students who have taken jobs in the United States. They are all teaching in Japan now.

The Koreans are very interesting. I once had a Korean student who was somewhat older. He was a journalist at first, and then in his thirties he decided to come to the United States and study. He did not come to Harvard, but went to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which is very good graduate school in law and diplomacy near Harvard. There he got his degree and I served on his dissertation committee. By the time he got his degree, he must have been about 45, and was married with two children. He was not an historian, but I knew him quite well and used to write him recommendations. It was somewhat more difficult in applying for jobs because he was a political scientist, and, as you know, in political science, particularly international relations have become very theoretical. But he was not a theoretician, he was more historical. So when he applied for a political science job, the committee said there was not enough theory, and when he applied for a history job, people said he was not an historian but a political scientist. So he had tremendous trouble. Eventually he
found a job in Aberdeen, Scotland. He was quite happy, but admitted that he wanted to apply for something else. He wanted to come back to Canada or the United States, but one problem was that he had not published. When his book was done, he had an opportunity to come back.

My own experience is that there really is no prejudice. You have to be able to speak English fairly well if you are teaching in an American university, so you have to be able to demonstrate that you can communicate in English. I know some people whose English is not native-speaker quality. Of course, my English when I first started teaching in 1961 was pretty bad, and even today I sometimes have trouble with pronunciation of words. My English is only about half-satisfactory! But there are people whose English is not even as good as mine, so sometimes the committee, particularly in a small liberal arts college where teaching is so important, will raise the question of whether this man really can teach. In the case of American history, a very famous and good French historian already teaching in the United States applied for a Harvard job. I was very much supportive of him, but one member of the history department said his English was not good and Harvard cannot expose its students to that kind of French English. So this Frenchman’s case was shot down. I was very upset about that, and said, “If you accept me with my imperfect English into the history department, why can’t you accept him, too?” They ended up saying that my English was better than this Frenchman’s English, even though I did not really think so. I think his English was about at my level, so they must have had other reasons why they chose not to hire him.

I think it is very important, whether you are Chinese, Japanese, or French, to teach in English. The problem is actually greater in the sciences, because in science courses you have a laboratory for chemistry, physics, or biology. The professor only gives one lecture a week, and the rest of time you go to the laboratory and do experimentation. Most of the lab
work is taught by graduate students or graduate assistants, and in the
United States many of the graduate students are foreign students from
India, China, and Brazil. There are very few Americans students, and this
has been a source of great trouble, because if you have to do some
laboratory work and the laboratory instructor is a foreigner, there is the
problem of communication. Particularly in the sciences, you do not really
have to communicate; you just need to say a few words in English and the
rest you can write down on the blackboard. So in laboratory work this has
been a nationwide problem. Many lab assistants are from India, for
example, and have very thick, heavy accents. Students do not quite
understand what the instructor is talking about. My daughter once did a
course in chemistry, and she had absolutely no idea what the graduate
assistant was saying. Even though he could speak English in India, it was
not with the same accent, and unless you are accustomed to Indian accent,
it is very difficult. My daughter got a D+, and it was because she did not
understand her lab assistant.

But now I think the universities are beginning to do something about that.
Even science course instructors and laboratory assistants have to go
through some kind of training program before they begin teaching. They
have to read something in English. In history, of course, writing and
talking are so much part of the job that you have to show some
competence there. Anyway, this is a long, long answer to your question.

*Among your Chinese students, some of them go back to China. What are
your connections with China today?*

They are not that much. I have been to China only four times. The first
time was when I attended a conference in Beijing in 1986. That was a
conference on East Asian affairs in the 1950s, and there was discussion on
China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It was interesting.
At that conference I was invited by Peking University to go and give a
talk. But this was 1986, and China had not opened up yet and was not as economically advanced. I remember there was no heating, and around this time towards the end of October it became very cold. I think the government decided that no hotels or public buildings were to be heated until December 1. So nobody had any heat. I remember that in the conference setting we had to wear overcoats. When I was back in the hotel, there was no heat in my room, and I remember I put on my jacket, then a raincoat, and then went to bed. It was so cold. In the day it was like that, too. I was very impressed that, despite the lack of heat, so many people came to the conference. The Chinese were not yet accustomed to so many foreign visitors, and I was one of the very few people there from abroad. At the time I was at the University of Chicago, and they wanted me to talk about something like ideology in international affairs and foreign policy.

But at that time they were so out of touch with the scholarly world in the United States and elsewhere, they had no read any of my books, or any American books, for that matter. That was quite amazing. There was no freedom to read. I asked if they were familiar with American books and they said yes, American books were all locked up somewhere, and the students had to ask permission to get a copy of a book published in the United States. It was totally restrictive, and therefore I did not quite get the sense that the students were aware of what I had done, or what other scholars had done, or that they were interested in what I had done. There was no exchange between the students and me. I just came and talked, and the professor made some comments in English that I was wrong because I was not a Marxist historian. Marxism was still the basic framework, and he said international relations had to be understood in a Marxist framework. I was not doing that, and he criticized me for it. That was the end of my first encounter in Beijing.

That was in 1986. The second time was in…
Sorry, do you think he really criticized you? Or did he just do it as a show?

It may have been. He may have just done that for show.

So he could have you come there—otherwise, he could not have had you.

Right, that is quite possible. I do not remember that there were any questions or comments from the students. I just gave my speech, and then the professor criticized me, and that was it. Then I went home to my chilly bed and caught a cold.

But then things changed, and in 1994 I was invited to go back to Weihai because 1994 was the one hundredth anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War. There was an international conference with mostly Chinese in attendance on this one hundredth anniversary. It was held in Weihai, which was very interesting because there was the naval battle of Weihaiwei. China by 1994 was much more developed. This was September, so we did not need any heat to keep warm. I felt that China had really begun to open up. There were some scholars from Academia Sinica in Taiwan invited to attend this conference, and many came from Japan. At the discussion there, I mostly talked about international context of the Sino-Japanese War, because by then my interests were broadening. I said yesterday that I was beginning to feel the need for studying things in the global, international context. So I talked about the Sino-Japanese War not as something that simply affected two countries, but as an event in world history. There was more discussion, and I got the sense that people had begun to read work that had been published in other countries.

Just before I went to Bei-Da in 1986, I went to Hong Kong because there was some kind of conference there about the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. There was some kind of commemoration, either of
American independence or maybe of the American constitution, because the first U.S. constitution was adopted in 1787, and it may have been the anniversary of that. It may have been 1987 that I went to Hong Kong. I do not quite remember, though quite possibly it was 1987—no, was it 1986? Anyway, I went there. There was a Chinese professor from Nanjing University. He bought a letter to me from a student of his saying that this student had heard about my work published in the United States, and that he was interested but unable to find any of my books in the library of Nanjing University. So he wanted to know where he could find my books, or if I could send him my books. He said he hoped that one day he could come to the United States and study with me. It was this student who had written to me through his professor who later came to Harvard. Yang Daqing—whom I mentioned earlier—that is how I came to know Yang Daqing, because he wrote me this letter.

That was Yang Daqing?

Yes. I think that, even as late as 1987, there was not much communication between Chinese universities and American universities. At about that time, I began to have some students of China coming to Chicago. I think the first students to Chicago were coming in the mid-1980s, so it has been quite a recent development. It was not until the 1990s that there was such an influx of Chinese students into the United States. It began in the eighties but really sped up in the nineties. Of course, there have always been students from Taiwan and Hong Kong, but from mainland China it has been a recent development.

So, you have been to China four times, correct?

That was the first time. The second time was 1994 at Weihai. The third time was last year. Unfortunately, I was unable to go back for twelve years between 1994 and 2006. Obviously there was impressive,
tremendous change in those twelve years. This time I only went to Beijing. In October they were holding a conference about civilization and prosperity called the Beijing Forum.

The Beijing Forum?

The Beijing Forum, right. I went back for the third time, the first time in twelve years. I was asked to come to Beijing University and give a talk. I spoke mostly about what I had been writing and thinking about, which was non-governmental organizations, because I was very interested in non-state actors. It was incredible! When I visited Beijing University in 1986, there was no exchange and no questions from the students. But this time it was amazing! I answered so many questions, and there very good participation by the students. They were eager to exchange ideas. I also had the impression that they were taking my ideas seriously, whereas in 1986 I do not think they were very interested. They were studying history in a certain way, and what I was doing did not fit into the framework. But this time they were much more open-minded, much more flexible, and much more eager to learn what was being done in the United States. It was the same as coming here or to any university in Japan or elsewhere in the world. I try out my ideas and then get feedback. That is the only way I can make progress, by communicating with others.

That was the third time. I went back for the fourth time this year in September, which was very interesting. This was only the fourth time, but the second time in two years. So I was not that surprised by the change as I was last year, because until then I had not been for twelve years. This time I went to Beijing for three days and Tianjin for three days, and then went to a city north of Peking called Chengde, which is closer to the Manchurian border. The Qing dynasty had some houses in Chengde which were very interesting to see. At Tianjin I gave three presentations at Nankai University. The people who wanted me to come were from the
Center for Japanese Studies. Nankai University has a very good Center for Japanese Studies.

Yes, I was there.

Were you there?

In September of this year.

This was September...

I was there, too. There was a conference there.

Maybe we were even attending the same conference? It was September 18-20.

Well, I do not remember the exact dates. It was probably early September, September 11 or 12. There was a conference on mutual image among Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese.

Yes, they told me about that.

I was in that conference.

I think maybe I was there, too. It is very easy to communicate with students and scholars in China now. My presentations were at the Center for Japanese Students, which wanted me to speak in Japanese. A graduate student translated, an excellent graduate student who really did a first-rate job. I felt as if I were in Harvard or in any other place in the world. The students had all kinds of different questions to ask and comments to make, and I felt very good about being there. Particularly after my retirement, I have tried to spend some time doing these kinds of things, basically
exchanging ideas, which is good. Sometimes it can be quite exhausting, but, on the other hand, you can see young scholars and students from different parts of the world exchange ideas. It was really a wonderful exchange, and now that more and more people are opening up to international communication, you can do that. I enjoyed doing that in Korea in June, and I am going to Germany next month in Hanover to attend a conference. After Hanover I will go to Wuhan because in Wuhan, Shifan Daxue wants me to give a talk. I have agreed, so I will be in China for the fifth time next month.

_Do you think you have more professional contacts with Europe than Asia?_

Yes, in Europe, you are absolutely right. So that is why I am trying to do something about it, because I have been away from Asia for so long. I mean, I did go back to Japan to teach once a year in the 1980s and 1990s. But there was a long hiatus between 1986 and 1994, and between 1994 and last year, when I did not go to China. Much of the time I was in the U.S. and Europe. I spent one year in France in 1986 and 1987, and half a year in London in 1994. I tended to spend more time in Europe than in Asia, but now I think I am going to spend probably more time in Asia, or as much time in Asia as in Europe, because Asia is so much part of the international universe now, things are really going on. To meet scholars and students who are really doing something interesting, you have to come to Asia. There are parts of the world I do not know much about. I have hardly been to the Middle East. I have only been to Egypt and Turkey as a tourist, and I did spend one month in Israel, so I know a bit about the Middle East through these places. I have been to India for a conference and also to Singapore, because there was a student at Harvard from Singapore who talked about the Japanese study program in Singapore and wanted me to come. I guess I served on some kind of committee for the history department there. I have been to Hong Kong twice, and served on some kind of committee for the history department,
an external committee of review for a university in Hong Kong called Lingnan University.

So I am developing these Asian contacts, and I enjoy that very much. I am sure I will be coming back to Asia again next year. I do not really know what I will be doing next year—I mean, I have no teaching obligation as such, and my wife wants me to settle down a little bit, she is worried about my health. But so long as I can travel, I think I would like to do this kind of thing. 

*Maybe we will have you here to be our external examiner.*

This is very much a part of Asia that I am interested in. I have not been to Southeast Asia except for Singapore, so I do not know if I should think about that, too. I have never been to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, or Burma. I have not been to that part of Asia at all. I have been to Australia and New Zealand.

*When you went to Europe, did you go in the capacity of an expert on American history or an expert on Chinese history?*

In Paris, France, there is the Center for North American Studies, which is basically a graduate school-oriented institution. They invited me to come for a year. They have a program called American Civilization, as well as a chair in American civilization that had been established by an American foundation to invite one scholar in American history or American civilization for a year. I was extremely fortunate that they invited me. It was a chair in American civilization, but what I decided to do was to teach the subject I knew most—the history of American-East Asian relations.

My host there, Heffer, has been to Taiwan since then, and he and I are very good friends. He has written a book in French called *History of American-East Asian Relations*, which is an excellent book by a French scholar with a very European perspective. It is in French, and it came out about five years ago. It is about how a French scholar thinks about
American-Chinese and American-Japanese relations. Someone from an organization in Taiwan invited him to come here about five years ago, and he had wonderful time here. So I did go to France as an American history person, but with a focus on this kind of topic.

When I was in London, I was invited by the London School of Economics to teach a course there for six months. My appointment was to do international history and international relations. And recently I was invited to spend three months at the Free University of Berlin. After Berlin was divided, the major university in Berlin, the Humboldt University, belonged to East Berlin. So West Berlin built its own university, the Free University. They want me to come in January to do a graduate course with another person. It should not be too strenuous. They first wanted me to do international relations and American foreign affairs, but they are saying now that they want American history. So those are my kind of post-retirement activities—to visit these places.

*In all this teaching, do you devise different syllabi for different audiences?*

I think they are basically the same. I have done a lot of courses, but if I am doing, say, the history of international relations, whether it is in London, Harvard, Chicago, or Japan, it is basically the same. If I teach a new subject, I have to make up a syllabus. I have been teaching perhaps three years in Kyoto in Ritsumeikan University. The Department of International Relations there said they wanted me to teach a course called the History of Global Governance. Global governance has, of course, become fashionable as a way to understand the world today. How you visualize global governance that does not mean the U.N.? I tried to define that.

*Where is that university?*
It is in Kyoto.

*I guess that is how they fund you—you have to do something about global governance.*

I had to do some reading because I had never quite focused on global governance. It sounds more like social science than history. But it is a history course, a history of global governance. I go back to the nineteenth century and see if there was anything like global governance then, and then try to bring it to the present. It is an interesting subject. I try to focus more on the recent decades since 1950s, but for that I had to develop some kind of syllabus. If I did a course like that again, I would use that as a basic framework.

I think that the way you teach in Asia, the United States, or in Europe is mostly the same. Of course, the requirements are different. In the U.S. there are very specific course requirements like writing short essays, reading assignments, discussion sessions, and so on. Of course, at Harvard it is quite typical. Usually what I do is give three lectures a week, and then the students are divided into small sections and meet. The lectures are very specific about the assigned reading. The syllabus will say that for a particular week the students are supposed to read this book, or chapters from this book—a very specific requirement. They do not have that in Japan, so I was somewhat taken aback. In the Japanese case, they do not really have the system of assigned reading. I guess I am supposed to give them some kind of suggested readings, not assigned readings. I think it is a lecture syllabus rather than reading, whereas in the United States I think that reading is much more important than lectures.

*Before we break for lunch, I would like to pursue the syllabus question. Over all those decades when you have prepared your syllabi, how have*
you changed them or have they changed at all?

That is a very, very interesting question. It reflects my current thinking. It used to be that I knew nothing about the contemporary situation, and that I was not that interested. For example, when I began teaching in the 1960s, I had no particular interest or concern with current affairs. I was an historian, I thought, and was interested in history. History will normally end with the time period that you can research. In the 1960s, I could engage in some research on archives from the 1930s that had been opened up. So I could say with some confidence that I found some documents written in 1930s. But for the 1950s and 1960s the archives had not been opened up yet; most work done on the 1950s and 1960s had been written by political scientists, not historians. So I could maybe summarize what others had written about the Korean War. I had not done this research myself, and I did not spend too much time on the subject.

But later, in the 1980s and 1990s, I began to change my mind about that. I began to think that a historian could understand Asia in the more recent decades by putting it in some kind of broader context. More specifically, the context of globalization, or global governance today, or some of the other things I have touched upon, such as the growth of international connections and transnational bridges. I no longer hesitate to teach about more recent decades, so there have been some changes in that regard. But in the past, my outlines and contexts of teaching have not changed that much. For example, as for the nineteenth century, First World War, Second World War, or the 1920s, my understanding of these things has not changed that much and I do go back to my lecture notes. I used to prepare more detailed lecture notes when I was young. I think it is inevitable that when you first start to teach you just want to make sure you are doing your best. So I tried to put so much into my lectures. And, in many ways, the lecture notes that I prepared in the late 1960s and early 1970s are still the best. I do write lecture notes each time I teach a course,
but they are less and less elaborate as I teach the same subject every year. I pretty much know what I am teaching.

For instance, when I was new to this, I was much less confident and I really wanted to cover so much. So the lecture notes I prepared in 1968-69 and 1971-72, those are already 25 years old, but they are still probably the best of all the lectures notes I have prepared. The lectures have been changed since that time, but in terms of the quality of preparation, those years were my best.

Did you have different lectures for different audiences? Is there an implicit assumption that history is the same for different people and different communities?

Different meaning?

Yes, because you talk about social history.

Right, right.

How do you accommodate that?

To be very honest and frank, I cannot be somebody else. I am not a Marxist, so I cannot engage in Marxist discourse. I do not talk about anything I do not believe in. It seems that no matter what I try to do, where I am, or what audience I face, I usually talk about the same subjects. One difference is when I am asked to come to a non-scholarly audience, a non-university audience which sometimes I do, where ordinary people come together without education. There are organizations that want you to come and talk about things. These organizations are not too scholarly—that is, most of them have never read anything I have written or work by other scholars—so I try to speak somewhat broader. For these talks I am not meticulous about scholarly details. If there is any method, it
is that I want to communicate the same thing. Nowadays I tend to focus on globalization and international relations. I think that these subjects are something that audiences in all parts of the world are very interested in.

_What I mean is when you talk about social history to an ethnic audience with different perspectives. It seems that you are sensitive to different perspectives, to looking at history with different meanings. Sometimes we go to different countries to teach students. In other words, although we have different perspectives on history, do you think all these perspectives are about objective history so that they can be taught anywhere in the world? Would you consider adding national perspectives top-down, instead of just following this new trend?_

Well, I think I would not emphasize that. That is unless I was talking about how the Japanese viewed something, which would become a topic in itself. I do not feel what I am doing is particularly Japanese or anything like that. In my scholarly input, I have been more influenced by American historians in the United States. But I do not consider myself as American in that sense. I basically consider myself a historian, not a Japanese historian, not an American historian, but an historian. So if I go to a country and people want me to talk about a topic, I guess I have two choices. If they want me to say what I really think about something or to comment about the past, I do that as an historian. If they particularly want me to say what Americans were thinking, or what Japanese were thinking, that is a different story. It seems we should not give different stories to different audiences. You can respond to the audience’s interest. But in my own case, my own feelings, past, and background are quite important in the sense that what I learned in the United States and what I have tried to do has been to develop a view of the past that can be meaningful in all given contexts—social history, diplomatic history, and others.

I may have trouble talking to people in other disciplines. For example,
political science. When I go to a political science meeting—it does not matter if it is in the United States, China, or Japan—I may have more trouble making myself understood. Or economics. I am not an economist. I am an historian and do not really understand economics. If I go to an economics meeting, I do not know what they are talking about—actually, it makes no sense. But if I go to a historians’ meeting, my hope is that we can talk about history and communicate about history without having to always be conscious of our national identity, which is just one identity. People talk about identities a lot nowadays, and ask me how I identify myself and what my identity is. Maybe I should I reply that my first and most important identity is that I am an historian. I was born in Japan, and it is part of my identity, but I do not think that is most important. There are other identities to think about. In the United States, I am quite often hear the question “Where are you from?” They ask you this question in the United States: “Where are you from?” Mostly I do not say I am from Japan. I usually say I am from the Midwest or from Chicago, because I have spent more time in the Midwest and the Chicago area than anywhere else in the United States. Most Americans understand what I think, so they do not pursue me. But it is a matter of choice, how you identify yourself and what you feel strongly about.

In terms of image, about those people in China, France, or Great Britain, what do you think they expect from you? Do they consider you to be an expert in American history or diplomatic history, or something additional in that you have bought in Japanese perspectives? Or does this have nothing to do with it?

I feel that it depends. I know that in the French case and the British case, probably because they wanted me to teach a particular subject, I do not think that my nationality was a factor. If it was a factor, it was not the most important factor. When I was invited to go to Nankai University last month, it was because the Center for Japanese Studies invited me to talk
about to Japan and Chinese-Japanese relations. But I do not think they wanted me to talk about the history of Chinese-Japanese relations from a Japanese perspective, because I do not have any Japanese perspective. The Japanese perspective is much more nationalistic, and I am very much against nationalistic kinds of standpoints. I think they invited me to come because I had written something about Chinese-Japanese relations, and in what I have written I have tried to be more transnational and international than national.

Yes, I can imagine that is what the Chinese would expect. I think they like to invite scholars with Japanese backgrounds who are willing to be critical of Japanese wars.

I agree with that.

It is deeper, I guess. They do not just want propaganda.

Right, absolutely, that is very much the case. I was very happy to do that in China because Japanese history is becoming very nationalistic in daily education in Japan, with the textbook controversy and Ministry of Education causing problems. It is very nationalistic, so I have written a great deal against this trend, and discussed it this time in China. I was not just repeating official propaganda. I cannot do that, as someone who writes so much against official propaganda.

Sorry, can I just pursue you on this subject? Do you have any connection or discussion with scholars in Japan on this newly rising discourse?

Yes, I have. I try to do that as much as I can, because of course there are good people who are not very nationalistic. There are lots of them, but they are not well-organized. I think they try to avoid the limelight and to do their own work, and so they are not as well known as the more
nationalistic writers. Nationalistic writers, and particularly extremely nationalistic writers, write for the media all the time and produce very irresponsible publications. Monthly publications, weekly publications—they are all filled with nationalistic propaganda justifying war. The best historians do their own writing and publish their own work in academic journals, so they do not really communicate with the masses, with the people.

It is when they do that that they can be attacked. I mean, there was a very good man at Waseda University who is somewhat younger than me, a very good historian of Indonesia who has written about the Second World War and the Japanese occupation in Indonesia and other subjects. He is very good, very liberal, very antiwar, and he is very much for writing more critical textbooks. On the apology question, the big question of whether Japan should apologize or make amends for what it did in the war, he is on the side of those who argue that, yes, Japan should continue to explain itself, apologize, and make amends. There are people who continue to do that, but when he came to talk at some public meeting, he was attacked by the right-wing. As soon as they find out there is some kind of public event going on, the rightists send a truckload of people with a loud-speaker to protest against it. So he was attacked as unpatriotic. I have not been attacked like that because I am in and out and the right-wingers have a very difficult time catching me. I am mostly at the airport going to another country.

There is a good scholarship, but it is not as audible, as visible as is possible. But there are students from Taiwan, students from China who go to Japan to study with Japanese professors, and Japanese professors do not on the whole mistreat these students. They are not anti-Chinese or right-wing. On the Rape of Nanjing, the big issue of 1937, there are some very good scholars who continue to do their work. I think we have to work on that. There are some good people, and then there are the totally
irresponsible fascists.

_A Japanese scholar told me that, as he understands it, 95% of the Japanese academics support or are sympathetic with Formosa independence. But half of them are also pro-China, and this could not be understood by the Chinese at all._

I think it was pretty bad when Shinzo Abe became prime minister. At least he went to China. But he was such an unintelligent and irresponsible politician, I think it is a very good thing that he resigned. Fukuda is a much more decent person, and he has been much more low-key about nationalistic issues. My sense is that there are very few good politicians in Japan. Fukuda is 71. It is a shame that they had to go to an older person like him, but he is much safer in dealing with foreign policy than Abe was. Abe is something like twenty years younger than I am. He is 52 or 53, and he went to the same high school as I did. I think he is the worst example of my high school’s education and the worst graduate from my school. That is a terrible, terrible thing to say, but he is very ignorant. He and George W. Bush are probably two of the most ignorant leaders in the world today.

_Would you mind adding ours?_

Yes, you can add them.

_When did you first start paying such detailed attention to Japanese domestic politics?_

I have not paid that much attention. I was so horrified by Abe. I did follow the election between Aso and Fukuda after Abe resigned. I was in China when it began, so I followed it to some extent. As I said, Aso is awful. He is younger but more nationalistic and emotional, and so I was
hoping that Fukuda would win, and the fact that he did win at least gives us some good news. I mean, most news that comes from Japan is bad news. Fukuda’s selection was of the few good things that came out of the country recently.

*Do you pay an equal amount of attention to what is happening in Chinese politics?*

Right now I do not write about what is happening in Asia. All I know about Chinese politics is what I read in the papers. But if China goes in the direction of sustainable growth, or something they are talking about with due attention paid to environmental issues, I think that would be excellent. That is the only way China can survive, I think, by doing more about the environment. The Chinese scholars I have met are much more open-minded, much more flexible than they used to be twenty years ago, so I am hopeful that there will be progress between all these East Asian countries. Economically, a big question one could talk about is whether there will be something like an E.U., an East Asian community, a regional community. I hope that there will be such a community. But there are all kinds of hurdles before it can exist.

*We can talk about that later.*

--------*Ends*--------

The third and the fourth interviews were postponed due to Professor Iriye’s health condition.
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經歷
Stein-Freiler Distinguished Service Professor of History, University of
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Charles Warren Professor of American History, Harvard University,
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Professor of American Civilization, Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en
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Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 1992
Visiting Professor of History, Waseda University, Tokyo, summer term,
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Woodrow Wilson fellowship, 1957-1958
Yoshino Sakuzô Prize for “best essay on public affairs,” Japan, 1970
Guggenheim fellowship, 1974-1975
President, Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 1978
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ACLS fellowship, 1975-1986
Honorary doctor of letters, Wittenberg University, 1988
President, American Historical Association, 1988
Honorary doctor of letters, Kalamazoo College, 2001

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Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (Harcourt, Brace, 1967)
After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Harvard University Press, 1965)
China and Japan in the Global Context (Harvard University Press, 1992)
Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)
From Nationalism to Internationalism: American Foreign Policy to 1914 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977)
Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the
Making of the Contemporary World (University of California Press, 2004)

Holt World History: The Human Journey (Correlated to Mississippi Social Studies Framework, World History: 1750 to the Present)

Japan and the Wider World (Longman, 1997)
Pacific Estrangement: American and Japanese Expansion, 1897-1911 (Harvard University Press, 1972)

Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War (Bedford, 1999)

Philanthropy And Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations Japan Center for International Exchange; 1 edition (August 30, 2006) coeditor


The Cold War in Asia (Prentice-Hall, 1974)

The Global History Reader (Routledge Readers in History, 2004) coauthor


The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Longman, 1987)

The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History, 2009) coauthor
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